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INTRODUCTION
One of the more rational conclusions to emerge from
America's experience with the Endangered Species Act' is that
we need to manage ecosystems and protect biological diversity
on a scale larger than individual species on the brink of doom.
Supported by evidence of a decline in diversity and the crash of
environments on which all species depend,2 "ecosystem management" and "biodiversity" have become new catchwords in
the vocabulary of natural resources management.'
1. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
2. See EDwARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 280 (1992)

(estimating diversity losses in rainforest ecosystems at 27,000 species per
year, 74 per day, 3 per hour); see also REED F. Noss & ROBERT L. PETERS,
ENDANGERED EcOsYsTEMs: A STATUS REPORT ON AMERICA'S VANISHING
HABITAT AND WILDLIFE (1995) (documenting ecosystem and species decline).
3. The original voice of species diversity and ecosystem management is
Aldo Leopold, whose focus and publications evolved from wildlife management
to landscape management over two decades spanning the Great Depression
and the Second World War. Compare ALDO LEOPOLD, GAME MANAGEMENT

(1933), with ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949). Leopold's
maxim, "[T]o keep every cog and wheel is the first order of intelligent tinkering," id. at 190, has become a fixture in the emerging literature of conservation biology. See Reed Noss, From Endangered Species to Biodiversity, in
BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF ExTINCTION: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 227, 227 (Kathryn A. Kohm ed., 1991) (opening
with a continuation of the maxim: "We have not yet learned to think in terms
of small cogs and wheels"). Initially proceeding at a snail's pace and focused
on individual ecosystems, the literature exploded in the 1980s and shows no
sign of abating. Classics in the field include: O.H. FRANKEL & MICHAEL E.
SOULt, CONSERVATION AND EVOLUTION (1981); BRYAN G. NORTON, WHY
PRESERVE NATURAL VARIETY? (1987); REED F. NOSs & ALLEN Y. COOP-
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We now have to decide what these words mean. The difficulty is not to determine what, in the name of biodiversity and
with willing hearts, we can do to save species and the landscapes they inhabit, but rather, as pressures to develop these
landscapes continue to mount, what we cannot do. This Article
is a search for the "can't-do's," a bottom line without which diversity and ecosystem protection will remain laudable aspirations but something well short of law. It is a search for law to
apply.4
ERRIDER, SAVING NATURE'S LEGACY (1994); and WILSON, supra note 2. More
than 500 sources, nearly all published within the past 10 years, are cited in
WILLIAM S. ALVERSON ET AL., WILD FORESTS: CONSERVATION BIOLOGY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 259-86 (1994), and Noss & COOPEREIDER, supra, at 343-87.

Recent legislative proposals at the federal level include: the Northern Forest
Stewardship Act, H.R. 2421, 104th Cong. (1995); the Forest Biodiversity Act,
H.R. 2407, 104th Cong. (1995); the Endangered Natural Legacy Protection
Act, H.R. 2374, 104th Cong. (1995); the Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act, H.R. 852, 104th Cong. (1995); the National Aquatic Ecosystem Restoration Act, H.R. 4481, 103d Cong. (1994); the National Biological Survey Act,
H.R. 1845, 103d Cong. (1993); and the National Biological Diversity Conservation and Environmental Research Act, H.R. 1268, 101st Cong. (1989). A
review of state legislation and programs is presented in SUSAN GEORGE,
SAVING BIODIVERSITY: A STATUS REPORT ON STATE LAws, POLICIES AND

PROGRAMS (1996). The leading federal administrative proposals and initia-

tives are discussed in this Article.
4. Compared with scientific publications on the same subject, the legal
literature on biological diversity and ecosystem management is relatively
thin. Beyond writings focused on the Endangered Species Act, single agencies
(e.g., the Forest Service), or particular ecosystems (e.g., the Everglades), recent treatments include Scott W. Hardt, Federal Land Management in the
Twenty-First Century: From Wise Use to Wise Stewardship, 18 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 345 (1994) (proposing an expansion of the multiple-use doctrine); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem
Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994) (urging a federal ecosystem
management mandate); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the EverExpanding Web of Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for
Something Completely Different? 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 555 (1995) (proposing a

partnership between federal, state, and private agencies for private lands
conservation); Rebecca W. Thomson, Ecosystem Management: Great Idea But
What Is It, Will It Work, and Who Will Pay?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Win-

ter 1995, at 42 (raising good questions, but offering no answers); and Holly

Doremus, Comment: Patching the Ark; Empowering Legal Protectionof Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265 (1991) (proposing an extension of Endangered Species Act protections). For a jaundiced view of federal involvement in diversity and ecosystem protection, see Allan K. Fitzsimmons,
Federal Ecosystem Management: A Train-Wreck in the Making (Oct. 26,
1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (portraying ecosystem
protection as Big Brother trampling on private rights). Recent symposia on
the subject are found in Symposium on Ecology and the Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 847 (1994), and Biodiversity Symposium, 8 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1994).
While all of these articles contribute proposals to advance diversity and eco-
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This Article accepts as a given that biological diversity is a
desirable goal.' This Article also accepts, and bypasses, the
need for multiple approaches to diversity, including gap
analysis, dispersion corridors, zoning restrictions, tax incentives, transferable development rights, acquisition programs,
public-private partnerships, and other measures proposed in
the literature and in Congress. Last and not least, this Article
recognizes only briefly the achievement of the Endangered
Species Act in bringing the message of diversity to an oftenunwilling public.' It is not possible to imagine the serious, difficult conversations now taking place over western water management,7 coastal land development,8 the depletion of aquifers 9
and the impact of marine fisheries 10 without the existence of
endangered turtles, salmon, salamanders and their kin-and
the law that backs them up. Indeed, it might be said that the
Endangered Species Act is in trouble today not because it fails
to address diversity and ecosystems, but instead because it is
beginning to address them too well.
The question now is whether we can eliminate the middlemen of endangered species and get to the business of protecting their landscapes in a more straightforward fashion.
This Article begins its study of this question by considering
system management, none offers a legal standard by which diversity and the
larger landscape are to be protected. Such a standard, if it exists, and the
dangers inherent in acting without one are the subjects of this Article.
5. For the importance and value of biological diversity, see WILSON, supra note 2, and sources cited supra note 3.
6. See infra notes 518-540 and accompanying text (describing the Endangered Species Act and some of its effects). Comprehensive reviews of the
Act are presented in MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EvoLuTIoN OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW 329-83 (1983); DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION (1989); Oliver A.
Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277 (1993); and
James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A
CloseupLook from a Litigator'sPerspective, 21 ENvTL. L. 499 (1991). The role
of the Act in driving the federal government and, increasingly, non-federal
entities towards diversity protection and ecosystem planning is recognized by
the Act's supporters and skeptics alike. See Ruhl, supra note 4, at 579
(asserting that the Endangered Species Act is "Without question the center
point of the federal biodiversity regulation web").
7. See infra notes 546-548 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 553-556, 567-587 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 551 and accompanying text.
10. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322, 334 (5th Cir. 1988)
(affirming federal requirements that shrimp trawls use turtle excluder de-

vices).
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three special problems presented by diversity and ecosystem
protection. It then examines the experience of the National
Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the National
Marine Fisheries Service, and other federal resource managers
over the past ten years, as well as more recent advances in
multi-species management on private lands. Driven by these
case histories, the Article concludes that, however high we
raise our sights towards managing the whole, the requirements
of individual species will remain the bottom line, or we will
have no bottom line, and the entire effort will fail.
I. THREE CHALLENGES OF BIODIVERSITY AND
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
Any proponent of biological diversity or ecosystem management faces several challenges from the start.11 The first is
establishing what these terms mean. A second is appreciating
their biological requirements. A third, which overshadows the
exercise from start to finish, is appreciating the scale of what
diversity and ecosystem protection are going to entail.
A. DEFINMTION

The phrases "biological diversity"" and "ecosystem"13 have
textbook and scientific definitions that, while serving well in
11. Although the terms are different by definition, this Article takes the
risk of considering "biological diversity" and "ecosystem management" together as a single challenge to the law for two reasons. First, they are fimctionally interdependent, since biodiversity requires ecosystem protection and
functioning ecosystems require diversity protection. Second, they present the
same challenges to scientists, lawmakers and federal managers. This Article
further takes the correlation between species diversity and habitat conservation to be established beyond cavil. See WILSON, supra note 2, at 259-70
(discussing how the destruction of habitat leads to the destruction of species
diversity).
12. Biological diversity has been defined as "the variety of life and its
processes. It includes the variety of living organisms, the genetic differences
among them, the communities and ecosystems in which they occur, and the
ecological and evolutionary processes that keep them functioning, yet ever
changing and adapting." Noss & COOPERRIDER, supra note 3, at 5 (modifying
a definition developed by the Keystone Dialogue, Keystone Center, 1991).
Biodiversity is usually further described at four levels: genetic, species, community or ecosystem, and landscape or regional. Id. In case this explanation
was not sufficiently complex, the authors continue, 'Each of these levels can
be further divided into compositional, structural, and functional components
of a nested hierarchy. Composition includes the genetic constitution of populations, the identity and relative abundances of species in a natural community, and the kinds of habitats and communities distributed across the land-
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academia, become more elusive in the world beyond. Perhaps
as technically sound as any is that of the proposed National
Biological Diversity Conservation and Environmental Research
Act, which states:
[T]he term "biological diversity" means the full range of variety and
variability within and among living organisms and the ecological
or comcomplexes in which they occur, and encompasses ecosystem
4
munity diversity, species diversity, and genetic diversity.1

The Act requires all federal actions to be "consistent" with this
goal to the "maximum extent practicable" 15 and requires all
federal lands and waters to be "managed to conserve" biological
of the purposes for which those
diversity "within the context
6
areas were established."'
Is this law? Eliminate, for the moment, the modifiers
"maximum extent practicable" and "the context" of the original
purposes, loopholes through which, granted, large exceptions
slip daily. Assume that one is a conscientious agency employee
intent on carrying out the purpose of the Act, and imagine the
discussions that will arise. They will include:
1. Geographic Scale
It is well to speak of community diversity, but to do so begs
the question: what community, viewed from what distance?
For a timber harvest in the Shoshone National Forest, the
community could be lodgepole pine on the North Fork of the
scape." Id. (citation omitted). The difficulty of converting these definitions to
a legal concept should be apparent.
13. Wilson has defined an ecosystem as "[t~he organisms living in a particular environment, such as a lake or a forest (or, in increasing scale, an
ocean or the whole planet), and the physical part of the environment that impinges on them. The organisms alone are called the community." WILSON,
supra note 2, at 396. From this definition, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
has concluded that an ecosystem can be anything from "a drop of wate? to
"the entire biosphere." U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, AN ECOSYSTEM
APPROACH TO FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION 6 (1994). A recent study

identifies seven distinct federal agency definitions of ecosystem management.
Richard Hauber, Setting the Environmental Policy Agenda: The Case of Ecosystem Management, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 25 (1996).
14. National Biological Diversity Conservation and Environmental Research Act, H.R. 585, 102d Cong. § 3(1) (1991).
15. Id. § 5(b).
16. Id. § 5(c). This requirement of the Act is a prosaic restatement of one
offered by Aldo Leopold a half century ago: "A thing is right when it tends to
preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is
wrong when it tends to do otherwise." LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC,

supra note 3, at 39. Taken literally, few human undertakings would pass this
standard.
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Shoshone River, or throughout the Shoshone Forest, or the
Northern Rockies, or North America. And while we are at it,
lodgepole may exist in Russia as well. Consider the bald eagle,
which is well-distributed across Alaska. How should these
populations affect planning around a handful of breeding pairs
along the Verde River in southern Arizona? Or consider
salmon, endangered through most of the Pacific Northwest although some Alaskan stocks remain harvestable; to one Idaho
representative, there are plenty of salmon-on the shelves in
the grocery store. 17 For some resources, using a broad lens may
make communities that are locally-rare, such as eagles, seem
well-distributed and plentiful. On the other hand, locallyabundant resources, such as old-growth forest, may look inexhaustible through a small lens but imperiled when viewed
more broadly. This problem of scale is exacerbated by a companion issue: time.
2. Temporal Scale
We are asking agencies to plan for and protect the diversity of species and their supporting ecosystems as of when?
The arrival of Columbus, perhaps. But no reason jumps to
mind why we should ignore the effects of earlier Americans,
which could take us back to the saber-toothed tiger and the
woolly mammoth. Even using a more contemporary baseline,
we are left with many ecosystems that have been irreparably
altered-Manhattan, for example-and others that, while
theoretically capable of being restored to a natural state, are
committed to other uses, such as farming. These systems are
beyond change. These realities force us to make judgments
about acceptable baselines for diversity that have little to do
with mother nature or science. This difficulty with time is, in
turn, exacerbated by yet another companion issue: the alterations of nature itself.
3. Change
The more we learn about diversity, the more that knowledge confirms the fact of evolution, and the more we examine
ecosystems, the more we see ecosystem change. Populations of
17. See Goodbye, New West; Hello Lords of Yesterday: Dispatchesfrom the
Field, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Carson City), Nov. 28, 1994, at 7 (describing the
remark of Representative Helen Chenoweth (R-Idaho) that coho and chinook
salmon could not be endangered because "you can buy salmon in a can at Albertson's).
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species fluctuate, sometimes wildly, in the natural world. They
migrate, invade, get invaded. So, too, the habitats on which
they depend grow up, burn down, shift south or north, invade,
and get invaded. These observations, while by no means new,
have led to the proclamation of a "New Ecology," the ecology of
instability and change. 8 For the New Ecologists, the fact of
ecological change creates a need for "adaptive management."
In its extreme form, "adaptive management" ridicules attempts
to save anything in nature. Construed more modestly, it emphasizes flexibility, discretion, and a minimum of legal standards. 9 It is possible to accept the premise of New Ecology
without accepting its conclusions, which seem to slide over the
fact that, absent some external catastrophe, species evolution,
distribution changes, and major habitat alterations take place
over long periods of time. The threat today is not the fact but
the pace of change. That we will all change, and die, is no reason not to have rules against homicide. Nonetheless, we have
the difficulty of focusing on a target that is inevitably, if slowly,
in motion.
4. Role of Humans
If efforts to articulate the meaning of diversity and ecosystems trip over concepts of scale, time, and change, they fall flat
over the role of human beings in the landscape. Aldo Leopold
once observed: "Granting that the earth is designed for manthere is still a question: what man?"2 0 Aboriginal humans may
have been a harmonious part of their ecosystems, giving and

18. See generally DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEw
ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990). Symposia on this concept
include Symposium on Ecology and the Law, supra note 4, and Beyond the
Balance of Nature: Environmental Law Faces the New Ecology, 6 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'YF. 1 (1996).
19. Compare BOTRIN, supra note 18, at 8 (criticizing those who "emphasize
the benefits of doing nothing and assuming that nature will know best"), with
A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L-. L. REV. 1121, 1139 (1994)
(describing how the doctrine of "adaptive management" differs from strict
application of fixed legal rules). For a rebuttal to the New Ecology perspective, see Walter Kuhlman, Making the Law More Biocentric: Responding to
Leopold and ConservationBiology, 6 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 133 (1996)
(characterizing the New Ecology as homocentric and advocating landscapelevel protection).
20. Aldo Leopold, Some Fundamentalsof Conservation in the Southwest,
in THE RIVER OF THE MOTHER OF GOD 86, 96 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird Callicott eds., 1991).
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taking in kind, but those days have long since given way to
human and industrial development that have put a new face
on the earth. Manhattan is not exactly Eden-nor is most of
the public range-and the difference is people (and cattle).
One participant in an extended and ultimately fruitless roundtable on the "Colorado Model" for rangeland reform recently
summarized his experience as follows:
The Colorado discussions reveal that common notions of ecosystems
health and sustainability-notionsthat can be encoded in standards
and guidelines for western public lands-will not emerge because
range policy lacks mechanisms for exploring and reconciling different
perceptions of ecological sustainability. We are as divided as ever
over just what an ecosystem is, and have not yet even found words or
useful metaphors to carry on the much
needed public discussion on
2
the correcthuman role in ecosystems. '

We are left with a conundrum. No reasonable person could
suggest that human beings are not a part of the ecosystems
that sustain all life on earth. On the other hand, once diversity
and ecosystems are defined in terms of existing or future human activities, the terms lose whatever science and objectivity
they may have had. Ecosystems become simply whatever humans want them to be, and the concept migrates, like "multiple
use," towards a standardless, subjective call.
B. SCIENCE
The science of environmental law is difficult and demanding. Reasonable men differ and controversies rage over safe air
and water quality levels, the effects of pollution discharges,
and tolerance levels for carcinogens, mutagens, and reproductive toxins. Similar disputes rage over the environmental impacts of a dredged canal, an oil lease, or a wilderness road. At
times we may ask for more precision than science can deliver,
at which point no decision is tenable and the law breaks
down . 2
21. William E. Riebsame, People as Part of Ecosystems: The Case for
Rangeland Reform, REsouRcE L. NOTES, Apr. 1996, at 9, 11 (last emphasis
added).
22. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146,
1165-66 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (noting that, because of "limited scientific
knowledge of the effects of exposure to carcinogens at various levels," the EPA
Administrator "must use his discretion to meet the statutory mandate"); see
also Phillip D. Reed, The Trial of Hazardous Air Pollution Regulation, 16
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,066, 10,067 (March 1986) (describing the
stalemate produced by the Clean Air Act's "ample margin of safety" standard).
For these reasons, the EPA and Congress have gravitated away from science-
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Biodiversity and ecosystem protection make particularly
great demands on science. In decisions about air quality or
water pollution, at least we have had a handle on the variables:
one discharge, a few contaminants, and a targeted effect.
When it comes to the diversity of an ecosystem, however, there
are thousands of organisms in a spade full of soil.2 3 We have
identified and classified only a fraction of the living organisms
on earth.24 We know even less about their interrelationships.
Beyond a few "charismatic megafauna," we know little about
the biology of even those species sufficiently well-identified to
be listed under the Endangered Species Act.26
Despite these complexities, a growing number of scientists
have proposed decision-making constructs for diversity and
ecosystem conservation. One of the most succinct of these efforts has been offered in support of diversity "reserves," and offers the following principles:
1. Species well distributed across their native range are less susceptible to extinction than species confined to small portions of
their range.

based approaches in pollution control and towards more achievable technology-based standards. See Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds and BAT: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 410-22 (1994)
(discussing the inherent difficulty in generalized ambient standards and the
subsequent recourse to technological standards).
23. See WILSON, supra note 2, at 132-33; see also ALVERSON ET AL., supra
note 3, at 25 (citing a study finding 250,000 mites, representing 75 to 100
species, in a square meter of Oregon forest soils).
24. See Edward 0. Wilson, The Biological Diversity Crisis:A Challenge to
Science, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Fall 1985, at 21.
25. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EcOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 7
(1994) ("[U]nderstanding the ecology of an ecosystem will require collecting
and linking of large volumes of scientific data .... Furthermore, there is still
much uncertainty about how ecosystems function-uncertainty that contributes to strong differences in the interpretation of scientific evidence.").
26. See Reed F. Noss et al., EndangeredEcosystems of the United States:
A PreliminaryAssessment of Loss and Degradation,28 BIOLOGICAL REP. 1, 3
(1995) (declaring that "[sicientists cannot yet say with accuracy how much
land or what percentage of an ecosystem type must be kept in a natural condition to maintain" either species or the ecosystem itself); see also Michael G.
Gippert, NEPA-What To Do When the Information Is Incomplete, Unavailable, or Keeps Changing: MaintainingLegal Sufficiency in the Face of "New
Information!", CA45 A.L.I.-A.B_.A 329, 332 (1995) (quoting former U.S. Forest
Service Chief Jack Ward Thomas: "[N]ot only are ecosystems more complex
than we think-they are more complex than we can think"). In another arti.
cle, Dr. Thomas concludes, "When is the information base adequate to support
emotionally laden, economically explosive decisions so that all parties will be
satisfied? The answer, likely, is never." Jack Ward Thomas, Wildlife in OldGrowth Forests, FOREST WATCH, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 13, 15.
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2. Large blocks of habitat containing large populations of a target
species are superior to small blocks of habitat containing small
populations.
3. Blocks of habitat close together are better than blocks far apart.
4. Habitat in contiguous blocks is better than fragmented habitat.
5. Interconnected blocks of habitat are better than isolated blocks,
and dispersing individuals travel more easily through habitat resembling that preferred by the species in question.
6. Blocks of habitat that are roadless or otherwise inaccessible to
humans are better than roaded and accessible habitat blocks. 7

These principles have been echoed in other scientific literature2 8 and federal documents,2 9 and they are "widely accepted" by ecologists and conservation biologists. 0 No statement that A is "better than" B, however-as accurate as it
might be-constitutes law. It does not say that B may not be
done, or establish conditions or limits for parties who want to
do B. It does not even require anA-B compromise.
Now if the "better than's" were to be removed from these
principles, we would have absolutes. 31 Indeed, for resources
management we would have something that looks like designated wilderness, which is certainly law to apply. But only a
limited amount of public or private land is classified as wilder-

27. NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 3, at 141.
28. See ALVERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 93 ("Big reserves ... will be
necessary to sustain sensitive elements of diversity over the long run."); Robert Peters et al., Standard Scientific Proceduresfor Implementing Ecosystem
Management on Public Lands, in THE ECOLOGICAL BASIS OF CONSERVATION:
HETEROGENEITY, ECOSYSTEMS AND BIODIVERSITY 320 (S.T-. Pickett et al.
eds., 1997). By way of disclosure, the author contributed to the latter work
29. See COUNcIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, INCORPORATING BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS INTO
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT 7 (1993) (noting the preference of large, connected "blocks of
natural habitat" to conserve biodiversity).
30. NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 3, at 141 (citing a report listing five
reserve guidelines recognized by many specialists).
31. In fact, the authors do drop the "better than's" in a later description of
principles for forest resources management. See NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra
note 3, at 206-09 (providing more detailed recommendations for preserving
landscapes).
32. See Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994). The Act
essentially prohibits development or permanent intrusion in designated wilderness areas.
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ness.3 3 For the remainder, large landscape protection is more a
goal than a bottom line.
CONSEQUENCES AND THE STATUS Quo
All environmental laws have to confront the status quo, or
there would be little reason for them in the first place. What is
unique to biodiversity and ecosystem planning is the scale of
that confrontation. The Endangered Species Act has enough
difficulty bringing its protections to a relative few, if expanding, habitats of listed species. When we start planning for the
needs of all species, great and small, common and rare, across
the mosaic of landscapes that are America, we make demands
of new magnitude. The first lesson of conservation biology
about perpetuating species and ecosystems over time is the
need for Major Space-Large Tracts of Undisturbed Landscape.3 4 Planning around a few endangered species was irritating enough to land managers and developers. Leaving large
landscapes undisturbed will send them up the wall.
The status quo, moreover, is not a level playing field.
What is commonly called free enterprise is fueled by federal
subsidies that encourage the development of the most sensitive
natural areas in America.3 5 Real estate development--even on
C.

33. As of January 1992, approximately 95 million acres of the public lands
were classified as wilderness. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL.,
FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAw 1032 (3d ed. 1992).
34. See Noss & COOPERRIDER, supra note 3, at 205 (making recommendations for forest reserve management); Noss et al., supra note 26, at 17
(noting the inadequacy of small, isolated samples of ecosystems and calling for
the use of large, interconnected landscapes). "In the near term, few regions
are likely to have reserves large and numerous enough to maintain the full
spectrum of nature species and ecological and evolutionary processes. But
without reserves we might as well throw in the towel." Noss & COOPERRIDER, supra note 3, at 205.
35. A recent U.S. Department of Interior report identifies 45 major federal subsidy programs encouraging the development of wetland ecosystems.
See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS ON
WETLANDS (1994) (analyzing the relationship between wetlands and federal
programs). For current federal projects impacting natural areas, see The

Green Scissors Campaign of Citizens United to Terminate Subsidies, The
Green Scissors Report: Cutting Wasteful and Environmentally Harmful
Spending and Subsidies (Jan. 1995) (on file with author); for additional subsidies see Elizabeth Losos et al., Taxpayers' Double Burden: Federal Revenue
Subsidies and Endangered Species (1993) (on file with author). For an analy-

sis of subsidies to a single industry, see Roland Hwang, Money Down the
Pipeline: Uncovering The Hidden Subsidies to the Oil Industry (Sept. 1995)
(on file with author); Bruce Alpert, Royalty Holiday Ok'd for Oil, Gas, TIMES-

PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 9, 1995, at Cl ("After intense lobbying by an
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beach dunes, floodplains, and high alpine meadows-is encouraged by $70 billion a year in federal income tax deductions.36 Similar deductions, price supports, and federal projects
underwrite large-scale ecosystem conversions from wetland
drainage to arid-land agriculture to residential cul-de-sacs at
highway interchanges.37 The most useful step the federal government could take to assure the diversity of species and the
ecosystems on which they depend is simply to stop subsidizing
their destruction. No one is predicting that this step will be
taken.3 8
The status quo is further tilted by psychological dependencies of a new dimension. Over time, if with great difficulty,
environmental law could address the problems of pollution control: we installed scrubbers and paid for them in our utility
bills, took the lead out of gasoline and continued to drive.
Large-landscape conservation challenges deeper assumptions
about animals and humans, about the purpose of forests, about
the primacy of man on earth. 39 No other objective in environmental law questions more how people live and think than preunusual alliance of Oil Patch lawmakers and the Clinton administration, the
House... voted overwhelmingly Wednesday for a royalty holiday on deepwater oil and gas leases .... ").
36. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, home mortgage interest deductions cost the U.S. Treasury $45.5 billion in 1994 with a five-year
projected cost of $253.9 billion. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
103D CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FIsCAL YEARS
1994-1998, at 13 (Comm. Print 1993). Additionally, $100 billion in incentives
over five years in the form of tax free roll-overs, exemptions, and real estate
tax deductions were also made available.
37. The primary facilitators of bottomland drainage, arid-land agriculture, and suburban development are public works projects of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, and Federal Highway Administration, respectively. See Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 371 (1994)
(proclaiming arid-land irrigation as a mission of the Bureau of Reclamation);
DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DOCUMENTATION, CHRONOLOGY AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS OF BOTTOMLAND HARDWOOD HABITAT LOSS IN THE LOWER MISSISSIPPI ALLUVIAL PLAN (Nov. 1979) (describing the relationship of Corps
projects to wetland loss).
38. Efforts to take such a step have been made. See Bruce Alpert, Subsidies Targeted by Labor Chief,TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 8, 1994, at
C1 (marking the proposed elimination of oil and gas royalty exceptions); see
also Public Resources Deficit Reduction Act, H.R. 721, 104th Cong. (1995)
(seeking to eliminate federal subsidies for natural resource depletion).
39. See Oliver A. Houck, Reflections on the EndangeredSpecies Act, 25
ENVTL. L. 689, 697-99 (discussing the psychological dimensions of this conflict). See generally JOHNMCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE (1989) (describing
continuing efforts to tame the Lower-Mississippi River and other natural
forces).
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serving ecosystems and biological diversity. No less is the
challenge to land and resource managers, who have been
trained to consider grass, trees, wildlife, and other resources as
"outputs" to be maximized by human intervention. Along
comes a new doctrine that says: Leave It Alone. The idea extends beyond the pocketbook; it says that the way we have
lived and the skills we have learned are wrong-headed, harmful, and 4in
need of change. None of this is easy medicine for
0
the soul.
Against such economic and psychological forces, laws
based on aspiration alone will not suffice. Indeed, they have
never sufficed in environmental law, nor have statutes authorizing agencies to take protective measures as they see fit. The
reality of natural resource law is that commodity users have
overridden the good intentions and the discretionary language
of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 4' the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act, 42 the National Forest Man-

40. Outbreaks of hostility and lawlessness continue to be directed toward
those proposing to modify the status quo to accommodate endangered species.
See Bomb Rips Building in Nevada, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 1,
1993, at A5 (describing a bomb explosion at offices of the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM)); The Conservation Fund, Pipe Bomber Targets Forest
Service Ranger, LAND LETTER, Sept. 1, 1995, at 6 (describing a bomb attack at
a Forest Service employee's home); Pattern of Violence Out West Alleged,
TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 13, 1996, at A2 (citing 58 incidents of
violence against federal land managers in the West, including assaults on five
federal workers and shots fired at six others). Beyond the level of physical
violence are regular reports of firings, transfers, and demotions of state and
federal employees attempting to secure environmental protections. See
ALVERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 240 (relating the dismissal of a Forest
Service biologist); Tony Davis, BLM Chief Jim Baca Leaves Amidst Cheers
and Boos, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Carson City), Feb. 21, 1994, at 1 (noting the
reaction of a New Mexico Cattle Growers Association spokesperson to the
resignation of BLM Chief Baca: "One down and 99 to go"); Adam Duerk, BLM
Manager in Wyoming Gets Trampled, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Carson City),
Feb. 22, 1993, at 3 (reporting on the transfer of BLM grazing manager for
proposing grazing reductions); Timothy Egan, Forest Supervisors Say Politicians Are Asking Them to Cut Too Much, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1991, at Al
(describing "intense political pressure" from Congress that Forest Service
employees resist "at the risk of their own jobs"); Todd Wilkinson, Utah Ushers
Its Frogs Toward Oblivion, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Carson City), May 27, 1996,
at 1 (describing the firings of state biologists for research on disappearing frog
populations).
41. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994); see infra note 58 and accompanying text
(discussing the failure of multiple use as a management standard).
42. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994); see infra notes 429-437 and accompanying text (discussing the Acefs difficulties in bringing conservation to singleuse range management)
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agement Act,4 3 and similar statutes without breaking stride.
Whatever the statute, and however well-intentioned the implementing agency, what Justice Holmes once described as the
"hydraulic pressure" of "immediate interests"' will wear it
down. Authorizations to protect languish, "shall's" become
"may's," and "may's" simply disappear. Tough odds call for
precise law.
Specificity, then, becomes the greatest challenge to any
law seeking to protect biological diversity and ecosystems. On
one level, it is a question of wrestling potentially limitless
questions of scale, time, baselines, and scientific complexity to
the ground. On another level, it is a question of standards sufficient to wrestle the most powerful economic forces in the
country, if not to the ground, to something closer to a draw.
In this quest for specificity, however, we need not start
from scratch. The U.S. Forest Service has been dealing with
diversity for the past twenty years. Its experience provides a
first guide.
H1. THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE EXPERIENCE
Federal planning for biological diversity began with-and
until recently pretty much ended with-the U.S. Forest Service, whose history of resource management extends back a century to Gifford Pinchot and Smokey the Bear.45 Originally es43. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994); see infra Part HIA (describing the Acts
spotty record in diversity planning). Some indication of the power of the
status quo in forest management can be gleaned from the following data: according to the incoming chief of the U.S. Forest Service, by the year 2000, recreation will account for $97.8 billion of the $130.7 billion generated by uses of
the national forests, while fish and wildlife will generate another $12.9 billion;
timber will generate only $3.5 billion. See Jon Christensen, The'Shotgun
Wedding of Tourism and Public Lands, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Carson City),
Dec. 23, 1996, at 12, 13. These disparate revenue potentials notwithstanding,
the U.S. Forest Service's fiscal year 1997 budget proposes to spend $196 million on timber sales administration, $93 million on timber-related road construction, and $164 million on recreation management. See Natural Resources Budgets for Fiscal 1997, LAND LETTER, Oct. 20, 1996, at 4. Whatever
its potential for the future, timber continues to wag the dog.
44. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and
before which even well settled principles of law will bend.").
45. Gifford Pinchot, the first Chief of the U.S. Forest Service, is largely
credited with its origin, and multiple-use philosophy. See STEWART L. UDALL,
THE QUIET CRISIS 102-08 (1967). Smokey the Bear, the Service's durable
mascot and symbol, was the brainchild of a toy manufacturer and the equally

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:869

tablished to protect "forest reserves" from wildcat logging, the
Forest Service's priorities shifted massively towards timber
production after the Second World War." The National Forest
Management Act 47 attempted to restore the balance with new
planning requirements, including one specifically for biological
diversity. These diversity regulations were developed by a
committee of experts in forestry and wildlife sciences whose
foresight remains, nearly twenty years later, remarkable. The
experience of these regulations is our closest guide to what
works in diversity and ecosystem planning.
The Forest Service began serious consideration of the impact of its operations on wildlife species in the 1930s, under the
impetus of general wildlife legislation and Service biologists
such as Aldo Leopold, who were studying the relationship of
habitat to wildlife and all living things.4 8 A respectable cadre
of wildlife scientists supported research and management activities until the Second World War and the subsequent, postwar timber boom. 9 By the 1950s, even as the agency was escalating its timber production to heroic proportions,5" it was also
conducting modest-if largely ineffective-planning for wildlife. The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 196051 encouraged the Service to continue these planning efforts, leading to
the development of two compatible but differing approaches
towards wildlife management. 2 The first emphasized "species
entrepreneurial President Theodore Roosevelt, who saw its potential for promoting a new conservation ethic. See generally SAMUEL TRASK DANA, FOREST
AND RANGE POLICY: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1980)
(providing an overview of the early history of the Forest Service).
46. See DANIEL R. BARNEY, THE LAST STAND 69-105 (1974) (describing the
Forest Service's swing to massive timber production); CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 135-41 (1992) (describing the Forest Service's
swing to massive timber production); see also infra note 50 and accompanying
text (providing statistics of timber production following World War II).
47. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994).
48. See Aldo Leopold, The ConservationEthic, 31 J. FORESTRY 634, 641
(1933) (promoting wildlife conservation); Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael
Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L.
REV. 1, 283 (1985) (noting Aldo Leopold's leadership in the Forest Service's
wildlife conservation policy).
49. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 48, at 285 (highlighting the
post-war boom).
50. Before the end of the Second World War, the annual cut from the
natural forests averaged 1 billion board feet; it jumped to 3.3 billion in 1944,
to 4.4 billion in 1952, and to 12.1 billion in 1966. Id. at 135-38.
51. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994).
52. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 48, at 288-89 (providing an
overview of the emergence of diversity in wildlife management). The "species
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richness" with the goal of ensuring that wildlife species within
the planning area were maintained in viable numbers. In
practice, this method, while broadly inclusive, proved short on
the specifics necessary to ensure species viability. 3 The second
approach looked to "featured species," the needs of which could
be accommodated in timber harvests and other uses. This approach worked best for selected game animals (whose lot was
often improved by clearcutting and other habitat modification),
and for threatened species with limited habitat needs. 4 In
terms of biological diversity, however, the "featured species"
approach was long on specifics but short on coverage. Since
that time, diversity planning has continued to rely on these
two primary approaches to the job.
A. THE FOREST SERVICE DIVERSITY REGULATIONS
In 1976, diversity planning was boosted forward by the
"most adventurous congressional incursion" into the activities
of the Forest Service,55 the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA)." Buried within the Act's many compromises over
competing uses of forest resources was the nation's first and
only explicit statutory provision for the protection of biological
diversity. Section 6(g)(3)(B) directed the Service to:
provide for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the
suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to meet
overall multiple-use objectives, and within the multiple-use objectives
of a land management plan adopted pursuant to this section, provide,
where appropriate, to the degree practicable, for steps to be taken to

richness" and "featured species" summaries that follow are taken from this
account.
53. See id. at 288 (citation omitted) (noting the absence of specific, prescriptive standards for wildlife species).
54. See id. at 289.
55. Id. at 7.
56. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994). Commentators widely hailed the Act
as providing substantive law for forest management. See Jack Tuholske and
Beth Brennan, The National Forest ManagementAct: JudicialInterpretation
of a Substantive Environment Statute, 15 PUB. LAND L. REv. 53, 54-56 (1994).
In the words of one forestry expert: "When the NFMA was enacted in 1976, I
had a great feeling of accomplishment. I felt that the law clearly stated what
must and must not be done." Id. at 67. (citing Arnold W. Bolle, The Bitterroot
Revisited: A University Re-view of the ForestService, 10 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1,
5-9 (1989)). Mr. Bolle, Dean of the University of Montana School of Forestry,
conducted a study of Forest Service practices that was instrumental in the
passage of NFMA. See Bolle, supra, at 1-15. Little did he know how few
"must's" and "must nots" would be found.
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preserve the diversity of tree57 species similar to that existing in the
region controlled by the plan.

Left to its own devices, this provision would not travel very
far. At first blush its language reads almost as a parody of law,
qualified by no fewer than two provisos: "where appropriate"
and "to the degree practicable," and, were anything left, by the
eviscerating "in order to meet multiple-use objectives," a stan-

dard that has consistently failed to limit agency decisions. 8

The legislative history of this section, however, tells a quite different story about what was intended and, indeed, said. The
diversity provision of NFMA was a seriously debated and conscious attempt by the Act's leading sponsors to curb the conversion of hardwoods to other species and to forestall monoculture forestry.5 9 In context, the use of the term "multiple-use
objectives" was intended to limit the reduction of forest diver-

sity to a few dominant species.

0

Departures from the principle

57. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (1994).
58. See infra notes 165-174 and accompanying text (illustrating failure of
the concept of multiple use to restrain even the most single-use decisionmaking); see also Sierra Club v. Marita, 843 F. Supp. 1526, 1556 (E.D. Wis. 1994)
(rejecting challenge to the Forest Service's Implementation of the Act); Intermountain Forest Indus. Ass'n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. 1330, 1336 (D. Wyo. 1988)
(finding no irreparable harm resulting from sale of timber); National Wildlife
Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 592 F. Supp. 931, 938 (D. Or. 1984)
(vacating a judgment and thereby failing to enforce a more stringent reading
of the act), appeal dismissed, 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986); Dorothy Thomas
Found. v. Hardin, 317 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (W.D.N.C. 1970) (allowing sale of
timber despite Multi-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960); infra notes 217-223
and accompanying text (discussing failure to enforce stringent standards). In
the words of one forestry expert, "[T]he real problem was timber primacy,
which now dominated and controlled Forest Service activity. This marked a
clear departure from the broader Congressional concept of multiple use as
earlier conceived." Bolle, supra note 56, at 11. See generally Michael C.
Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the PublicLands: Why Multiple Use Failed,
18 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 405 (1994) (criticizing multiple use as a management
standard); George Cameron Coggins, Of Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous
Platitudes: The Meaning of "Multiple Use, Sustained Yield" for Public Land
Management, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 229 (1982) (analyzing the dismal record of
multiple use as a management standard).
59. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 48, at 170-73, 292-96 (noting
the intent of the sponsors).
60. Id. at 172-73. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey sought to "elevate wildlife and ecological values in relation to timber," id. at 171, while Senator Jennings Randolph-through his own bill, introduced concurrently with Humphrey's proposal--"sought to prohibit any action in a national forest that
would result in significant loss of fish or wildlife habitat." Id. at 292. The two
senators, however, "were united in their concern that timber management
had taken top priority at the expense of other forest resources." Id. at 293.
The language of the Humphrey bill requiring planning regulations to "provide
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of species diversity would be allowed only where justified on
the basis of "overall" multiple-use objectives, that is to say, objectives other than timber." The burden of this justification
lay on the Service.6 2 When Congress said "multiple-use" in
Section 6(g)(3)(B), it was not thinking license; it was thinking
constraint.
Congress went one step further. In order to make the new
limitations on timber management a reality, Congress directed
the appointment of a Committee of Scientists to assist the Forest Service in developing regulations that would flesh out these
provisions and become, in effect, the law of NFMA.63 The
Committee's recommendations on managing for diversity were
to become the state-of-the-art.
The Committee of Scientists approached this task with
more dedication than Congress had any reason to expect.
Meeting eighteen times over a year and a half in public meetings across the country, the Committee assisted the Forest
Service staff in drafting regulations, and commented extensively on the initial draft, before it prepared a final draft with
comments and a summarizing report.64 During this process,
for plant and animal communities based on the suitability and capability of
the specific land area," became the basis of the NFMA diversity requirement,
but the final bill incorporated an amendment, offered by Senators Metcalf and
Bumpers, that drew heavily from Senator Randolph's bill. Id. The language
"multiple use objectives" was added by the committee staff tasked with merging
the Metcalf amendment with the Humphrey bill. Id. at 294. The principal
drafter of the bill, James Moorman, explained: 'he basic injunction... is to
preserve the natural diversity of forest types and species." Id. at 292 n.1561.
61. Senator Bumpers asked Chief McGuire: "[Y]ou can only do
[conversions] for one purpose in the long run; that is for timber production. It
is not compatible with multiple use; is it?" Id. at 172 n.891 (alterations in
original). The question was rhetorical.
62. In the words of the most comprehensive analysis of this legislation
and its history, "The agency must be able to justify the conversion in terms of
the 'overall,' nontimber resource objectives." Id. at 172.
63. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h) (1994).
64. The Committee of Scientists, composed of seven experts in forestry
and wildlife biology appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture, held 18 public
meetings between May 1977 and January 1979. See Supplementary Final Report of the Committee of Scientists, 44 Fed. Reg. 53,967 (1979). The Committee issued its final report in May 1979, Final Report of the Committee of Scientists, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,599 (1979), and a supplementary final report in
August 1979. Supplemental Final Report of the Committee of Scientists, 44
Fed. Reg. 53,967 (1979). The Forest Service adopted the Committee's recommendations in September 1979. See 36 C.F.R. § 219 (1996). In 1982, the Department of Agriculture proposed changes in the regulations. See 47 Fed.
Reg. 43,026 (1982). In the face of a substantial and adverse public response,
the Department convened a panel of members of the former Committee of
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the concept of diversity was one of the most "perplexing issues"
faced, as well as one of the most contentious.6 5 At least six different draft versions of the diversity ("fish and wildlife") section were circulated and reviewed. 6 At one pole were those
who saw Congress's diversity language as entirely (and appropriately) discretionary. 67 At the other were those who, feeling
that the "lure of monetary returns" would continue to produce
"biological deserts" and "unstable [forest] communities," urged
68
great specificity to ensure that diversity would materialize.
The Committee opted for the latter approach, urging as much
specificity as science could usefully bring
to bear. The Com69
mittee saw specificity as "mandatory."
In reaching this conclusion, the Committee reasoned that
Congress intended not only that diversity be "considered" in
forest planning, but that it be achieved. The Committee rejected the use of "diversity indices" as more mechanistic than
useful, and declared it "impossible" to prescribe regulations to
identify the ingredients of diversity "in all regions, in a wide
variety of vegetation types, and with a wide range of natural
and human factors." 70 By the same token, the Committee felt
impelled to develop regulations that went beyond the minima
of the Act to "assure" that the Forest Service would "indeed
'provide for' diversity by maintaining and preserving existing
variety."" The first step would set a baseline of the natural
forest: "species and community diversity ...at least similar to
Scientists. See id. The final amendments left the diversity provisions largely,
but not entirely, intact. See infra notes 72-86 (describing the final amendments).
65. See Final Report of the Committee of Scientists, 44 Fed. Reg. at
26,602 (noting criticism of proposed regulations).
66. See id. at 26,627.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 26,609; see also id. at 26,604 (discussing the specificity issue);
Supplemental Final Report of the Committee of Scientists, 44 Fed. Reg. at
53,968 (same).
69. The Committee explained:
Section 219.10 contains language intended to meet some of the most
difficult and demanding requirements of RPA/NFMA. Therefore,
adequate regulations in this section are mandatory. Although the
language of the draft regulations is a reasoned approach by the Forest Service... it often falls short of the specificity necessary to establish appropriate guidelines and standards in these critical and controversial areas.
Final Report of the Committee of Scientists, 44 Fed. Reg. at 26,626-27
(emphasis added).
70. Id. at 26,609.
71. Id.
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that which would be expected in unmanaged areas in the region."72 The second would be to maintain "viable populations of
all existing native vertebrate species," and "habitat of management indicator species."73 This approach echoed the viable
populations and indicator species approaches of yore, with two
strengthening amendments: the Service was to maintain all
native vertebrate species, and it was to select indicator species
primarily,
not on the basis of their local popularity but instead,
74
for their role as indicators of ecosystem change.
In its final comments and report the Committee defended
the specificity of these regulations: it was "simply not possible
to carry out the planning requirements of NFMA in accordance
with a set of regulations that contain nothing but generalities."75 The Committee also defended its reliance on species diversity and abundance against arguments that Congress made
no particular reference to these factors in the Act: the "kinds
and numbers [of species] are the biological ways that diversity
is measured."7 6 The Service was to use indicator species to
achieve diversity of the whole.
And so it did. The Forest Service's final biological diversity requirements are contained in two sections of its planning
regulations. Section 219.27, entitled "Management Requirements," provides the goal and the baseline:
(g) Diversity. Management prescriptions, where appropriate and to
the extent practicable, shall preserve and enhance the diversity of
plant and animal communities, including endemic and desirable
naturalized plant and animal species, so that it is at least as great as
that which would be expected in a natural forest and the diversity of
tree species similar to that existing in the planning area.7

72. Id. at 26,653; see also Supplemental Final Report of the Committee of
Scientists, 44 Fed. Reg. at 53,975 (stating that diversity should be at least as
great as that which would be expected in an unmanaged part of the planning
area). The Forest Service would convert this baseline from an "unmanaged
area" to the "national forest," a conversion of which the Committee disapproved. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(g) (1996). The consequences of this apparently
innocuous change would appear a decade later. See discussion infra part
II.B.5(a) (discussing lessons learned, specifically from problems with an everchanging baseline).
73. Final Report of the Committee of Scientists, 44 Fed. Reg. at 26,653.
74. See id. (describing these amendments).
75. Supplemental Final Report of the Committee of Scientists, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 53,968.
76. Id. at 53,975.
77. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(g) (1996).
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Granting the modifiers and the qualifiers, there is no escaping
that the goal is the diversity of the natural forest. The regulation continues:
Reductions in diversity of plant and animal communities and tree
species from that which would be expected in a natural forest, or
from that similar to the existing diversity in the planning area, may
be prescribed
only where needed to meet overall multiple-use objec78
tives.

Departures from the goal of natural forest diversity face a
heavy burden of proof.
The second requirement is contained in Section 219.19,
entitled "Fish and wildlife resource."7 91 It is specific and prescriptive: Habitat "shall be managed to maintain viable populations" of existing species; that is, populations with sufficient
numbers and distribution "to insure" that the species remains
"well-distributed in the planning area."80 The standard is both
numerical, "a minimum number of reproductive individuals,"
and spatial, habitat that is "well distributed" to facilitate interaction and breeding.' Notable here is the obligation "to insure" the viability of these populations, language that would
seem to call for cautious assumptions in favor of the species. 2
Notable also is the absence of qualifiers and escape clauses.
The standard may be difficult, but it is plain.
Section 219.19 then prescribes a mechanism by which diversity shall be identified and managed through management
indicator species (MIS).83 The Service must select species
whose "population changes are believed to indicate the effects
of management activities." 4 Five categories of species "shall be
78. Id. The regulation further explains that planned conversions need to
justify their relation to "the process of naturalchange." Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id. § 219.19.
80. Id.
81. Id. In 1982, however, the Forest Service moved to qualify its responsibilities here by adding, to their obligation to maintain and improve habitat
for management indicator species, the phrase "to the degree consistent with
overall multiple-use objectives." Id. § 219.19(a). This qualifier was seen as
necessary to allow some modification of habitat otherwise relied on by species.
It did not purport to qualify the agency's duties to ensure viable welldistributed populations across the planning area. See Wilkinson & Anderson,
supra note 48, at 303 n.1614 (identifying the change in language).
82. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 48, at 298 (indicating the requirement that planners allow for contingencies, including fire, disease, and ecological changes).
83. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1).
84. Id. In the scheme and language of the regulations these species are to
be those sensitive to, and indicative of, change. See Final Report of the

1997]

LAW OFBIODIVERSITY

891

represented where appropriate":85 species truly indicative of
habitat changes, species that may be significantly influenced
by management programs, game species, non-game species of
"special interest," and threatened and endangered species. 86 In
the world envisioned by the Committee and the regulations,
the protection of these species and their habitat needs would
have become goals of proactive forest planning, with each species identified and monitored to ensure, in turn, a diverse forest ecosystem. In the more mundane world of a commoditydriven forest program, they became instead a defensive, biology-based bottom line-and a legal battleground.
B. FOREST SERVICE DIVERSITY PLANNING AND THE COURTS
Environmental statutes rarely settle controversy, nor do
their implementing regulations. At best, these statutes and
regulations set the outer limits for battles in which the same
arguments that were compromised in the legislative and rulemaking processes reappear, eventually, in court." With the
NFMA regulations, the argument would continue between
those who believed that NFMA vested, and should vest, maximum discretion in the Forest Service and those who believed
that the law had to, and did, limit that discretion in significant,
enforceable ways. On the ground, the Forest Service did not
suddenly become less interested in cutting timber and more interested in preserving diversity. The same institutional, economic, and congressional pressures remained. The history of
diversity planning since NFMA has been one of enormous inCommittee of Scientists, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,599, 26,627 (1979) (stating that the
species should be selected because their population changes are believed to
indicate effects on other species).
85. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1). Language amplifying the "where appropriate" modifier was considered and abandoned by the Committee of Scientists.
It was also abandoned by the Forest Service in its original regulations, but
inserted in its 1982 amendments without further explanation. Wilknon &
Anderson, supra note 48, at 301. Whatever the term might mean, it does not
appear to remove the Service's obligation to select species that are sensitive
indicators of ecosystem change. Id. at 302.
86. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1).
87. This phenomenon is common to all statutory law, and has been well
described in relationship to the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Al Kamen, De.
spite Bill's Signing, Fight Has Just Begun: Second Front Opens Over Rights
Law's Meaning, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1991, at A14. ("Those fights-a major
source of employment in Washington-are generally the stuff of trade and legal journals and industry publications, even though the infighting often lasts
much longer and consumes much more time, energy and money than the fight
over the bill itself.") So it would be with NFMA.
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stitutional resistance, with sufficient countervailing pressure
from advocates of wildlife diversity to produce grudging but
equally enormous change. 88 Where diversity planning has
made its greatest strides, it has been with the aid of judicial
review that saw the Forest Service's discretion clearly bounded
by Section 219. Where diversity planning has failed to alter
the pre-NFMA status quo, it has done so with the approval of
courts who saw a very different set of regulations, if indeed
they saw regulations at all.
Courts have decided more than two dozen federal cases on
Forest Service diversity issues since 1980, the majority of them
quite recently. Many of the cases became interrelated as the
litigants struggled with the convolutions of standing, ripeness,
and the relationships of NFMA, the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), and the ESA. 89 This Article will not recapitulate these cases. Rather, it will attempt to determine what
this line of litigation says about the effectiveness of standards
for the management of biological diversity. To that end, we
have two kinds of stories. One story emerges from the Pacific
Northwest and from Alaska, where diversity planning has produced nothing short of dramatic change. The other story
emerges from forest controversies in Wisconsin, Arkansas,
Texas, and elsewhere, where diversity planning has had considerably less impact to date. The difference lies, in large part,
in how reviewing courts have perceived the diversity standards
themselves.
1. The Pacific Old-Growth Forest
No environmental issue in recent memory has generated
as much public attention, passion, and litigation as the conflict
between timber interests in the old-growth forests of the Pacific Northwest and the forests' most famous resident, the
northern spotted owl.9"
To the President of the United
88. Many of these wildlife advocates have come from the ranks of the
Service itself, including the Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (AFSEEE). See Solicitation Letter from Dave Iverson,
President, AFSEEE 1 (undated) (on file with author).
89. See infra Part II.B.1-ll.B.5 (summarizing the cases and the various
results in different areas of the country).
90. For a sampling of the legal literature surrounding this issue, see generally Alyson C. Flournoy, Beyond the "SpottedOwl Problem":LearningFrom
the Old-Growth Controversy, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 261 (1993) (suggesting
ways to avoid future spotted owl problems); Victor M. Sher, Travels With
Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey Through the Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND.
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States-and much of the general public-this was an endangered species issue, and there is no doubt that its several outcomes were driven by the ESA. 91 They were also driven, however, and were in fact initiated by, use of the owl as an
indicator species under NFMA.
From the outset, the northern spotted owl was viewed as
the symbol of an ecosystem. The Forest Service had listed it as
a management indicator species for old-growth forest in the
1970s, 92 with little effect on timber sales. By the 1980s, federal
agencies held nearly 90% of the owl's remaining habitat, the
vast proportion of it on Forest Service and Bureau of Land
93
Management (BLM) lands that remained open for logging.
Together, the two agencies were selling old growth at the rate
of 86,000 acres a year.9 4 By the 1990s,
perhaps 10% of the
95
original old-growth forest remained.
Environmental plaintiffs brought suit in Washington,
challenging Forest Service sales on the basis, inter alia, of
NFMA. 96 They also filed in Oregon, challenging BLM timber
sales under NEPA, the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (FLPMA), and on related grounds. 97 The cases were soon
complicated by the listing of the owl as a threatened species
(another lawsuit),98 a petition for the listing of its critical habiL. REV. 41 (1993) (providing a chronology of the litigation); Steven L. Yaffee,
Lessons About Leadership From the History of the Spotted Owl Controversy,
35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 381 (1995) (discussing agency inability to deal with the
changing social and political climate).
91. See Michael Wines, Bush, in Far West, Sides With Loggers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, at A25 (quoting President Bush's characterization of
the ESA as a "sword aimed at the jobs, families and communities of entire
regions").
92. See Sher, supra note 90, at 43.
93. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination
of Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114,
26,118 (1990) (describing, inter alia, the habitat locations for the Northern
Spotted Owl). (hereinafter Final Rule)
94. See, e.g., INTERAGENCY SCIENTIFIc COMMITTEE, A CONSERVATION
STRATEGY FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL 14 (1990) [hereinafter ISC
REPORT]; Final Rule, supra note 93, at 26,182.
95. See J.A. Savage, Timber Companies Can'tSee the Forestfor the Trees,
BUS. & SOcY REv., Summer 1990, at 44 (citing statement of F. Dale Robertson, Chief of Forest Service, regarding the timber remaining in the Pacific
Northwest).
96. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, Nos. C89-160WD, C89-99(T)WD,
1991 WL 180099, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 1991) (order on motions for summary judgment and dismissal).
97. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1989).
98. See Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D.
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tat (another lawsuit),9 9 an appropriations bill apparently exempting the sales from environmental laws for the next two
years (another lawsuit),l"' and an interagency report recommending a conservation plan for the owl (another lawsuit) 0 1
In March 1991, however, the federal district court in Washington granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the NFMA
claim.102 The ruling was based squarely on the diversity regulations, under which the "minimum requirement is that '[ftish
and wildlife shall be managed to maintain viable populations
of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in
the planning area.'" 0 3 This duty extended "to the entire biological community-not for one species alone,""°4 and was not
preempted by the ESA or other subsequent law. 05
In May 1991, the district court granted an injunction
against the sales, 10 6 finding again that the Service had not
adopted a plan "to ensure the owl's viability." 7 Again, the
court saw the issue beyond the owl. Citing a recent report that
the bird was "inextricably tied to mature and old-growth forests," 10 8 the court noted that "the fate of the spotted owl has become a battleground largely because the species is a symbol of
the remaining old-growth forest."10 9 It was the classic indicator
species.
The Forest Service was by no means ready to surrender.
On appeal the Service argued-breathtaking as this argument
may now appear-that it had no responsibility to consider the
owl as an indicator species because, as an endangered species,
Wash. 1988) (invalidating the Service's decision not to include the northern
spotted owl on the endangered or threatened species list).
99. See Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 629-30 (W.D.
Wash. 1991) (ordering the Service to designate critical habitat for the northern spotted owl).
100. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir.
1990) (upholding the appropriations bill).
101. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1085 (W.D.
Wash.), aff'd, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing the creation of the Interagency Scientific Committee and its conservation strategy).
102. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, Nos. C89-16OWD, C89-99(T)WD,
1991 WL 180099, at *13 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 1991) (order on motions for
summary judgment and dismissal).
103. Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Evans, 771 F. Supp. at 1096.
107. Id. at 1085.
108. Id. at 1088.
109. Id.
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it no longer "indicated" anything."
With some restraint, the
Ninth Circuit pointed out that the Service's diversity regulations specifically required the use of endangered species as indicators and, besides, to do otherwise "would be to reward the
Forest Service for its own failure[]"' to maintain viable populations in the first place.
Following this defeat, the Service prepared new owl management guidelines, which came back to district court in early
1992.112 The new management guidelines constituted a tradeoff, permitting "further, near-term loss of owl habitat in return
for later recruitment of new habitat"1 in future reserve areas.
The new management guidelines approved the logging of
nearly half a million acres in the "near term"1 14 over the next
fift years. The question was whether the owl could take that
much of a hit. The court declined to defer to the Service's discretion concerning the issue and deemed the Service's optimistic assurances questionable based on the competing concerns of
non-Service biologists." 5 The Service's admission that its plan
would have only a "low to medium-low probability of providing
for viable populations""6 of old-growth species other than owls
further troubled the court. "NFMA and its implementing
regulations plainly [do] not allow the agency to plan the extermination of native vertebrate species."1 7 The court followed
this ruling with an injunction a few months later, again emphasizing the diversity violations. 1 ' The injunction declared
that to adopt a plan that might save the owl while sacrificing
other species "would defeat the purpose of monitoring to assure
general wildlife viability."" 9 The injunction also noted that the
use of an indicator species did not diminish the separate obligation of the Service to maintain well-distributed, viable
populations of existing species. The injunction and its ration-

110. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir. 1991).
111. Id. at 301.
112. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473, 1476 (W.D.
Wash. 1992).
113. Id. at 1478.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 1480.
116. Id. at 1483.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1484. The Seattle Audubon Society initially challenged the
new regulations in the Spring of 1992 and filed a request for injunctive relief
in the Summer of 1992. See id.
119. Id. at 1489.
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ale were upheld on appeal.120 The Service went back to the
drawing board.
Meanwhile, a series of lawsuits stalled BLM timber sales
in Oregon, based on "the uncertainty about the ability of the
spotted owl to survive as a species." 2 1 At this point President
Clinton intervened, convening a Forest Summit of all affected
interests and establishing a Forest Ecosystem Management
Assessment Team (FEMAT) of scientists, economists and other
government experts. The President instructed FEMAT to develop options to maintain biological diversity, sustainable levels of timber production and local, timber-dependent communities.1 22 No small task.
FEMAT was up to the job, which it viewed as nothing less
than achieving an "ecosystem approach to forest management."123 The Team evaluated fifty-four alternatives against
biological indicators, thirty-five in more detailed review, and
ten in a final review. l24 The assessment considered the effects
of these ten options on more than one thousand animal and
plant species.125 The primary indicator, however, and the
measurement for the degree of protection it would afford, was
the spotted owl. At bottom, the question was how much old
growth would be opened to logging, and in what fashion and
how much would be reserved. The final options ranged from
reserving 11.4 million acres of old-growth forest, the option favored by the environmental community, to reserving only 5.4
million acres; timber production ranged from 1 to 1.8 million
board feet. 26 After extensive public hearings and written
comment, FEMAT recommended (1) outright reserves keyed
primarily to the needs of the spotted owl and other deep forest
120. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1993).
121. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489, 1493 (D. Or.
1992) (citing Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1485 (D. Or.
1989)).
122. See FOREST EcOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM, FOREST
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: AN ECOLOGICAL, EcoNoMIc AND SocIAL AsSESSMENT, at i-iv (1993) (explaining FEMAT's purpose and goals). At the

helm was Dr. Jack Ward Thomas, a well-respected biologist with the Forest
Service and soon, largely on the basis of FEMAT's work, to become the Service's Chief Forester. See Yaffee, supra note 90, at 401 (discussing Dr. Thomas's contributions to FEMAT and their significance).
123. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1310 (W.D. Wash.
1994), aff/d, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996).
124. See id. at 1303.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1304.
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species, (2) additional circles of protection around known owl
habitat in the areas open to timber harvest, (3) additional restrictions along the coast and key watersheds to protect the
marbled murrelet and aquatic species, and (4) an ongoing
monitoring and evaluation program. 127 Of the remaining oldgrowth forest, about 10 million acres would be reserved and 1.3
million released for logging.'2 8 Logging would be reduced 73%
from timber sale levels of the 1980s that were even then, in the
opinion of the court, unsustainable. 129 On the other hand, even
with these reductions, the plan offered
only an 80% chance for
130
the northern spotted owl's survival.
Environmental groups and the timber industry both challenged the plan, leading to important interpretations of the
federal diversity regulations. The district court upheld the ex131
haustive FEMAT recommendations against both challenges.
Environmentalists objected that if the plan offered the owl and
murrelet an 80% chance of survival, it also offered them a 20%
chance of extinction. 32 Moreover, they noted that the plan
faced a significant threat from logging in the near term. Species would expand and stabilize in new habitat, at best, only
over a long period of time. With risk this high, no amount of
additional logging could be condoned until the populations
were better recovered. The court upheld FEMAT's judgment.
It went on to note, however, that "careful monitoring [would] be
needed to assure that the plan [in fact] maintains owl viability."133 The court emphasized that "[n]ew information may require that timber sales be ended or curtailed."'34 In finding the
viability projections adequate, the court was influenced by the
fact that achieving greater assurances would eliminate all
competing uses of the forest, i.e., timber, and, reading between
the lines, threaten the success of FEMAT's compromise. 135 To
reach this conclusion in law, the court interpreted the viability
requirement of the diversity regulations to be qualified by

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id. at 1306.
See id. at 1305.
Id. at 1306.
See id. at 1316.
See id. at 1291-92.
See id. at 1320-21.
Id. at 1321.
Id.
See id. at 1320-21.
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"multiple use objectives," 13 6 a doubtful proposition because the
viable population requirement, as noted earlier, is not qualified
by multiple use or any other modifier. 137 As a practical matter,
on an issue so controversial, political, and apparently accommodating to the needs of the owl, a more absolute guarantee of
viability was not in the cards. Hard cases make bad law.
The timber industry challenged the heart of diversity
planning itself. The timber industry pointed out that nowhere
in NFMA did Congress mention indicator species or viable
populations. 138 The court found both concepts appropriate,
however, concluding that "[dliversity... can exist only if individual species survive." 139 The court also dismissed the industry's argument that BLM lacked statutory and regulatory mandates for diversity protection, noting that diversity planning was
in accordance with the agency's responsibilities under FLPMA,
the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA), and
related laws. The timber industry also challenged "ecosystem
bas[ed]" planning 4 ° as beyond the multiple-use principles of
MUSYA and NFMA. Quoting an earlier decision that NFMA
"requires planning for the entire biological community-not for
one species alone," the court held that "[g]iven the current
condition of the forest, there was no way the agencies could
comply... without planning on an ecosystem basis." 14 1 Multiple use itself cannot be provided when native species are extirpated.
Against the timber industry's complaint that the
owl's range served as indicia of the needs of other species, the
court replied exactly so. "The owl [had] long been an indicator
43
species" and this was the way indicator species worked.

136. Id. at 1316.
137. See supra notes 51-85 and accompanying text (discussing the history,
development, and application of multiple-use objectives).
138. See Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1315.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1310.
141. Id. at 1311.
142.

See id.

143. Id. at 1312. The industry also attacked the diversity baseline, which
it characterized as "pre-European settlement." Id. at 1311. Noting that the
plan found a return to pre-European conditions unattainable, the court approved the more modest objective of reversing "the management trend of the
last 50 years." Id.
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As the dust settles on this extraordinary saga,'4 it is hard
not to conclude that, while viability requirements are difficult
and demanding, 145 they generate results that would otherwise
be unimaginable. 146 A second conclusion, likely to go unnoticed
as the nation and its media move on to new controversies, is
that these results did not shut down the Forest Service, the
timber industry, or economic development in the Pacific
Northwest. 147 They provided for a transition from a status quo
that was clearly unsustainable, even in the absence of environmental law.
2. The Tongass Forest of Alaska
As controversial as planning for the northern spotted owl
and the Pacific old-growth forests has been, the concept of diversity has met an even greater challenge in the Tongass National Forest of Southeast Alaska. The largest national forest
in the United States, nearly 17 million acres of "soaring mountain peaks, narrow fords, lush woods and more than a thousand named islands,"4 ' the Tongass has been openly committed to single-use management to a degree that precluded even
consideration, much less planning, for biological diversity.149

144. The Ninth Circuit affirmed these opinions in Seattle Audubon Society
v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996).
145. See Jack Ward Thomas, Wildlife in Old-Growth Forests, FOREST
WATCH, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 13 (summarizing his conclusions from the FEMAT
exercise and declaring that "[tihe biology of certain wildlife population and
habitat relationships is not conducive to precise estimates, no matter how
much they are studied"). While Mr. Thomas's comments are doubtless accurate, the demands on science here are no different than those imposed for the
development of, inter alia, the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act standards. Scientists make their best guesses, and we live with the resulting
numbers. See Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(upholding toxic standards involving multiple educated guesses and arbitrary
safety factors for two chlorinated pesticides).
146. See Flournoy, supra note 90, at 301 ("American resource protection
law ensured that the most effective, if not only, strategy for challenging the
management of old-growth forest on publicly-owned lands was to rely on a
species as a surrogate for a broader range of values.").
147. See Timothy Egan, ForestService Abusing Role, DissidentsSay, N.Y.
TIdES, May 4, 1994, at A9.
148. Jim Grode, Comment, The Tongass Timber Reform Act: A Step Towards Rational Management of the Forest, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 873, 873
(1991).
149. See Steven A. Daugherty, Comment, The Unfulfilled Promise of an
End to Timber Dominance on the Tongass: Forest Service Implementation of
the Tongass Timber Reform Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 1573, 1576 (1994); see also
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Historically, the Tongass has not been about resource management. Instead, it has been about providing local lumber
mills more timber than any other forest in America. 5 From
this unlikely venue has come the most advanced and comprehensive example of species-based diversity planning yet seen.
It has not been an easy journey, and it is not yet over.
The Tongass, for its sheer size, climate, topography, and
biota, is unique to the world. Five hundred miles long and 120
miles wide, the forest is an archipelago of mountainous islands,
rivers, marshes, lagoons, and bays. Receiving more than nine
feet of precipitation a year in some regions,15 ' the Tongass is
one of the few remaining temperate rainforests. 5 2 It harbors
800-year-old Sitka spruce with diameters of ten feet and more,
hemlock 200 feet in the air, spawning streams for 90% of
southeast Alaska's salmon, and the highest concentrations of
grizzly bears and bald eagles on earth.'5 3 The key to its diversity is the old-growth forest itself, which absorbs the rain, traps
the snow, shelters wintering wildlife, holds the soil, filters the
runoff, offers snags and dens for smaller mammals, and provides shade and riffles for aquatic life in54an economy of work
hammered out through eons of evolution.
Of its 18.8 million acres, about a third of the Tongass is
classified as productive forest.' 55 Of these forests, about 5 million acres are production old growth and only 11% of those
acres are rated as high volume old growth, the most valuable
both to wildlife and to the timber industry.156 For the last fifty
years, timber sales have focused almost exclusively on the high
volume stands. 157 Forty percent are gone.' 58 The remaining
60% are the prize.
In 1947, Congress launched the first of a series of initiatives aimed at developing a timber-based economy for southeast Alaska. The Tongass Timber Act of 1947 authorized the
Grode, supra note 148, at 884 (noting that "[t]he only value protected in any
meaningful way on the Tongass has been that of the timber industry").
150. See Daugherty, supra note 149, at 1583-87 (detailing the history of
high volume timber harvests on the Tongass).
151. See id. at 1581.
152. See Grode, supra note 148, at 873.
153. See id. at 873-74.
154. See id. at 874.
155. See Daugherty, supra note 149, at 1581.
156. See id. at 1582.
157. See id. at 1583.
158. See id. at 1582.
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Forest Service to sell Tongass timber despite the claims of Native Americans to the land. 159 In the 1950s, as long-term supply contracts were being phased out in most of the nation's forests, the Service encouraged the construction of two large pulp
mills adjacent to the Tongass with fifty-year contracts promising 13.25 billion board feet of timber. 160 Congress followed in
1980 with a $40 million a year subsidy for timber production in
the Tongass, and a guarantee to make 4.5 billion board feet
available per decade. 61 Lest concern for the capacity of the
land to support these harvest levels get in the way, Congress
further exempted the Tongass from those provisions of NFMA
requiring the Service to reserve those forest areas physically,
economically or otherwise unsuitable for production. 62 The
Tongass thus became, and became understandable only as, a
large public works project. In 1988, nearly half a billion board
feet of old-growth forest were cut and sold at bargain prices. 6 3
At a time when most Forest Service regions were at least covering their costs in timber sales, on the Tongass the Service was
getting back as little as eight cents on the dollar.16
Environmental lawsuits and, eventually, reform legislation were inevitable. Although initially couched in other language and other provisions of law, the Tongass litigation was
from the outset about preserving biological diversity. The first
cases were grounded in MUSYA 65 If ever a proposal were to
violate multiple use it would have to be the timber sale at issue
66 In
in Sierra Club v Hardin.'
1958, only six-tenths of 1% of
the Tongass commercial forest lands were reserved from log-

159. See -R.J. Res. 205, 80th Cong., 61 Stat. 920, 920-21 (1947) (authorizing
the sale of timber from the Tongass "notwithstanding any claim of possessory
rights" by Native Americans or others).
160. See Daugherty, supra note 149, at 1583-84.
161. See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96487, § 705(a), 94 Stat. 2371, 2420 (1980) [hereinafter ANILCA].
162. See id. § 705(d), 94 Stat. 2420 (mandating that the subsidy and harvest provisions apply despite any limits imposed by the NFMA).
163. See Grode, supra note 148, at 880 (stating that "the mills' cost of processing alone has sometimes been greater than the market price of the logs").
Half of the harvested timber is used for pulp and half is made into raw logs
for export to Japan. See id. at 876.
164. See id. at 880.
165. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994). MESYA requires that the resources of
the national forests be administered "for multiple use and sustained yield of
the several products and services obtained therefrom." Id. § 529.
166. 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971).
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ging; 99.4% were to be cut. 167 At 8.74 million board feet, covering 1.09 million acres of land, 168 the proposed sale would have
been the largest sale in Forest Service history.1 69 The Service
justified the sale by asserting that 95% of the commercial forests in southeastern Alaska were occupied by "overmature
stands of hemlock, spruce and cedar... [which] should be removed by clearcutting methods as soon as possible."'70 It was a
policy which the reviewing court characterized as nothing less
than "liquidation of the old-growth forests in [sloutheastern
Alaska."17 1 Although one might conclude that liquidation of the
prevailing ecosystem from an entire region might impair such
other multiple uses of that ecosystem as hunting and fishing,
the court reduced the question to a procedural one: whether
the Service had given "due consideration" to non-timber production values.17 2 Floundering over what "due" might mean,
the court interpreted "due consideration" as "any" consideration.7 3 Since the Service had given some consideration to the
information available, multiple use was satisfied. 174
The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision explicitly on multiple-use grounds,7 5 holding that due consideration was not a
license but a caution to ensure that multiple-use factors were
"rationally taken into balance." 7 6 This requirement could
"hardly be satisfied by a showing of knowledge of the consequences and a decision to ignore them."'77 Whatever legal potential this holding may have offered for the Tongass and

167. See id. at 122.
168. See id. at 104.
169. See id. at 104 n.4.
170. See id. at 122 (citing Forest Service guidelines).
171. Id.
172. See Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 123-24 (D. Alaska 1971)
(concluding that, because the Forest Service followed appropriate procedures
in making the decision to sell Tongass timber, "the court is forbidden to go
further and substitute its decision in a discretionary matter for that of the
Secretary").
173. See id. at 123 n.48 (considering possible definitions of the term "due
consideration," concluding the term is "impossible to define," and holding that
"some" consideration was sufficient to satisfy MUSYA).
174. See id. at 123-24 (presuming, lacking evidence to the contrary, that
the Service gave due consideration to values outlined in MUSYA).
175. See Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,292,
20,292 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1973) (addressing whether the contested contract
violated the "due consideration" requirement of MUSYA).
176. Id. at 20,293.
177. Id.
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MUSYA, new environmental statutes would now take over the
action.
The next serious jolt to the timber-only management of the
Tongass was sparked by a decision in far-off West Virginia,
declaring that the practice of clearcutting violated the Organic
Act of 1897, which established the national forests and
78
authorized logging only of marked and identified stands.
This opinion was quickly taken to Alaska, where it was seconded,17 9 leading to pressure from the timber industry for a
new forest management law. The result was NFMA, 180 which,
while it did not ban clearcutting, imposed planning requirements 181 that set yet another stage for litigation. NFMA created particularly acute tensions on the Tongass because of the
Service's existing long-term contracts and the encouragements
of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(ANILCA).182 The Service simply concluded that, whatever
NFMA, NEPA and MUSYA might say about multiple use and
diversity planning, the Tongass was different. Lawsuits would
test that assumption.
An extended series of cases brought by the City of Tenakee
Springs and environmental groups challenged the Service's
183 At
first NFMA plan and subsequent sales on the Tongass.
178. See West Virginia Div. of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc., v.
Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 948-54 (4th Cir. 1975) (concluding, after extended analysis
of its text and legislative history, that the Organic Act of 1897 requires selective timber cutting in National Forests, and that clear-cutting therefore violates the Act).
179. See Zieske v. Butz, 406 F. Supp. 258, 260 (D. Alaska 1975) (issuing a
permanent injunction against any cutting of trees other than as required by
the Organic Act).
180. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614) (1994)) (amending the Forest and Rangeland Renewable
Resources Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (1974)).
181. See National Forest Management Act § 2, 90 Stat. at 2952-54
(outlining criteria and required provisions for land and resource management
plans for the National Forest System).
182. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text (listing ANILCA
provisions which encourage continued timber harvesting of the Tongass).
183. In the first round of the Tenakee Springs litigation, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's denial of an injunction against construction of a
logging road through a national forest. See City of Tenakee Springs v. Block,
778 F.2d 1402, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985). The court held that the Service's land
management plan was not immune from review under ANILCA and that the
contested project's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was not sufficiently site specific. See 1d. A district court subsequently granted the City's
motion to enjoin construction of a different road covered by the EIS at issue in
the first case, and ordered the Service to supplement the EIS in accordance
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bottom was the issue of whether the liquidation of the Tongass
remained a given, driven by the existing long-term contracts,
or whether NEPA and NFMA had ushered in a new day and
new environmental values. In 1990, the Ninth Circuit held
that the Service was required to consider the alternative of
terminating its pre-existing contracts, breaking the great taboo.184 How the Service might have responded to this order will
remain conjectural because Congress stepped in to change the
rules of the game.
The Tongass Timber Reform Act of 1990 (TTRA)18 5 took
important steps to restore balance to the Tongass. It also,
however, continued to vest the Service with considerable discretion over most of the remaining old-growth forest. The purpose of the TTRA was "to create a more appropriate balance
between timber harvesting and other uses of the natural resources" of the Tongass. 186 The Act repealed ANILCA's' 8 timber supply guarantee, automatic $40 million subsidy, 188 and
partial exemption from NFMA.' 89 It set an additional one million acres of the forest off-limits to commercial logging, 190 and
called for buffer strips around anadramous fish streams and
best management practices for other watersheds. 9 ' For the
remainder of the forest, the TTRA required the Service to provide a timber supply that meets market demand, but only "to
the extent consistent with providing for the multiple use and
with the Ninth Circuit ruling. See City of Tenakee Springs v. Courtright, No.
J86-024 CIV., 1987 WL 90272, at *5 (D. Alaska June 26, 1987). In the final
round, a district court denied the City's motion for a preliminary injunction
based on the inadequacy of the supplemental EIS, see City of Tenakee Springs
v. Clough, 750 F. Supp. 1430, 1433 (D. Alaska 1990), but the Ninth Circuit
again reversed and remanded. See City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 915
F.2d 1308, 1314 (9th Cir. 1990). On remand, the district court again denied
permanent injunctive relief, and the Ninth Circuit this time affirmed, arguing
that the matter was resolved by intervening legislation. See City of Tenakee
Springs v. Franzel, 960 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1992).
184. See Clough, 915 F.2d at 1312 (holding that "the Service's failure even
to discuss, much less evaluate, the consequences of terminating, suspending
or amending its contract necessarily implicates the environmental and subsistence interests of the plaintiffs").
185. Pub. L. No. 101-626, 104 Stat. 4426 (1990) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 539(d) (1994)).
186. H.R. REP. No. 101-84, pt. 1, at 4 (1989).
187. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text (summarizing relevant provisions of ANILCA).
188. See Tongass Timber Reform Act of 1990 § 101, 104 Stat. at 4426.
189. See id. § 102, 104 Stat. at 4426.
190. See id. § 201, 104 Stat. at 4428-29.
191. See id. § 103(a), 104 Stat. at 4426-27.
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sustained yield of all renewable forest resources." 19 2 The uncertainty of this language is apparent, mirroring those many
buck-passing mandates that infect nearly all natural resources
law. To environmentalists, the key was multiple use, supported by the full requirements of NFMA. To most Service decisionmakers, the mandate remained satisfaction of annual
timber demand. But some members of the Forest Service were
now released to take multiple-use planning, and NFMA diversity regulations in particular, to heart.
Back in 1990, the Service had established an Interagency
Team-chaired by a Service biologist-to examine with particularity the diversity requirements of the forest and their interaction with various harvest scenarios.19 3 Like its sister oldgrowth controversy to the south, the bottom line would be how
much old growth should remain, in what configuration, and
where. Unlike the Pacific old-growth planning, however, this
exercise was not driven by the needs of a single, bellwether
species. It would be multiple species based. It would start
where the Pacific experience had stopped.
The Interagency Report began with unaccustomed frankness. Previous Forest Service analyses of wildlife distribution
and population viability on the Tongass were "lacking in thoroughness and scientific merit."194 For a scientifically defensible
approach, the Team selected eight vertebrate indicators of
Tongass old growth, reviewed the literature concerning their
195
spacial and habitat needs, and created a plan to meet them.
Essential to the analysis was the quantification of the needs of
a "well distributed" population, which the Team characterized
as a population with "a high likelihood of occurring within each
192. Id. § 101, 104 Stat. at 4426.
193. See Lowell H. Suring et al., A Proposed Strategy for Maintaining
Well-Distributed, Viable Populations of Wildlife Associated with Old-Growth
Forests in Southeast Alaska 3 (May 1993) (review draft, on file with author).
194. Id.
195. The Committee created its plan in five steps: it reviewed prior conservation efforts by the Service, identified species that may have either viability or distribution concerns, documented the best information available and
the need for research, proposed management standards to maintain habitat
capable of supporting "viable, well-distributed populations" of old-growth
species, and consolidated proposed management standards into a conservation strategy for the long term. See id. at 12-13. To select the eight species
used to formulate the plan's details, 17 criteria were assessed. See id. at 1320. The eight "species of concern" identified were: great blue heron, northern
goshawk, gray wolf, brown bear, marten, mountain goat, northern flying
squirrel, and river otter. See id. at 4.
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10,000 acre watershed within its current range." 96 Armed
with such objective criteria, the Team could arrive at numbers,
and it did. At the heart of the Team's plan was the creation of
unmanaged and lightly-managed preserves called Habitat
Conservation Areas (HCAs).' 97 Large HCAs were designed to
accommodate wide ranging indicator species such as the goshawk and the brown bear with enough space to resist stochastic events and allow populations to recolonize unoccupied areas. 198 These large HCAs were mapped at twenty-mile
intervals with a minimum of 40,000 acres, including at least
one pristine watershed and 10,000 acres of dense old growth.' 99
Medium HCAs were designed to provide habitat for small, local
populations prone to frequent local extinction; mapped at
eight-mile intervals, they totaled 5,000 acres each, half in
dense old growth.20 0 Small HCAs of 800 acres
in old growth
21
would be selected later in the planning process.
These recommendations were explosive. Altogether, the
Team called for 38 large and 111 medium HCAs, °2 connected
by a network of small HCAs, stream buffers and travel corridors. 203 The allowable sale quantity from the total forest would
drop from 714 million board feet to under 580 million.2 °4 Even
with reserves this extensive, the Team acknowledged that the
HCAs would provide only "a reasonably high likelihood" of
maintaining viable populations, and only then if all of its recommendations were adopted. 2 5 To the Service, the recommendations were not good news.
So the Service buried them. It ordered members of the
Team not to release their report while it prepared its own response in an appendix to a new Environmental Impact State-

196. Id. at 12.
197. See id. at 4.
198. See id. at 26.
199.

See id. at 24-25.

200.

See id. at 26.

201.
202.

See id. at 28.
See id. at 36.

203. See id. at 37-38.
204. See id. at 36.
205. Id. at 39. Though hard data on the efficacy of travel corridors was
lacking, "biological intuition" was that corridors would help preserve diversity,
and the team recommended that "existing linkages should be a primary component of conservation planning since it is easier to retain them than to replace them in the future." Id. at 29.
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ment (EIS) for the Tongass. 0 6 Appendix M was a remarkable
document. It purported to consider and largely adopt the Interagency Team's work, while in fact doing its best to discredit
and reject the Team's conclusions. 0 7 The Service began by discounting the use of viable population analysis and adherence to
any numerical standard for species distribution. 208 It went
on-in a reprise of its efforts in Oregon and Washington to
dismiss the needs of the spotted owl-to state that endangered
species would not be used as indicators since they did not have
viable populations.2 9 It then made its major stroke, asserting
that, if the Team's HCAs would maintain species viability,
then reserving only fifty percent of the HCAs would still provide a likelihood of viability.210 Such logic, from a scientific
standpoint, might have come from Alice in Wonderland. All
the "curiouser and curiouser," to quote Alice, because the
Service's own analysis showed that, under the harvest proposed in its EIS, three entire regions of the Tongass would fall
below even the fifty percent threshold. 211 As might be expected,
Appendix M took heavy criticism from the environmental and
scientific communities.
Congress then intervened once again, requiring the Service to subject the Interagency Team report to peer review.2 12
The Service submitted the report, along with Appendix M, apparently confident that its analysis would hold.1 3 It was
wrong. A peer review team of more than a dozen non-federal
scientists2 14 reviewed the data and concluded that both Appendix M and the Team's recommendations were inadequate to

206. See HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITEE, 103D CONG., REPORT ON
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS BILL

73-74 (Comm. Print 1993).
207. Id.
208. See Tongass National Forest Land Management Planning Team, Appendix M-Fish and Wildlife: A Viability Risk Assessment, at M-2 (Feb. 1993)
(on file with author).
209. See id.
210. See id. at M-20.
211. See id. at M-21.
212. See HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, 103D CONG., supra note 206,
at 74.
213. See A. Ross Kiester & Carol Eckhardt, Review of Wildlife Management and Conservation Biology on the Tongass National Forest: A Synthesis
with Recommendations 1 (Mar. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). By way of disclosure, the author participated in this peer review.
214. See id. at 221-81.

908

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:869

protect diversity in the Tongass. 211 The peer group recommended the creation of Very Large Reserves and the imposition of additional restrictions on management activities within
and without the reserves.2 16 For the Service, the bad news was
finally incontrovertible.
Unable to stiff-arm viable population analysis any longer,
the Service released a Final EIS in March of 1996, with yet a
new preferred alternative. 2 17 Facially, the Service adopted the
Habitat Conservation Area concept and designations proposed
by the Interagency Team. 218 At the same time-in a reprise of
the conservation plan first arrived at for the spotted owl-it
proposed to allow current levels of harvest to continue at nearcurrent levels for the next ten to fifteen years, at which point
the real restrictions would kick in.2 19 The timber cut levels
would be, coincidentally, an almost even compromise between
the business-as-usual of Appendix M and the business-asreduced by the Interagency Team. 22 0 The risks to evaluated
indicator species would be increased significantly, and in some
cases doubled.2 21 In a cover letter to its EIS, however, the
Service stated that it "believed" these risks to be small and, in
215. See id. at 5.
216. See id. at 16. The group concluded, for example, that because succession takes so long to climax, a "rotating block" harvest design was not appropriate. Id. at 17. The "existing largest blocks of contiguous high volume oldgrowth forest [should] not be further fragmented by timber harvesting or road
building." Id. at 25. There should be no "differential cutting" in low altitude,
high volume stands. Id. The reviewers even suggested Inverse HCAs, with
reserves for timbering rather than for wildlife. See id. at 16.
217. See Summary: Revised Supplement to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Tongass Land Management Plan Revision, TONGASS FOREST
PLAN REV. (U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1996, at 7.
218.

See id. at 6.

219. See id. at 11. The Service declared that continuing the cut at current
levels "would not have significantly different environmental effects" than implementing the HCA-based alternative immediately. Id.
220. See id. at 5. Alternative 2 is the old plan, and Alternative 3 incorporates the HCAs of the Suring study. See id. at 6.
221. See U.S.D.A. FOREST SERVICE, TONGASS LAND MANAGEMENT PLAN
REVISION: REVISED SUPPLEMENT TO THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 3-206 to 3-259 (1996) (presenting the Service's tables on and dis-

cussion of its viable population studies). The alternative based on the viable
population studies, Alternative 3, was "intermediate in overall risk" even
without the ten year wait before its implementation! Id. at 3-258. That alternative was, for example, twice as risky for the viability of both the northern
goshawk and the marten as was that of the Interagency Team. See id. at 3251. Notably, the viable population studies provided no analysis of the Service's proposal to wait a decade or more to implement the team's strategy.
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any event, to be "outweighed" by the "benefits to be derived
from the changes."2 n These benefits-to no one's surprisewere continuing timber production at current levels for ten to
fifteen years and meeting the terms of its remaining, long-term
contract.22 3
However this story ends, and the end may take a while, it
is obvious that for Tongass managers the timber-first mindset
continues to prevail.22 4 This is one powerful status quo, backed
up by a congressional delegation that cracks the whip on both
appropriations and legislation for natural resource issues. The
lesson of the Tongass is not that the Service departed from the
conclusions drawn by both its own and other biologists, but
rather that slowly, resisting at almost every turn, it began to
adopt these conclusions, as painful and revolutionary as they
might be. Wherever the Tongass plan ends, Tongass management has been forever changed towards greater protection of
the forest's most unique wildlife and its essential ecosystem by
planning that was based, objectively and numerically, on the
needs of indicator species.
3. Wisconsin Old-Growth and Second-Growth Forests
It is fitting that the most imaginative challenge to biodiversity planning has come from Wisconsin, where near-total

222.

Open Letter from the Forest Plan Revision Team 5 (Apr. 5, 1995) (on

file with author).
223. See id. In late 1996, with prospects of continued congressional subsidies dimming, see Margaret Kriz, Forest Fight, NATL J., Sept. 21, 1996, at
1998, the Louisiana Pacific Pulp Mill in Ketchikan, Alaska, announced that it
would close in March 1997. For its part, the Forest Service announced that it
would proceed to complete its forest plan revision expeditiously, despite this
rather dramatic change in circumstance. See Ketchikan Pulp Mill Announcement Effect on the Tongass ForestPlan,TONGASS FOREST PLAN REV. (U.S.DA_
Forest Service, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 1996, at 6.
224. In its latest environmental statement and NFMA plan revision, the
Service rejected many of the recommendations and the conclusion of both the
peer review committee and its own interagency diversity review team. See
James G. Deane, The Tongass's Time of Decision, DEFENDERS, Summer 1996,
at 53, 55. Meanwhile, the Alaska congressional delegation, erstwhile champions of free enterprise in other circumstances, were hammering for continued
subsidies to local mills and, to this end, even proposed transferring the entire
forest to the state. See id. Issues of this scale will obviously not be decided by
the habitat needs of northern goshawks and pine marten alone. These species
have set too high a standard, however, to allow a return to the status quo
ante. At the time this Article went to press, the Service had terminated the
remaining long-term contract on the Tongass, with a two-year grace period
until 1998.
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destruction of the original forests by the early 1900s n 5 inspired
A Sand County Almanac and the ecological principles of Aldo
Leopold.2 26 Large portions of the clearcut, gullied, and burnedout landscapes of northern Wisconsin were subsequently purchased by the Forest Service and managed, in the spirit of the
new times, for the production of timber and deer, objectives
that are both largely compatible and hugely popular in the region."' Two such forests, the Nicolet and Chequamegon,
spread over 1.5 million acres of upstate Wisconsin with a
nearly even mix of hardwood and pine species, hundreds of
lakes and streams and, as would be expected, a broad range of
common to rare plant and animal species.228 In the early
1980s, the Service began the planning process for these forests
under the requirements of NFMA and the diversity regulations.229
The planning efforts for the two forests were essentially
identical and focused first on identifying and maximizing diversity of tree species by type, age and-convenient to the
Service's existing timber harvest program-the number of
"upland openings" provided. 23 0 The Service prepared an elaborate matrix of "diversity indices"2 3 ' (an exercise against which
the Committee of Scientists had warned),2 32 and extrapolated

225. See Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 609 n.1 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Until
the mid-1800s, both the Nicolet and Chequamegon were old-growth forests
consisting primarily of northern hardwoods. Pine logging around 1900, hardwood logging in the 1920s, and forest fires (caused by clear cutting) significantly affected the landscape."); see also ALVERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at
210-11 (describing history of these two forests).
226. See supra note 3 (discussing Leopold and his work).
227. See ALvERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 212-13 (describing deer hunting pressures in Wisconsin).
228. See Marita, 46 F.3d at 609; ALVERSON ETAL., supra note 3, at 218.
229. See Marita, 46 F.3d at 608-09. For a summary of the Service's efforts,
see id. at 616-17.
230. See Sierra Club v. Marita, 843 F. Supp. 1526, 1533-36 (E.D. Wis.
1994) (describing the Service's analysis for the Nicolet Forest), affd, 46 F.3d
606 (7th Cir. 1995). The third variable that the Service considered in addition
to tree type and age was "high recreation/wildlife management intensity." Id.
at 1534. The Service put "particular emphasis on the total acreage of permanent forest openings." Id.; see also Sierra Club v. Marita, 845 F. Supp 1317,
1323 (E.D. Wis. 1994) ("Finally, the Service concluded that permanent upland
openings would optimally account for about five percent of the [Chequamegon]
forest."), affd, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
231. Marita,843 F. Supp. at 1533-36.
232. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting Committee's rejection of "diversity indices").
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from it a "preferred vegetative composition for wildlife diversity."23 3 This preferred composition formed a "baseline against
which alternatives would be evaluated."2 34 The baseline would
not be the historical forest,2 35 nor even the mix of hardwoods
and softwoods prevalent at the time. Rather, it would be what
the Service "preferred" it to be. The Service then proceeded to
measure the impacts of its preferred composition and other alternatives on population viability generally, and on management indicator species. 3 6 Herein lay a second problem.
Of the eighteen indicators selected for the Nicolet Forest,
only one was a reptile or amphibian and none was an invertebrate or plant.237 Of the vertebrates chosen, the preponderance
were "habitat generalists," 238 able to live in multiple environments. "Young/mature hardwoods," for example, were indicated by the ruffed grouse, which also thrives in cut-over areas. 239 To represent old growth the Service chose the pileated
woodpecker,2 40 also a frequent resident of second-growth wood
and even suburbia. Ditto the ground squirrel, "ubiquitous
throughout the forest," and the common yellowthroat, endemic
to low brush.2 41 Not surprisingly, the preferred composition of
forest vegetation would feature aspen, which the Service found
to be "especially important to the most abundant game species-the white-tailed deer, ruffed grouse, and the snowshoe
hare."242 For wildlife, the Service continued with perceivable
ardor, "the more equal the amount and spacial distribution of
aspen and age classes the better";243 the optimal number of
acres under this intensive "wildlife management investment"
233. Marita, 845 F. Supp. at 1323 (quoting from Service's final EIS for
Chequamegon Forest).
234. Id.
235. See Marita,46 F.3d at 621.
236. See Marita,845 F. Supp. at 1322-24.
237. See ALVERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 219 (discussing the Forest
Service planning for the Chequamegon Forest); see also Marita,46 F.3d at 617
(noting the existence of 33 management indicator species in the Nicolet, 18 in
the Chequamegon).
238. ALVERSONETAL., supra note 3, at 219.
239. Id.
240. See id. In reference to the Nicolet plan, the Forest Service defined
"old-growth designated stands" as those "to be managed for timber, but at a
delayed rotation age." Id. at 222 (emphasis omitted) (quoting the Nicolet

Plan).
241. Id. at 219.
242. Id. at 216 (citation omitted) (quoting from the Nicolet Final EIS).
243. Id.
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would be 85% of the "total manageable lands" in the Nicolet
National Forest.2" A reviewing court noted that "without some
intervention, the forests would return to their pre-1800s, climax hardwood composition, a composition less diverse than at
present."2 45 In short, diversity was accomplished neither by
using the indicators most sensitive to change, nor by maximizing the habitat of rare or reclusive populations. It was done by
a body count, and the bodies counted just happened to support
timber harvests-and excellent hunting.
Environmentalists appealed, objecting that the plan would
exacerbate the problem of forest fragmentation. 246 They proposed, instead, the creation of large reserves called "diversity
maintenance areas"247 that would better accommodate the
needs of reclusive, deep forest species. During the administrative appeals, they introduced numerous studies and an array of
experts attesting to the adverse effects of chopping up the forest and the benefits of large-scale conservation.24 8 As one expert testified: "Supporting large reserves these days is like
supporting motherhood. The overwhelming consensus among
ecologists and biogeographers is 'the larger the better.'" 2 49 The
testimony was persuasive enough to lead the Chequamegon
Supervisor to recommend creating two large diversity management areas. 21' The Chief of the Forest Service rejected this
proposal, however, finding that the diversity regulations established "no additional requirements beyond those identified"21 1 (i.e., population viability and indicator species). The
emerging concepts of conservation biology, while "not new,"
remained an "untested" subject for the future. 2 The Sierra
Club went to court.

244. Sierra Club v. Marita, 843 F. Supp. 1526, 1534-35 (E.D. Wis. 1994),
affd, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
245. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606,621 (7th Cir. 1995).
246. See Marita, 843 F. Supp. at 1537-38 (describing plaintiffs' view that
large tracts of undeveloped land are essential to conservation biology).
247. Id. at 1538.
248. See id. at 1537-38. Thirteen experts on biological diversity testified
before the Service on behalf of the administrative appeal. See id. at 1538. No
witnesses were produced to the contrary. See Sierra Club v. Marita, 845 F.
Supp. 1317, 1329 (E.D. Wis. 1994), affd, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995); Marita,
843 F. Supp. at 1541.
249. Marita,843 F. Supp. at 1538.
250. See Marita,845 F. Supp. at 1326.
251. Id. at 1328 (quoting from the administrative record).
252. Id. (quoting from the administrative record).
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The Sierra Club had great facts and difficult law. It lost
its cases on both forest plans before the same trial court, in virtually identical opinions.2 53 The Service's industrious attention
to age-class diversity, its matrices and its cultivations of wildlife-no matter which wildlife-obviously impressed the trial
court. So, however, did the plaintiffs' evidence on large scale
reserves. Indeed, the court found that it could "safely assume
that the principles of conservation biology set forth by plaintiffs represent sound ecological theory."25 4 But it found
"considerable uncertainty" as to "how exactly these principles
should be applied."2 55 The court noted, "Nowhere in plaintiffs'
exhaustive briefs and supporting materials does there appear
any suggestion of what methodology the Service should have
used to incorporate principles of conservation biology into its
planning process."2 6 If the Committee of Scientists could not
come up with a formula in 1978,257 the court would not require
one of the Forest Service in 1991.258 Conservation biology was
a good idea, but it was not law to apply.
On appeal, the Sierra Club did not challenge the Service's
use and manipulation of indicator species and the resulting viability analysis. 2 9 It went for the larger prize, arguing that
MISs and viability analysis only added up to half the picture of
biological diversity. 2 0 To the Seventh Circuit, the Sierra Club
was 26reading requirements into NFMA that "simply do not exist." ' Conservation biology was "not a necessary element of
diversity analysis" because, beyond MISs and viable populations, "the regulations do not dictate that the service analyze

253. Compare Sierra Club v. Marita, 845 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Wis. 1994)
(Nicolet Forest), affd, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995), with Sierra Club v. Marita,
843 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (Chequamegon Forest), affd, 46 F.3d 606
(7th Cir. 1995).
254. Marita,843 F. Supp. at 1541.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text (describing the Committee's regulations as based on diversity principles).
258. Marita,843 F. Supp. at 1541-42.
259. See Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 1995). This argument was not raised at the trial level. Sierra Club v. Marita, 845 F. Supp.
1317, 1331 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (noting that "plaintiffs do not challenge the assumptions underlying the methodology or the manner in which it was conducted'), affid, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
260. See Marita,46 F.3d at 619.
261. Id. at 620.
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diversity in any specific way."2 62 Furthermore, if the Sierra
Club's position on fragmentation and patch size were true,
then "an MIS should to some degree indicate their impact on
diversity."26 The game was back to management indicator
species.
Which left the question: indicator species for what type of
ecosystem? The baseline. To the Sierra Club, the baseline was
the "natural forest."264 The Service, clever with words here, responded that its regulations did not actually require the promotion of" natural forest' diversity" but only "the promotion of
6
diversity at least as great as that found in a natural forest."
The Service was reducing diversity to a numbers game in
which lots of common species could trump a few rare ones,
every time. Disappointingly, the circuit court accepted this
sleight-of-hand. The "extent [to which] the Service's final
else" was a
choice did not promote 'natural diversity' above all
regulatory discretion."26 6 At which
decision "well within its
267
point, no law remained.
The messages from the Nicolet and Chequamegon decisions should be sobering to any enthusiast of biodiversity
planning and ecosystem management. Principles as obvious to
contemporary science as the need for large reserves to maintain population diversity are not likely to be accepted until the
federal government chooses to accept them, which, given their
implications for commodity production and natural resources
management, is likely to be a very cold day in hell. Further,
the MIS viability process, which is both accepted and comprehensible even to a reviewing court, is subject to gross manipulation to achieve what the Service would call "desired outputs."
And finally, the very concept of diversity itself may be stripped
of its moorings in natural systems and, with a "preferred ecosystem" as a baseline, put up for grabs. Unfortunately, these

262. Id.
263. Id. (citation omitted).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 620-21 (emphasis added).
266. Id. at 621 (citation omitted).
267. One never knows, in the continuing saga of natural resources management, exactly who wins and when. On April 22, 1996, the State of Wisconsin enacted legislation requiring state forest management to be "consistent
with the ecological capability" of these lands and "with the long-term maintenance of ... ecosystems." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 28.04(2)(a) (West Supp. 1996).
The battle over interpreting these provisions is obviously at hand.
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discouraging conclusions are playing out in Forest Service and
judicial decisions elsewhere around the country.
4. Four Forests in Texas
One does not tend to associate Texas with woodland, but
the Forest Service manages four national forests in the eastern
part of the state totaling 662,000 acres of mixed hardwoods
and pine. 268 In 1964, the Service began large-scale clearcutting
and conversion of these ecosystems to faster-growth pine. 269 By
1976, news of the National Environmental Policy Act had filtered south, and a coalition of environmental organizations began a series of lawsuits against clearcutting in the Texas forests. Twenty years later, the litigation continues; its results
reflect the Forest Service's historic and current approaches towards diversity management on the ground.
The first cases raised NEPA claims. Bolstered by the success of contemporary cases in requiring comprehensive, "programmatic" environmental impact statements for on-going federal activities, plaintiffs based their lawsuit on the absence of
such a statement for clearcutting programs in the four Texas
forests.270 The federal district court found this argument persuasive and enjoined clearcutting until a programmatic EIS
was prepared.27 1 Spurred forward by the Texas Forestry Association and a dozen timber company intervenors, the Department of Agriculture appealed, 272 and received a windfall from
an unexpected
quarter. Just prior to the trial, Congress passed
NFMA. 273
Although the trial court did not base its ruling on the new
forest management act, the Fifth Circuit seized on NFMA as
its way out of the woods. It reasoned that Congress itself had
failed to ban clearcutting in NFMA, choosing instead to limit it
on a case-by-case basis through forest management plans.2 7 4
Until these plans were in place, injunctive relief against clear-

268. See Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201,
204 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating the acreage and location of the forests).
269. See id. at 205.
270. See Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 433 F. Supp.
1235, 1245 (E.D. Tex. 1977), order rev'd by 573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1978).
271. See id. at 1254.
272. See Bergland, 573 F.2d at 206.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 212.
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cutting was inappropriate. 275 Neatly avoiding the question of
how the Service was to comply with NEPA in the meantime,
the circuit court in effect gave the Service a stay of execution.
The stay would last a long time. Forest plans in Texas would
not emerge for another ten years.2 7 6 In the meantime, clearcutting and conversions continued.
Phase two of the Texas litigation invoked the Endangered
Species Act, which was also spreading south in the wake of the
initial and successful cases on the northern forests and the
spotted owl. In 1985, the Sierra Club challenged the Service's
southern pine beetle control program, under which it was cutting large stands of old-growth timber that included nesting
sites of the red-cockaded woodpecker, a listed species. 277 The
red-cockaded, dependent on older tree species and their associated conditions (e.g., disease, sap, and low understory), was an
indicator species for the original ecosystem and was now on the
way to becoming its spotted owl. 2 78 The court found that, under
the guise of beetle control, the Service was cutting extensive
stands that were in no way threatened by the insect.279 Based
on these findings, and its palpable skepticism of the Service's
forest management,
the court decided to restrict these "salvage"
280
cuts.

Two years later, plaintiffs moved directly under the ESA,
prompted by a Service biological survey finding a sharp decline
in red-cockaded populations. 21 The court tried the facts for
four days and took the time to understand them.28 2 It found
that the demise of the red-cockaded woodpecker was directly
attributable to clearcutting, the "sole reason" for which was
275. See id. at 210.
276. See infra note 297 and accompanying text (noting that the Forest
Service developed a NFMA plan in 1987).
277. See Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Tex. 1985). This first
suit, although it concerned impacts on an endangered species, was based on
NEPA. See id. at 135.
278. See Chuck D. Barlow, The ProposedManagement of the Red-Cockaded
Woodpecker in the Southern National Forests:Analysis and Suggestions, 17 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 727, 729 (1995) (providing a full description of the
species and its habitat requirements).
279. See Block, 614 F. Supp. at 139-41.
280.

Id. at 140-41.

281. See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in
part, vacated in part sub nom., Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir.
1991).

282. The trial judge declared the case a "privilege" to hear and complimented counsel and witnesses on all sides. Id. at 1266.
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that it was "preferred by the timber companies" with which the
Forest Service had a "revolving door" relationship.8 3 Although
the Service protested that it had prepared management guidelines for the species and was in active consultation with the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service over an improved plan, 284 what
mattered to the court was that, in the meantime, the cuts continued and nothing had changed. 25 In its relief, the court ordered remedial measures that included a 1,200-meter buffer
zone around red-cockaded colony sites and requirements on
standing trees and logging roads.286 Objective numbers were
finally coming to the four forests in Texas, and they were coming because of an indicator, endangered species.
The story now takes two paths. One follows the trail of the
red-cockaded woodpecker and its impact on forest planning. At
this story's end, in June 1995, the Forest Service issued a Record of Decision for management of the red-cockaded woodpecker and its habitat on national forests throughout the
American South.287 The plan acknowledged that more than
50% of the known, remaining members of this species live on
southern forest system lands; more importantly, twelve of fifteen populations identified as necessary to the recovery of the
species "nest and forage for food totally or in part" in these forests.2 88 The plan called for the creation of "habitat management areas," large blocks of pine and pine-hardwood managed
289
to provide red-cockaded nesting and foraging habitat.
Rather than taking a nest-and-circle approach to existing sites,
the HMAs would range from 6,500 to 144,000 acres in size and
total 2 million acres in all.29 ° The HMAs would not be managed as wilderness. Rather, management would be scaled to
the condition of the colonies found within each HMA; the more

283. Id. at 1268.
284. See id. at 1273.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 1278. These specific requirements were overturned on appeal as beyond the authority of the trial court; the substance of the court's
opinion, however, was affirmed. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429,440
(5th Cir. 1991).
287. U.S. FOREST SERVICE, RECORD OF DECISION: FINAL ENvIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE RED-COCKADED
WOODPECKER AND ITS HABITAT ON NATIONAL FORESTS IN THE SOUTHERN

REGION (June 1995).
288. Id. at 1.
289. Id. at 2.
290. Id. at 7-8.
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imperiled the species, the greater the protections afforded.2 91
Clearcutting, however, was precluded in all HMAs, except in
specific situations to improve red-cockaded habitat. 292 To these
protections were added delays of up to 120 years in harvest rotations 293 to allow for emergence of old-growth stands, and control of the understory by prescribed burns and other measures,
to mimic the historic, savannah-like, longleaf pine ecosystem. 294 In short, the biological requirements of the redcockaded woodpecker would force a significant step towards
restoration of a rapidly vanishing ecosystem across the South.
And that is where the Forest Service drew its line. It
would go this far to meet the ESA; it would go no farther for
diversity under NFMA. Citing cases it would later rely on in
proposing to amend the diversity regulations themselves, 295 the
agency concluded that multiple use, not diversity, was its
guiding principle and that, beyond the ESA, diversity protection lay in
its unreviewable-and largely unexercised96
discretion.
The second path of the story returns to the four forests in
Texas. In 1987, after the Service had finally produced a NFMA
plan on the management of its Texas forests, plaintiffs again
sued to enjoin nine timber sales under NEPA and NFMA. 297 Of
the more than 6,000 acres scheduled for harvest, more than
90% would be clearcut; less than 10% would use more selective
methods. 298 To the trial court, these figures stood NFMA, and
its intention that clearcutting be employed only in exceptional
circumstances, on its head.2 99 Citing a magistrate's findings of
fact that old-growth stands were not explicitly considered as an
element of diversity, and that indicator species would in fact
decline under clearcutting, °° the court found a substantial
likelihood that the Service had violated NFMA's requirement

291. See id. at 8. Four levels of management are provided for, depending
on the current status of the species. Id.
292. See id. at 15.
293. See id. at 8.
294. See id. at app. A, 18-32.
295. See id. at 14; infra note 344 (listing cases the Service cited when
making its diversity proposal).
296. See U.S. FOREST SERVICE, supra note 287, at 14.
297. See Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356, 359 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
298. See id. at 364.
299. See id. at 363-64.
300. See id. at 366.
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3
that clearcutting not adversely affect wildlife. "' The Fifth Circuit however, saw a different NFMA, one bottomed on multiple
use and deference, 30 2 and concluded that NFMA imposed
"something less than preservation" but "something more than
eradication of species."30 3 The court noted with approval that,
beyond the red cockaded woodpecker, the Service was going to
provide ample numbers of wild turkey, white-tailed deer, and
bobwhite quail-all game species. 314 The Service was also
committed to maintaining viable populations of chats and
bluebirds-open-field, clearcut species. 30 5 Within this free-fire
zone, diversity simply called for the kind of "policy-oriented
decision Congress wisely left to the discretion of the expertshere, the Forest Service."30 6 Diversity meant the ESA, plus
business-as-usual.
Environmentalists sued again,
The wars continued.
claiming that the 1987 forest plan itself violated NFMA in a
host of respects, including its diversity requirements. 30 7 In
1996, however, before the resolution of this case, the Service
issued a new plan for the four Texas forests, responding in part
to its critics and in the main to its new red-cockaded woodThe plan placed 250,000 acres under
pecker guidelines. 30
management primarily for the red-cockaded,30 9 including three310
quarter-mile circles of protection around known colonies.
Logging would be permitted under longer rotations, with intervals of up to 120 years. 31 ' Overall, the forest acreage in late
succession-fifty to ninety years of age-would decline by more
than 50%, while that defined as old growth, ninety years and
over, would jump threefold.312 The Texas forests would remain

301. See id.
302. See Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 802 (5th Cir.1994).
303. Id. at 800.
304. See id. at 802.
305. See id.
306. Id. at 800.
307. See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (E.D. Tex. 1988).
For the alleged violations, see Plaintiff Sierra Club's and The Wilderness Society's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Aug. 1996) (on file
with author).
308.

U.S. FOREST SERVICE, REVISED LAND AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

PLAN, NATURAL FORESTS AND GRASSLANDS IN TEXAS (1996).
309. See id. at 96.
310. See id. The plan also added more than a dozen prescriptions for
burning, shelter trees and other habitat management. See id. at 107-34.
311. See id. at 122.
312. See id. at 307.
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highly managed environments, but would move toward a semblance of their original state.
Beyond the protections for the red-cockaded woodpecker,
no important management restrictions emerged from diversity
analysis or indicator species.313 The species identified were the
usual assortment of wild turkey, squirrel, yellow-breasted chat
and deer, most of which would thrive under new management
or old.314 As of this writing, the message from Texas is that the
Service would respond to a series of court orders and take steps
for bellwether endangered species, and not a great deal more.
5. Additional Forest Plans and Lessons Learned
The histories just described range from earnest and effective diversity analysis with recommendations for major, systemic change to defensive, manipulative analyses designed
largely to perpetuate the status quo. With the exception of a
few celebrated cases, the Service has adopted the latter approach in forest planning across the country, and the courts
have been unwilling to demand more.
A familiar-looking series of cases arose in the Ouichita
National Forest of western Arkansas and eastern Oklahoma.
Sierra Club v. Robertson315 centered on a Forest Service plan
"to cut existing trees and grow pines of uniform height, which
in turn will be harvested." 31 6 The court looked at the statutory
language in NFMA, saw no specific diversity requirements,
and seemed to stop; 3 17 nowhere in its three opinions are the
MIS or viable population regulations cited or discussed. In313. See id. at 54-55.
314. See id. at 307.
315. The two substantive Robertson cases are found at 784 F. Supp. 593
(W.D. Ark. 1991) and 810 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Ark 1992), affd, 28 F.3d 753
(8th Cir. 1994).
316. Robertson, 810 F. Supp. at 1024. In characterizing the effects of
clearcutting, generally, the court revealed itself to be a latter-day forester at
heart, finding:
Although some vegetation will be removed, the vegetation will be replaced: Some trees will be cut; new trees will grow in their place.
Some prescribed burning is planned to enhance wildlife habitat, and
there is evidence that the animals hunters pursue will thrive in the
wake of the harvest. The court cannot conclude that any net harm
will ensue from the Forest Service's contemplated activities.
Robertson, 784 F. Supp. at 599.
317. See id. at 609-11 (finding that the NFMA did not require diversity at
the compartment level and deferring to the Forest Service's diversity determinations).
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stead, it found that the clearcutting itself would "enhance" diversity because-and this, by now, will be no surprise"certain species will benefit from the clearing, e.g. white-tailed
318
deer, harvest mice, wild turkey and bobwhite quail."
The same conclusion was reached in Sierra Club v. United
States ForestService,319 where clearcuts in the Black Hills National Forest of South Dakota were justified on diversity
grounds as providing habitat for white-tailed deer 3 20-one of
the few native species more abundant today than at the time of
Columbus. And again in Krichbaum v. Kelley, 321 involving conversion of the George Washington National Forest to "a mosaic
of even-age tree stands,"3 n where the Service argued success323
fully that it was entitled to manage for a "desired future" of
diversity:
Ecosystem management is the means to an end. It is not the end itself. The Forest Service does not manage ecosystems just for the
sake of managing them or for some notion of intrinsic ecosystem valFor the Forest Service, ecosystem management means to
ues ....
produce desired resource values, uses, products or services in ways
that also sustain the diversity and productivity of ecosystems.324

And again, in yet another Sierra Club v. Robertson,32 5 another
"mosaic" forest to be achieved through clearcutting, 326 with the
following rationale:
Timber sales are the most economically viable means of achieving
desired plant and animal diversity. Our publics put high values on
wildlife-associated recreation and the visual amenities of the Forest.
If these benefits were provided through a method other than com-

318. Id. at 611. It is hard to tell from these opinions exactly what evidence
was presented or what issues were argued. It does appear, however, that the
courts were influenced by the relatively small scale of the challenged sales (61
acres in one instance, see id. at 604). The courts also seemed influenced by
efforts made to reserve at least some percentage of original hardwoods, and
the courts were unwilling to inquire at the level of species selection and needs
where, of course, diversity planning stands or falls. See id. at 601, 604 (noting
that the technical questions facing the court were better resolved by "trained
agency specialists" and consequently applying a narrow scope of judicial review).
319. 878 F. Supp. 1295 (D.S.D. 1993), affd, 46 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 1995).
320. See id. at 1311.
321. 844 F. Supp. 1107 (W.D. Va. 1994), affid, 61 F.3d 900 (4thCir. 1995).
322. Id. at 1114.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1115.
325. 845 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
326. See id. at 490 (detailing the harvest methods recognized by the Forest
Service).
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mercial timber sales, costs would 327be significantly higher and would
eliminate returns to the Treasury.

As for restoring conditions of a natural forest, this was not a
natural forest to begin with;3 28 the baseline, apparently, was
the cut-over landscape, circa 1900.
One emerges from these cases with the conviction that, at
some early point, they took a wrong fork in the road. On reflection, Congress took the first wrong turn in assuming, with
unrealistic optimism, that the Service could offset decades of
timber-first training and continuing pressures to keep the cut
high with precatory language about diversity goals and multiple use. Despite the Committee of Scientists' efforts to pin diversity down, it too left enough flexibility and ambiguity in its
recommendations to allow diversity planning to continue as an
afterthought, and even a justification for the status quo. The
courts for their part could have interpreted the diversity regalations both by their intent and their literal word, rather than
give up at the first mention of multiple use; they could do so
still. So could the Forest Service itself. Wherever the fault
lies, it seems clear that, in order to secure diversity across the
broad scale of landscapes under Service management, a few
truths have become self-evident:
(a) The naturalforest baseline. The Committee of Scientists clearly had the unmanaged forest in mind as the baseline
for diversity planning. The Forest Service has managed to
pervert that concept to "natural forest," and from there to
"desired" natural forest, and from there sideways, to diversity
"equal to" that of a natural forest. From there, the concept of a
biological or even an objective goal has disappeared entirely
from radar. Either the objective for diversity is the historic
natural forest in its unmanaged condition, or it is whatever set
of "outputs" the dominant political pressure wants it to be.
There is no in between.
(b) Viable populations. The viable population concept is
demanding, time-consuming, expensive, never certain and often inconclusive-but it works. It produces defensible conclusions on what habitat is needed and how much and where. No
other approach provides that level of objectivity and specificity.
For decisions that are then going to run a gauntlet of fire from
every side, an objective, scientific basis is indispensable.
327. Id. at 498.
328. See id. at 502 (noting that the area had been cleared between 1850
and 1880 to fuel the ore smelting industry).
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(c) Management indicator species. The MIS approach is
as excellent or as abysmal as the species selected. The Endangered Species Act is effective because it flatly requires the selection of its listed species for MIS-like analyses. The diversity
regulations fail when they allow the selection of common species or species of convenience, obviously selected to continue a
high level of locally popular "outputs."
The Forest Service now stands at a crossroads of its own,
based on its experience with diversity planning.3 29 Its instincts, however, have not been to accept the observations just
presented. Rather, as will next be seen, they have been to
travel in almost the opposite direction.
C. THE SERVICE SouNDs RETREAT
In the late 1980s, facing a wave of litigation over NFMA
planning that was increasingly focused on biological diversity,
the Forest Service initiated proceedings that would minimize
the diversity requirements and insulate its decisions from judicial review. 330 In so doing, the Service was doubtless responding to the volume of appeals to its forest plans, to the difficulties it was encountering in protecting viable populations of
identified species, and to the trend of court decisions just described, which suggested that it could do nearly anything it
wanted in the name of diversity. 331 The rationale it chose to
329. In a January 1997 address to Forest Service employees, incoming
Chief Michael Dombeck announced his "expectation" that every action by the
Service "will not compromise the health of the land." See Letter from Roger
Featherstone to Oliver Houck 1 (Jan. 8, 1997) (on file with author) (citing an
Associated Press article). Granting the evident sincerity of this announcement, the question remains exactly how the health of the land is to be measured, and its compromise determined.
330. See National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning: Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 18,887 (1995) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §
219) (proposed Apr. 13, 1995). The Service had also been escalating its rhetoric for diversity protection-while resisting the enforcement of its regulations-through an initiative called "New Perspectives in Forestry." See Harold Salawasser, New Perspectives for Sustaining Diversity in the U.S.
National Forest Ecosystems, 5 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 567, 567-69 (1991)
(describing the Forest Service's approach to diversity planning). "New Perspectives" has been roundly criticized for its high level of public relations effort and its low level of impact on Forest Service decisionmaking. See, e.g.,
ALVERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 145-50 (criticizing the Service's efforts as a
presentation of vague goals having little practical effect).
331. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 18,892 (granting the Forest Service full discretion
to determine its approach to the diversity goal and noting court decisions
which upheld Forest Service discretion under the NFMA).
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justify its new approach, however, was neither necessity nor
convenience-it was the new, motherhood concept
in the field
332
of natural resources: "ecosystem management."
The genesis of the Service's proposals was, officially, a
"critique" of its regulations conducted in conjunction with a
university forestry school, a conservation organization, and unspecified "others" in 1989. 333 The critique concluded that, while
NFMA was basically sound, the planning process was too
complex to be user-friendly and should be simplified.334 Coincidence or no, this critique was followed quickly by a petition
for rulemaking from the timber industry.335 In early 1991, the
Service responded with an advance notice of proposed rulemaking,336 which stalled temporarily, then reemerged in April
1995. 337 The new rules would "streamline"33 1 the planning proc-

ess and "incorporate principles of ecosystem management."33 9
Grand in its sweep--ecosystem management was defined as:
a concept of natural resources management wherein National Forest
activities are considered within the context 34of economic, ecological,
and social interactions within a defined area. 1

Lest the non-biological nature of this definition elude the
reader, the Service made clear that a "key aspect" of ecosystem
management would be "meeting people's needs and desires,"341
and optimizing "net public benefits."342 Whatever the new goal
of this exercise might be-people's needs and desires, public
benefits, or economic and social interactions-it would not be

332. Id. at 18,920; see infra text accompanying note 340 (defining ecosystem management).
333. See id. at 18,887 (noting the process and finding put forth in 1
SYNTHESIS OF THE CRITIQUE OF LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING (1990)).

334. See id. ("The Critique found that the complexity of the forest planning
process was so overwhelming that few people understood it.") The Critique
also found that the complexity inhibited communications between interested
parties and delayed plans. See id.
335. See id. (noting the response of the National Forest Products Association).
336. Id. (citing Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 6508
(1991)).

337. See id. at 18,886-932 (detailing the history of the rule-making process).
338. Id. at 18,888 (noting the various recommendations to streamline the
planning process).
339. Id. at 18,919.
340. Id. at 18,920 (emphasis added).
341. Id. at 18,890.
342. Id.
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anything one might confuse for science or law. The rest of the
regulations followed suit.
A detailed critique of the regulations may await other
authors and, if they are adopted, reviewing courts.3 43 What is
important here is what the Service has proposed to do to diversity planning. Capitalizing on a selected line of jurisprudence, 3" the Service declared its forest plans to be essentially
think-pieces, constantly evolving and not ripe for judicial review. The new regulations would postpone review of diversity
and other key requirements until implemented in specific
"projects," 3 45 such as timber sales. By this point, of course, the
most important questions, such as whether to sell at all, where,
and with what impact on diversity across watersheds and
landscapes, would be largely moot.
Whatever got reviewed, it would not be "diversity," which
the Service declared inoperative and removed from the regulations.34 6 Citing court decisions in its favor,347 the Service found
that diversity was neither the "controlling principle in forest
planning," nor even a "concrete standard."34 The controlling
principle was "multiple use objectives." 349 If the Service pro-

343. For one detailed critique, see Defenders of Wildlife & Natural Resources Defense Council, Revised Comments on the Proposed Rule for National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning (Aug. 17
1995) (on file with author). See also Kathie Durbin, High Noon in the National Forests, AMICUS JOURNAL, Summer 1996, at 26 (criticizing the Forest
Service's approach).
344. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 18,892 (citing Sierra Club v. Espy, No. 93-5050
(5th Cir. Nov. 15, 1994); Sierra Club v. Marita, 843 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Wis.
1994); Kirschbaum v. Kelly, 844 F. Supp. 1107 (W.D. Va. 1994); Sierra Club v.
Marita, 845 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F.
Supp. 485, 502 (S.D. Ohio 1994); ONRC v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 727 (D. Ore.
1993); Glisson v. United States Forest Serv. (S.D. Ill. August 26, 1993); Sierra
Club v. Robertson, 784 F. Supp. 593, 609 (W.D. Ark 1991)). Not cited, for example, is Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash.
1991), affd, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
345. See 60 Fed. Reg. 18,903 (1995) (noting that ecosystem analyses are
not mandatory precursors to decisionmaking); id. at 18,909-10 (stating that a
determination of consistency with a forest plan should be made when projects
are initiated); id. at 18,927-28 (detailing a process for monitoring and evaluating project consistency with forest plans).
346. See id. at 18,894-97 (finding it impossible to adequately and consistently define "diversity" for the purpose of regulation).
347. See id. at 18,889 (citing Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons, No. C92479WD (W.D. Wash. Dec. 21, 1994)).
348. Id. at 18,892 (citation omitted).
349. Id.
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vided for ecosystems, diversity would follow; thinking big
would bring in the small.
The Service next freed itself from the shackles of viable
population analysis. Viability was a concept that "no longer
meets the agency's expectations."35 0 It was not possible to
guarantee, and was in any event outmoded in the new era of
ecosystem science.351
Finally, the Service rejected even a goal of the "natural
forest."352 Instead, new forest plans would recognize the
"dynamic nature of ecosystems and natural role of disturbances." 3 Natural disturbances could be mimicked, of course,
by human disturbances. 4 The baseline, thus, would be whatever humans wanted it to be.
In sum, the regulations eliminated diversity as a goal, viable populations as a standard, and the natural forest as a
baseline against which species distribution and abundance
would be measured. That done, the regulations relegated diversity and all other critical NFMA decisions to the final and
least inclusive stage in forest planning: timber sales.3 5 In
place of these requirements,
two analyses emerged: habitat for
"sensitive species" 356 and "ecosystem planning."3 57
In the first of these analyses, the Service would select
"sensitive species" from various U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
biological inventories, a process that at least facially could trim
its reliance on the ubiquitous bobwhite quail and white-tailed
deer. 58 From here, however, few constraints would follow.
Only if the Service "predicted" a "continuing downward trend"
in the status of a sensitive species would it bother to identify
that species' habitat needs. Even if such a trend were detected,
moreover, the Service would require plan modifications only if
failure to do so would likely result in the need for listing the
350. Id. at 18,895.
351. See id. at 18,895-96.
352. See id. at 18,896-97.

353. Id. at 18,897.
354. See id. at 18,896 (explaining that examples of natural or humaninduced disturbances include floods, wildfires, and oil spills).
355. See supra notes 159-224 and accompanying text (describing the government's management policy for the Tongass National Forest as one designed to further only the interests of the timber industry).
356. See National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 60 Fed. Reg. at 18,895-97.
357. See id. at 18,892-93, 18,903-04.
358. See id. at 18,922.
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species under the Endangered Species Act, or in the species'
extirpation in the plan area. 5 9 While it may be difficult to perceive a difference between population viability under the old
regulations and the avoidance of endangerment under the new,
the distinction lies in their presumptions and burden of proof.
In the current regulations, the Service must "insure-a concept requiring caution in the face of weak data or indeterminate science;3 60 under the new regulations the burden of proof
would be on the species, whose decline must be "predicted"that is, proven-to trigger a response. The decline, further,
must be so drastic as to endanger the species or "extirpate" it
from the region. Lest anyone think the Service's judgment on
such issues would be subject to review, the proposed regulations go on to caution that decisions as to the "degree of protection" needed by these sensitive species "are inherently dependent on professional judgment."361 In sum, MISs would be
replaced by a very low safety net, trotted out largely at the
Service's discretion. But if this net is low-and it is-the second net, strung by another new analysis called "ecosystem
management," never gets off the ground.
Turning to ecosystem planning, the Service is quite up
front about its responsibilities: it has none. The regulations
state: "[E]cosystem analyses are not mandatory, and it is left to
agency discretion to conduct them as appropriate." 361 In a
frank effort to avoid the requirements of environmental assessment and judicial review, the Service has repeated that
"ecosystem analysis is not a decisioumaking effort and does not
result in a resource decision." 363 The agency does not intend,
moreover, that ecosystem analysis "be used to identify any preferred or desired alternatives or outcomes." 36" In other words,
the analysis would be as useless and as minimally influential
in actual decisionmaking as possible, and beyond the reach of
law.
From here, the reader may proceed to the actual definitions of "ecosystem management" quoted above36 5-which is to
359. See id.

360. See id. at 18,895.
361. Id. at 18,922.
362. Id. at 18,903.

363. Id. at 18,904.
364. Id.

365. Cf. supra text accompanying note 340 (defining "ecosystem management" as "a concept of natural resources management wherein National For-
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say managing for everything at once and for nothing in particular, except for people's "needs and desire." But why bother? In
its definitions without meanings, processes without standards,
and replacement of objectivity with generalities, the Service
would eliminate any commitment to diversity qua diversity. In
the name of "ecosystem management," it would reinvent multiple use.
D. REFLECTIONS ON THE FOREST SERVICE EXPERIENCE WITH
BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
Emerging from the landscape of the Forest Service's experience with biodiversity, the conscientious development of its
regulations, the complexity and difficulty of the Pacific oldgrowth and the Tongass Forest plans, the continuing warfare
over diversity requirements in the courts, the lure of regulations so vague as to render Service plans immune from judicial
review, and the lure of a single bullet, unassailable in its target-"ecosystem management"-that would cut through the
controversy and solve all of these problems in a stroke, it is
hard not to sympathize with the Service as it proposed to run
for cover from its planning regulations and their implementation in the next round of forest decisions. In so doing, the
Service would make a major strategic mistake. As onerous as
rules and the prospect of judicial review may be, they are
nothing to the contorting influence on agency life of economic
interests and politics. 6 6 One of the few things in life that can
stand up to a bullying committee chairman is law.36 When the
agency cuts itself loose from the specific requirements of species-based planning, in favor of amorphous, unenforceable conest activities are considered within the context of economic, ecological, and
social interactions within a defined area").
366. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing political
pressures against diversity planning). For the development community's enthusiasm for laws that provide maximum agency "discretion," see the comments of the American Forest and Paper Association imposing limits on Forest Service "salvage" logging, Ag. Secretary Glickman Issues Salvage Rider
Order, LAND LETTER, August 1, 1996, at 1, 2 (explaining that the limits
"tighten the handcuffs on professional foresters"), and those of Senator Larry
Craig (R-Idaho), id. ("[Tihe way to try to legislate in this area is to try to allow
discretion for the professionals."). The code words fool no one involved: more
"discretion" means that industry gets to cut more timber.
367. See Don Cornelius, A Hot Foot for Senator Stevens, DEFENDERS,
Summer 1996, at 23 (describing pressure from Senator Ted Stevens (RAlaska) to expedite logging on the Tongass Forest; a Service employee concludes: "I wouldn't want to go through another summer like that").
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cepts of ecosystem management, it throws its biologists, field
managers, and forest rangers to the dogs. They may pick up a
lot of apparent discretion, but they will have no shield when
the pressure comes on. And when it comes to decisions that
will affect large amounts of real estate, these pressures are always on.
Ironically, as the Forest Service was retreating from its
commitment to the nitty-gritty of diversity planning, other federal agencies were stepping forward, however tentatively, into
the ring.
III. ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT SPREADS TO THE
FEDERAL FAMILY
The federal government manages nearly one-third of the
land mass of the United States, some 650 million acres, 628
million of which are under the differing authorities and philosophies of the Bureau of Land Management, the Forest
Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park
Service. 6 8 In addition, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) manages living resources, including commercial fisheries, in federal waters 200 miles out into the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Gulf of Mexico. 69 These agencies came to ecosystem management in the 1990s, prompted by the realization
that local and species-specific management regimes were insufficient to protect even the resources within their jurisdictions, and by the unrelenting consequences of the Endangered
Species Act when these regimes failed.
The President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
took an early lead in stimulating the discussion with a 1992
publication promoting diversity and ecosystem planning on
public lands.3 7 ° The Secretary of Interior was already heading
368. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT:
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY TEST A PROMISING APPROACH

12 (1994) [hereinafter U.S. GAO].
369. This authority includes management of marine mammals, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1994), marine endangered species, id. § 1531, and commercial fisheries, id. § 1801.
370. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, LINKING ECOSYSTEMS
AND BIODIVERSITY 135-87 (1992) (discussing the nature and value of biodiversity and exploring the benefits of ecosystem management). For another early
report, see U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES TO
MAINTAIN BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (1987) (assessing the technological and institutional opportunities and constraints to maintaining biological diversity in
the United States and worldwide).
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in that direction, if only to avoid future endangered species
"train wreck[s]" within his agencies.371 In 1993, the CEQ issued a second report on incorporating biodiversity considerations into the NEPA process. Among its management principles, this report identified minimizing fragmentation,
promoting connectivity, and maintaining naturally-occurring
structural diversity.3" As the President and the Secretary of
Interior were trying to quell the fires of controversy in the Pacific Northwest, the Vice President's National Performance
Review recommended an executive order establishing policies
for ecosystem management government-wide. 3 The U.S. General Accounting Office made a similar recommendation in
August 1994,3 4 summarizing nascent federal initiatives and
identifying barriers to the new approach, among them the fact
that, while federal laws define minimum levels of protection for
air and water quality and endangered species protection, no
one had yet articulated a "minimum level of ecosystem integrity and functioning" for this new agenda.375
At about the same time, the White House was convening
an Ecosystem Management Task Force to nudge action forward. 376 The Task Force's report, issued in 1995 with the
cheery title The Ecosystem Approach: Healthy Ecosystems and
Sustainable Economics, 37 confirmed that "people are part of
ecosystems" and prescribed a "shared vision" of ecosystem conditions and goals, to be achieved through better "communication" and "partnerships" with "nonfederal stakeholders,"

371. See Bruce Babbitt, The EndangeredSpecies Act and "Takings: A Call
for Innovation Within the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 364 (1994).
372. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, INCORPORATING BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS INTO ENVRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 6-8 (1993).
373. See U.S. GAO, supra note 368, at 28.
374. Id. at 36.
375. Id. at 39. In late 1996, the White House proposed the creation of a
"coordinated federal ecosystem database" to measure "how the environmental
protection system is working." Gore Calls for CoordinatedFederalEcosystem
Monitoring, INSIDE EPA, Oct. 4, 1996, at 9. The measures chosen will, de
facto, become management indicators for federal lands.
376. See U.S. GAO, supra note 368, at 35. Representatives of 12 federal
agencies and of the White House offices of the budget and sciences and technology compose this task force, which the White House Office of Environmental Policy chairs. Id.
377. 1 REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT TASK
FORCE, THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH: HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMICS (1995).
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leading to "resource allocations" and "adaptive management.""
The concept of ecosystem management, punching every buzzword in the new vocabulary of government, was migrating from
scientific principles towards a large, and largely-standardless,
town meeting.7 9
Several such processes are now underway. The Forest
Service and BLM have launched initiatives in the Columbia
Basin that constitute, in effect, consensus-based land use
planning. BLM has taken its planning further, to rangewide
standards and guidelines in several Western states. The
NMFS, for its part, has faced sustainability requirements for
commercial fisheries for many years, with relevant lessons for
ecosystem management as well. Experience with these programs, heterogeneous and preliminary as they are, demonstrates the same promise and pitfalls seen in the evolution of
national forest diversity planning.38 0
A. PACIFIC SALMON: FROM PACFISH TO THE INTERIOR
COLUMBIA BASIN ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT PROJECT
Pacific salmon make the spotted owl look easy. The owl
was a single, well-defined species with basically one habitat,
one threatening commodity use, and one management requirement that could be accommodated, albeit with pain in
378. Id. at 6-8.

379. For more of this genre, see COASTAL AMERICA,
APPROACH:

TOWARD A WATERSHED

A FRAMEWORK FOR AQuATIC ECOSYsTEM RESTORATION, PRO-

11-18 (1994) (promoting coordinated environmental management to treat watershed regions). Ten federal agencies collaborated to produce this report, which urges greater interagency
communication and cooperation. Id.; see also The Keystone National Policy Dialogue on Ecosystem Management (Oct. 1996) (on file with author) (describing
ecosystem management as an elaborate "collaborative process").
380. Initiatives of the Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) typically follow the "sofV path of the White House Task Force and produce few specific guidelines. The FWS planning guide, AN ECOSYSTEM
APPROACH TO FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, supra note 13, launching a
planning process around 52 watershed-based ecosystems, id. at 7, is not discussed further in this Article because, at the time of this writing, it had not
been taken to the next stage of application to management decisions. One
identified watershed is the entire Lower Mississippi River Valley, which could
lead to a very long planning discussion indeed. Like the White House Task
Force's report, the Forest Service's New Perspectives, and the similar BLM
document, BuREAu OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT IN THE BLM: FROM CONCEPT TO COMMITMENT (1994), these
guides praise partnership and consensus planning for resource goals, but
avoid providing rules or standards that might impose restraints or resemble
"law to apply."
TECTION, AND MANAGEMENT
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several local mills, without major economic impact. But there
were some 400- different stocks of salmon, steelhead and searun cutthroat trout in the Pacific Northwest, ranging in their
migrations from the coast of Russia to streams and freshets
over 900 miles inland, from sea level to elevations of 7,000 feet,
spanning northern California, Oregon, Washington and Idaho. 381
Because they breed, spawn, and migrate in different areas and
at different times of the year, we have difficulty even classifying salmon stocks as species. 382 What we do know is that the
cumulative effects of high dams, logging and grazing have
brought the salmon stocks to their knees.3 83 Of the 400 known
stocks, 214 were identified as at risk of extinction by the early
1990s;384 106 were completely gone. 385
None of this was a secret in the Pacific Northwest. The
Pacific salmon fishery supported a multi-million dollar industry in coastal communities from California to Alaska. Blue
ribbon recreational fishing, from offshore to inland Idaho, created a spin-off economy in boats, gear, and tourism that added
an order of magnitude of economic impact.386 Since the 1950s,
381. See Murray D. Feldman, NaturalForest Management under the Endangered Species Act, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1995, at 32, 34. For
a sampling of the extensive literature dealing with salmon-related litigation,
legislation, and administrative proposals over the past 20 years, see generally
Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon: A History of Failureand a Dubious Future,28 IDAHO L. REv. 667 (1991-92) (examining the decline of Idaho's
salmon population and proposing strategies to restore the salmon runs); Colloquium: Who Runs The River?, 25 ENVTL. L. 349 (1995) (presenting various
issues concerning the Columbia River salmon).
382. See 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992) (discussing difficulties in determining
whether salmon stocks constitute species under the ESA); 59 Fed. Reg. 48,855
(1992) (same).
383. For the role of hydropower, see Idaho Dep't of Fish and Game v. National Marine FisheriesServ., 850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or. 1994). For the role of
clearcutting, grazing, and mining, see 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227) (listing NMFS endangered salmon species and identifying courses).
384. See Willa Nehlson et al., Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads:Stocks at
Risk from California,Oregon, Idaho, and Washington, 16 FISHERIES 4, 4-21
(1991). Of those 214 stocks, 134 are found on Forest Service lands and 109 on
BLM lands. See Jason M. Paths, BioDiversity,Ecosystems and Species: Where
Does the EndangeredSpecies Act FitIn?, 8 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 33, 73 (1994).
385. See Feldman, supra note 381, at 34.
386. See The Endangered Species Coalition, The Salmon Scenario (undated)
(on file with author). "In 1988, the commercial and recreational Pacific
Northwest salmon fishing industry supported an estimated 62,750 jobs and
brought in more than $1.25 billion to the region in personal income. Since
1988, the commercial salmon industry has declined by about 97% and recreational salmon fishing has declined by at least 80% throughout the Pacific
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state fish and game agencies had been battling federal hydroelectric agencies, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bonneville
Power Administration, and navigation, aluminum manufacturing, and agricultural interests in an effort to win concessions
for the fishery.3 7 To little avail. After extensive jawboning,
they won fish hatcheries that replaced wild stocks with weaker
captive breeds, and trucks and barges to carry the fish
around.38 8 Against Alcoa, Boeing, and the power and promise
of cheap electricity, no amount of salmon advocacy was going to
change the status quo.
Meanwhile, in the high watersheds of the salmon spawning grounds, cattle were beating the streams into mud, and
clearcuts were obliterating dozens of stream miles at a stretch
with avalanches of dirt and debris.38 9 The advent of NEPA,
NFMA and FLPMA produced little change on the ground.
These laws remained essentially discretionary, and the economic and political power of the grazing and timber industries
was simply too strong. The cattle allotments continued with
few restrictions, 3903 9as
did timber harvests in even the steepest
1
forest watersheds.
Enter the Endangered Species Act. The sagas of litigation,
administrative action, responsive legislation, and renewed litigation by sportsmen's organizations, Native Americans, and
even the State of Idaho over the endangered salmon are welltold elsewhere and beyond the scope of this Article. 391 Suffice it
to say that, after long hesitation, the National Marine Fisheries Service finally took the plunge and declared several salmon
runs at first threatened, and later and with more realism, endangered.3 93 At the close of 1993 it went further, designating
Northwest." Id. (citing data from the Wilderness Society, the Pacific Rivers'
Council, and the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations).
387. See Daniel Jack Chasan, Goodbye Wild Salmon?, DEFENDERS, Sept.Oct. 1991, at 17 (detailing the demise of salmon populations in the Northwest
due to overfishing, pollution, and water removal for irrigation).
388. See id. at 31-33; see also American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 94-940-MA, 1995 WL 464544 (D. Or. April 14, 1995) (challenging
salmon barging as a conservation practice under the ESA).
389. For a case illustrating the effects of clearcutting on salmon spawning
streams, see National Wildlife Federationv. United States ForestService, 592
F. Supp. 931 (1984).
390. See infra note 425 and accompanying text (describing harmful effects

of cattle).
391. National Wildlife Federation,592 F. Supp. at 937.
392. See sources cited supra note 381.
393. After several years in deep denial, in August 1989, an environmental
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critical habitat for the listed salmon on the Columbia, Snake
and Salmon rivers and their upstream tributaries. 394 Federal
agencies would now have to respond. This study focuses on
that response and its evolution towards ecosystem planning.
As resistant as they were to listing the salmon as endangered, the Forest Service, BLM and other federal agencies saw
the handwriting on the wall and began preparing for it. In
January 1991, a year before the first NMFS listing proposal,
the Forest Service adopted a Columbia River Basin Anadromous Fish Habitat Management Policy and Implementation
Guide, directing forests within the region to establish salmon
objectives and monitor the effects of permitted activities.395
What were missing, of course, were those specifics that would
produce real change. The endangered species listings required
more. For openers, they required these agencies to consult
with NMFS on each timber sale, cattle allotment, and other
significant intrusion. 36 For the Umatilla Forest alone, 755
projects were up for ESA review; an additional 2,806 projects
were identified in the Wallowa-Whitman Forest.397 The agen-

cies needed a common strategy for handling these consultations and a blueprint for their outcome. The answer was
PACFISH.
PACFISH was initiated by the Forest Service and BLM in
1993 as an "interim" strategy for managing anadromous fish
habitat on their Northwest holdings. 398 Because the FEMAT

plan 399 addressed multiple species conservation from the west-

ern slope of the Cascade Mountains to the Pacific Ocean,
PACFISH started at the Cascades and went east. At the heart
lawsuit prodded the NMFS into making an emergency listing of the winterrun Chinook as threatened. 54 Fed. Reg. 32,085 (Aug. 4, 1989) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pts. 226 and 227). In 1992, noting an almost 90% decline in the

past 25 years and observing that the 1988 class was almost a "total failure,"
the NMFS reclassified the species as endangered. 57 Fed. Reg. 22,416 (1992).
394. See 58 Fed. Reg. 68,543, 68,543-44 (Dec. 28, 1993) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 226).
395. See Feldman, supra note 381, at 34.
396. See Pacific Rivers Council v. Robertson, 854 F. Supp. 713 (D. Or.
1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d
1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
397. See id. at 717.
398. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE & UNITED STATES DEPT
OF INTERIOR, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
INTERIM STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING ANADROMOUS
FISH-PRODUCING
WATERSHEDS IN EASTERN OREGON AND WASHINGTON, IDAHO AND PORTIONS

OF CALIFORNIA (March 1994) [hereinafter PACFISH ENvTL. ASSESSMENT].

399. See supra notes 112-130 and accompanying text.
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of PACFISH is the designation of Riparian Habitat Conservation Areas (RHCAs), buffer zones around anadromous streams
in which development activity is limited.0 ° Perennial stream
RHCAs occupied by anadromous fish extend 300 feet on either
side of the waterway; perennial streams not currently occupied
are protected out to 150 feet; important seasonal streams to
100 feet; less-important seasonals to 50 feet.40 1 In these
streamside buffer zones, timber harvests are prohibited altogether; mining, grazing, and road construction are also discouraged and, where necessary, conditioned to protect stream
values. 402 Additional, specific stream objectives are established
for pool frequency, water temperature, bank stability, log and
snag habitat, and width/depth ratios.4 °3
What must strike the eye here is the objective, numerical
texture of PACFISH's requirements. The need for this specificity is reflected not only in the gross statistics on salmon decline
but also in data on upstream conditions that PACFISH brought
to light. A study of the Upper Grande Ronde River Subdrainage
in the Wallowa-Whitman forest found 80% of the waters in a
"deteriorated" condition; only twenty-four adult spring/summer
chinook salmon returned to the river in 1992.!4 For the Upper
Grande Ronde and 15,000 similar miles of anadromous fish
habitat on Forest Service lands alone, the PACFISH prescriptions offered new life.40 5 Moreover, the Service took the prescriptions to heart. The Challis National Forest announced a
policy of "100 percent compliance" for conditions imposed on
grazing permitees; violations will mean revocation. 0 6 Under
PACFISH, federal agencies began at long last to protect the
watersheds of the Pacific Northwest-based on the identified
needs of individual species.40 7

400. See Feldman, supra note 381, at 35.
401. See id.
402. See id.
403. See id.
404. See Pacific Rivers Council v. Robertson, 854 F. Supp. 713, 718 (D. Or.
1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d
1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
405. See Feldman, supra note 381, at 34.
406. Id. at 36.
407. The Forest Service projected that the PACFISH standards might reduce timber sales by 58 million board feet, PACFISH ENvrL. ASSESSMENT,
supra note 398, at 64, an obvious trigger for the "ecosystem" drama that
would ensue.
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It remains to be seen whether PACFISH will survive. As
we speak, it is being superseded by two large planning efforts
jointly named the "Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management Project."" 8 The project brochure lists the following
goals and "benefits":
Develop "big picture" ecosystem management strategies that will
strengthen multiple use management ....
Refine PACFISH with flexible approaches that will protect fish and
other species and... keep ecological risks at acceptable levels
Resolve broad "big picture" problems that cross jurisdictional lines
(e.g. salmon) and refine and improve interim strategies (e.g.
PACFISH)
Provide for species viability on an ecosystem basis, rather than with a
species-by-species approach .... 409

One does not have to be a cat to smell a rat. Two of the
seven listed benefits endorse "multiple use management" and
reject species-based viability. Two others specifically. target
revising ("refining") PACFISH. The question is how, and with
what. From a draft document, entitled A Framework for Ecosystem Management in the Interior Columbia Basin, we can
tease out a pretty good idea. 10
The approach is frankly political. The project goal is
"ecosystem integrity" defined as "providing products and serv408. Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management Project, Preliminary
Goals for the Development of Alternatives (undated draft) (on file with
author); see also U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management,
Amendment to the Eastside Ecosystem Management Project (undated draft)
(on file with author). The Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management
Project originated from the President's commitment in 1993 to resolve the
Northwest timber controversy. See Richard W. Haynes et al., A Framework
for Ecosystem Management in the Interior Columbia Basin 12 (Nov. 11, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In July of that year the President directed the Forest Service to develop a "scientifically sound and ecosystem-based strategy for management of Eastside forests." Id. The strategy
was to be based on an Eastside Forest Ecosystem Health Assessment that had
been developed by agency scientists. See id. The Chief of the Forest Service
and BLM Director then launched a joint assessment project for Eastern Slope
lands in Oregon and Washington, leading towards an Eastern Oregon/Washington Environmental Impact Statement. See Eastside Ecosystem
Management Strategy, Pacific Northwest Region, 59 Fed. Reg. 4680 (Feb. 1,
1994). Recognizing the need to extend their focus upstream to Idaho and
western Montana, in 1995 the two agencies announced a second assessment
project leading to an Upper Columbia River Basin Environmental Impact
Statement.
409. Upper Columbia River Basin-EIS Project Update, Comments to Issues and More 6 (July 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter EIS Project Update].
410. Haynes et al., supra note 408.
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ices within an ecosystem's capabilities." 411 Ecosystems are
"dynamic, evolutionary and resilient"; they also have
"biophysical, economic and social limits." 412 What is meant by
"social limits" is not left to the imagination. Maintaining diversity and the "resilience" of natural resources "depends on an
understanding of how society values these resources" and how
"natural and human processes" affect the ecosystem.4 13 The
challenge for resource managers is to balance "biological science" with "how society values renewable and non-renewable
natural resources."4 14 The role of science, by contrast, is not to
provide standards or management principles, but simply to
provide information to managers; scientists should "leave im415
portant value choices" to "duly recognized decision makers"
through "the democratic and institutional processes established."416
Having equated ecosystem management with the political
process, the Framework identifies six "goals" for ecosystem
management.4 17 Goal three is to "maintain viable populations
of native and desired non-native species"; 418 goal five is to
"manage for the human sense of 'place'"; and goal six is to
"manage to maintain the mix of ecosystem goods, functions and
conditions that society wants."4 19 No particular weight is given
to viable populations of species, nor is any prescription made
for resolving the inevitable conflicts between, for example,
goals three and six. These management decisions will require
"mutual learning experiences for stakeholders, planners and
scientists."4 2 ° Viable population analysis leads back to politics.
In all, the Framework comprises over seventy pages of
text, appendices, and citations to virtually everything written
on ecosystem management to date. One appendix presents a
schematic representation of the ecosystem management proc-

411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

EIS Project Update, supra note 409, at 15.
Haynes et al., supra note 408, at 18.
Id. at 28, 29, 39, 40, 41.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49.
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ess. 2 With the thought that it might save further words, the
schematic is reproduced here:

Whatever we have here, it is not law. It is not policy. It is not
even a goal. It is an attempt to make unpleasant management
decisions acceptable to more people by involving them in their
lengthy discussion, and by tempering even the possibility of a
"requirement" with administrative discretion and political
pressure. The Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management Project has rediscovered--once again-multiple use. The
effort may or may not be politically successful. It would certainly not hurt to try, except for what is given up in the process. What are obviously, explicitly, put on the negotiating table in the Interior Columbia Basin process are the hard-won,
objective, and necessary standards of PACFISH. PACFISH,
with its mandatory three-hundred-foot buffers and percentage
of canopy cover, is for trade.

421. Id. at 87 fig.8.
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Nothing better illustrates the potential benefit and reach
of ecosystem management, and its latent danger, than the Inner Columbia Basin story just described. To seek consensus is
admirable. Yet it is neither necessary, nor desirable, nor will it
ultimately be effective, to trade off law in the process.

B. THE PUBLIC RANGE
The public range, the last frontier, has been something of a
last frontier for environmental law as well.42 2 Covering fully
one-fifth of the United States, the public domain is largely arid,
its distances remote, and its historic economy a struggle between cattle and the available grass. The occupation of the
West by livestock in the mid-nineteenth century was one of the
transforming events in the American landscape. In 1870, Arizona Territory held about 5,000 cattle;423 twenty-one years
later there were 1.5 million; across the West the total number
had jumped to 26.5 million head.4 24 They ate out native
grasses; they trampled streams; they pounded valley floors to a
pan of dirt.425 Between the end of the Civil War and the turn of
the century, "700 million acres of grass west of the Mississippi
River [were] depleted or destroyed." 426 On these once rich public lands, efforts at ecosystem management and diversity protection face two great challenges. The first is that the ecosystem we see today has been so greatly altered. The second is
422. As used in this Article, the "public range" refers to approximately 160
million acres of public land located in the 11 Western states and administered
by the Bureau of Land Management, primarily for grazing. See GEORGE
CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 688
(3d ed. 1992) (describing the federal lands upon which grazing is permitted).
423. See DENZEL FERGUSON & NANCY FERGUSON, SACRED COWS AT THE
PUBLIC TROUGH 15 (1983).

424. See id.
425. See id. at 60-99. For a description of the effects of livestock on one
watershed, see WILKINSON, supra note 46, at 75-76 (describing overgrazing on
Camp Creek, Oregon). See also Edward Abbey, Even the Bad Guys Wear
White Hats, HARPER'S, Jan. 1986, at 51, 53 ("[Cattle] pollute our springs and
streams and rivers. They infest our canyons, valleys, meadows, and forests.
They graze off the native bluestem and grama and bunch grasses, leaving behind jungles of prickly pear. They trample down the native forbs and shrubs
and cactus. They spread the exotic cheat grass, the Russian thistle, and the
crested wheat grass."). Some cattlemen see these descriptions as exaggerated, and even absurd. See Richard H. Braun, Emerging Limits on Federal
Land Management Discretion:Livestock, RiparianEcosystems, and Clean Water Law, 17 ENVTL. L. 43, 50 n.16 (1983) (describing concerns for riparian ecosystems as "ripariopsychorrhea).
426. FERGUSON & FERGUSON, supra note 423, at 32.
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that the major source of the alteration, large numbers of cattle,
remains.
We have never been very good at managing cattle on the
public lands. Until recently, we have not even tried. It was
not until 1934 that federal law initiated any administration of
grazing, and what emerged was essentially a monopoly in
grazing permits supported by federal subsidies and run largely
by the stockmen themselves.42 7 In 1976, with only 16% of federal grazing lands in good condition and 84% at "fair, poor or
bad,"428 Congress moved to upgrade BLM's authority to administer these lands by passing the Federal Land Policy and Management Act.429 The results were mixed. The Bureau launched
a series of resource planning efforts, but the cattle lobby was
strong and FLPMA's substantive requirements were highly
discretionary, 43 ° finessing one step everyone knew was necessary for ecosystem restoration: fewer cattle. 431' Even the mod427. See Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1994)). For a description of the power of
grazing permittees, see George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public
Rangeland Management V: Prescriptions for Reform, 14 ENVTL. L. 497,
503-04, 527-28 (1984). The subsidies include below market-cost grazing fees
and federal insecticide, herbicide, chaining, and predator control programs.
See FERGUSON & FERGUSON, supra note 423, at 147-70 (outlining federal
range improvements and arguing that they amount to a massive subsidy to
ranchers); WILKINSON, supra note 46, at 93-94 (describing how the Taylor
Grazing Act allowed the poisoning of competing animal species and the maintenance of below-market value grazing fees).
428. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp.
829, 840 (D.D.C. 1974) (citing a BLM budget report), affd mem., 527 F.2d
1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976); cf Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel,
618 F. Supp. 848, 857 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (citing a BLM budget report classifying
19% of grazing lands as "improving," 65% as "static," and 16% as "declining").
429. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (1976) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994)).
430. FLPMA's policies bottom out on "multiple use," § 202(c)(1), 90 Stat. at
2747 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1) (1994)), for the minimal usefulness of
which see supra note 58 and accompanying text. See also Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1062 (D. Nev. 1985)
("Congress attempted to remedy this [overgrazing] situation through FLPMA,
PRIA and other acts.., which [do] not provide helpful standards by which a
court can readily adjudicate agency compliance."), affd, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir.
1987).
431. See WILKINSON, supra note 46, at 99 (describing industry efforts to
counter FLPMA stock reductions); see also Kelly Nolen, Residents at Risk:
Wildlife and the Bureau of Land Management's PlanningProcess, 26 ENVTL.
L. 771 (1996) (describing the failure of recent BLM "Fish and Wildlife 2000"
and riparian initiatives to significantly reduce grazing impacts). The problem
is not unique to BLM; reducing cattle numbers on Native American reservations has been equally difficult even in times of severe drought. See Elizabeth
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est reductions proposed led to warfare. Unpopular BLM officials were transferred or fired.413 BLM offices were bombed.433
The Secretary of Interior was accused of starting a War on the
West, 434 and to make sure that he lost, local ordinances were
passed forbidding Interior employees from enforcing environmental laws. 435 This was not going to be an easy audience to
sell on ecosystem management. As for the idea of biological diversity, this audience had only recently stopped shooting eagles 436 and was still content
with the fact that it had finally ex437
terminated the wolves.
In the early 1990s, led by a new Secretary of Interior, BLM
tried again. During a three-month period beginning in late
1993, the Secretary met nearly two dozen times with western
governors, state and local officials, ranchers, environmentalists
and other public lands users to discuss rangeland reform.438 At
about the same time, the department circulated an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking on the administration of the
public lands, followed by a draft impact statement, more than
Manning, DroughtHas Navajos Discussing a Taboo Subject-Range Reform,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Carson City), Aug. 5, 1996, at 4 ("The term 'reduction!
is still taboo, but officials now speak of 'livestock adjustments,' then quickly
add the word 'voluntary.'")
432. See Davis, supra note 40; Duerk, supra note 40.
433. See Bomb Rips Building in Nevada, supra note 40, at A5 ("A bomb
exploded on the roof of the Bureau of Land Management office Sunday. The
blast was heard at least two miles away .... The bureau is involved in controversies over grazing fees on federal land and mining law enforcement.").
434. See Jon Christensen, Nevada's Ugly Tug-of-War, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (Carson City), Oct. 30, 1995, at 1, 10 (describing the combat mentality
of some Nevadans in controversies surrounding the use of public lands).
435. See Andrea Hungerford, "Custom and Culture" Ordinances:Not a
Wise Move for the Wise Use Movement, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 457, 461-68 (1995)
(describing the basic elements of local "custom and culture" ordinances and
how they are designed to hamper federal enforcement of environmental pol-

icy).
436. See generally DONALD G. SCHUELER, INCIDENT AT EAGLE RANCH
(1980) (describing eagle killings in Texas); Key Test Avoided on Eagle Killings,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 1973, at A66 (describing eagle killings in Wyoming).
437. See generally HANK FISCHER, WOLF WAs (1995) (describing the extirpation of wolves in the American West and opposition to their reintroduction); Thomas McNamee, Warring Over Wolves, DEFENDERS, Winter 199411995,
at 15-17 (describing opposition to wolf reintroduction in Yellowstone Park). In
the view of one New Mexico resident, the wolf is not endangered; it is in a zoo
where it belongs. See Charles Bowden, Lonesome Lobo, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 44, 51.
438. See Department Hearings and Appeals Procedures; Cooperative Relations; Grazing Administration-Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9,894,
9,894 (1995).
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twenty thousand public comments, and final regulations in
February 1995. 439 The rules were intended to restore the natural ecosystems of the public range.
Although the new regulations cover a wide range of issues,
among the most controversial has been a section titled
"Fundamentals of Rangeland Health."" ° In the face of heated
opposition-e.g., "rangeland reform is not needed," "rangeland
improvement is inconsistent with current laws," reduced allotments would constitute "takings""-the department maintained its goals of restoring the federal range and its proposed
methods for getting there. The goals are the maintenance of
functional watersheds and healthy biotic communities, water
quality standards, and habitat of endangered species and other
species of special interest."2 Where these goals are not met,
BLM must take "appropriate action as soon as practical, but
not later than the start of the next grazing season"; appropriate action may include reducing livestock numbers, seasons or
times of use. 3 A hammer would fall. BLM districts must develop regional or statewide guidelines "to sustain native populations and communities";"' if appropriate guidelines do not
emerge, the regulations provide highly specific "fallback guidelines," for example, that "desired species are . . . allowed to
complete seed dissemination in 1 out of every 3 years."" 5

439. See id. at 9,894-95. Several aspects of these regulations, but not those
at issue in this Article, were successfiffly challenged by the ranching industry
in Wyoming District Court. Public Lands Council v. United States Dep't of
Interior, 929 F. Supp. 1436 (D.Wyo. 1996). The case is now on appeal.
440. 43 C.F.R. § 4180.1 (1995).
441. Department Hearings and Appeals Procedures; Cooperative Relations; Grazing Administration-Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. at 9,906-09.
In response to comments that "rangeland reform is not needed," the Department pointed out that "under current management practices 22 million acres
of BLM uplands would be functioning but susceptible to degradation,...
about 20 million acres would be nonfunctioning," and the toll on riparian areas would be even worse. Id. at 9,907.
442. See id. at 9,898. A small war over these goals has apparently broken
out in Wyoming, which has insisted that its implementing regulations
"recognize the economic impact on grazing communities"; the BLM has, as of
the time of this writing, insisted that the regulations be "based on science and
not socioeconomics." Paul Kirza, Cow Coup: Wyoming Governor Usurps Federal Grazing Group, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Carson City), Dec. 23, 1996, at 4.
The issue, of course, goes to the heart of ecosystem management, and of this
Article.
443. 60 Fed. Reg. at 9,898-99.
444. 43 C.F.R. § 4180.2(e)(10) (1995).
445. Id. § 4180.2(f)(2)(vii).
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In effect, BLM adopted a viable vegetation population
analogue to the Forest Service diversity regulations. Unlike
the service regulations, the "natural background" measuring
stick is absent, due in part to the fact that so much of BLM's
natural landscape has been irreversibly altered." 6 Perhaps for
the same reason, the BLM regulations also lack any requirement that all such populations be maintained. Instead, the
bureau districts must show "significant progress" toward these
goals in order to allow continued grazing at current (or any
other) levels. The specifics of the implementing standards, including "specific quantitative assessment methods," are left to
state and regional guidelines.
Draft Utah regulations were issued in August 1996 with a
stated goal of "sustainable production of the ecosystem's desired outputs."' 4 Not surprisingly for a grazing district, the
document is light in its description of overgrazing and heavy in
its description of the "advantageous relationships between
plants and grazing animals, each contributing to the benefit of
the other.""8 When it further cautions that "rangeland health"
is a relative term capable of only qualitative, and not quantitative, measurement," 9 the reader might be inclined to abandon
the exercise as pointless. That would be a mistake. The document continues by requiring that its standards be "measurable
and attainable,"' 0 establish "parameters for management decisions,"45 ' and be measured by "indicators" to "determine if
standards are being met."4 2 That is, they will be something
close to law.

446. Native, perennial grasses have been widely replaced by cheatgrass, an
annual, exotic species: "It is not likely that knowledge and resources will ever
be available to return all of these areas to their natural potential because they
have been greatly altered." Utah State Office Bureau of Land Mgmt., Preliminary Draft Proposed Standards and Guidelines For Rangeland Health on
Public Lands in Utah 5 (1996) (preliminary draft, on file with author)
[hereinafter Preliminary Proposed Standards].
447. Utah State Office Bureau of Land Mgmt., Standards for Rangeland
Health and Guidelines for Grazing Management on BLM Lands in Utah 3
(Aug. 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Standards for Rangeland Health].
448. Id. at 2.
449. Id. at 3 n.1.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 5.
452. Id. An earlier draft had gone on to explain the role of indicators as
follows: "Just as blood pressure is one indicator of human health, the extent of
sheet erosion is one indicator of the health of a rangeland ecosystem." Preliminary Proposed Standards, supra note 446, at 5.
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The Utah office identified four standards, 453 each supported by narrative indicators such as "root-masses capable of
withstanding high streamflow events" 454 and "absence of indicators of excessive erosion such as rills, soil pedestals, and actively eroding gullies."455 Two of the four standards target an
indicator described as the "Desired Plant Community" and defined as plants selected for "their contributions to ecosystem
outputs (e.g. wildlife, watershed, clean water, etc.)"456 based on
457
the "site's natural succession and management capability."
Importantly, the "desired" plant community is not defined by
human, social or economic demands; rather, it is defined by the
natural potential of the area, restrained only by the limits of
management to restore it to that condition. 458 The baseline, in
other words, is the natural world. The third standard addresses species diversity directly, requiring the "frequency, diversity, density, age classes and productivity of desired species
[e.g., species of the natural system] necessary to ensure reproductive capability and survival."4 9 Species' habitats are to be
"connected at a level that enhances species survival." 4 ' Native
species should "re-occupy habitat niches and voids" caused by
"disturbances" (read: overgrazing).4 61 Standard three should
now look familiar; it is viable population analysis with additional emphasis on reversing habitat fragmentation.4 62
The draft guidelines, the management tools for achieving
the standards, are equally straightforward. Grazing manage-

453. See Standards for Rangeland Health, supra note 447, at 6-9.
454. Id. at 6.
455. Id.
456. Id. (noting standard one is for upland soils and standard two is for
riparian and wetland areas).
457. Id. at 62.
458. In practice, BLM intends to refer to U.S. Soil Conservation Service
surveys projecting, on the basis of climate, soils, and hydrology, the potential
natural community of the area. Telephone Interview with Dean H. Zeller,
Rangeland Team Leader, Utah State Office Bureau of Land Management
(Aug. 22, 1996).
459. Standards for Rangeland Health, supra note 447, at 7.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. EPA has adopted a similar approach for prairie wetland ecosystems,
see Environmental Protection Agency, Bioindicators for Assessing Ecological
Integrity of Prairie Wetlands (July 1996) (on file with author), and, as a
backup measure, for its Clean Water Act pollution discharge control program.
See Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,528, 10,558 (1991).
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ment practices will "meet the physiological requirements of
desired [e.g., endemic] plants" and will "maintain viable and
diverse populations of plants and animals appropriate for the
site."

63

Grazing may continue on rangelands that fail to meet

these standards only if conditionsare approaching the express
requirements. 4" When grazing contributes to poor conditions,
BLM will "prescribe actions" aimed at improvement. 65
The result in Colorado is not so clear. On April 19, 1996,
the Colorado State Office published standards and guidelines
that target the "potential or capability" of the landscape, but
then constrain that capability analysis by "a variety of socialeconomic factors."46 6 The proposal adopted the natural ecosystem as the baseline, but then allowed "local goals" to replace
it.4 67 The local goal may be a "desired future condition,"4 68 that
is rooted in conservation, but it is then compromised by defining the "desired plant community" as one that "meets the goals
established for the landscape." 469 The standards themselves contain the same ambiguity: upland soils must have "appropriate"
ground cover, 470 and riparian systems must have vigorous
"desired" plants. 471 These standards reveal an inherent vagueness. Native communities are to be distributed across the
landscape, but nothing specifies the means by which these
communities are selected. The goal of the exercise remains
opaque, the mechanisms unclear.
Neither proposal may survive in its present form. The
forces of erosion work on regulations as inexorably as they do
on soils, and indeed the Utah regulations were weakened be463. Standards for Rangeland Health, supra note 447, at 8.
464. Id. at 11. This seemingly straightforward requirement still allows
more discretionary enforcement than BLM officials can handle. A previous
draft required that when range conditions fell below par and showed no improvement, grazing would be ended until it again became compatible with the
ecosystem. Preliminary Proposed Standards, supra note 446, at 15. The current draft, by contrast, places the burden of proving the poor conditions and of
articulating a proper remedy on the BLM, a burden it has rarely met. Standards for Rangeland Health, supra note 447, at 10-11.
465. Standards for Rangeland Health, supra note 447, at 11.
466. Colorado State Office, Bureau of Land Management, Standards for
Public Land Health and Guidelines for Livestock Grazing Management in
Colorado 2 (Apr. 19, 1996) (on file with author).
467. Id.

468.
469.
470.
471.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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fore the official public comment period began. The lesson for
this study lies in the tools chosen to improve battered ecosystems once management responsibility for that chore has been
accepted. Utah turned to objective indicators for guidance.
Colorado has kept its options open. Which approach will prove
more effective remains an open question, but fifty years of
rangeland management without specific standards should
provide a clue.
C. THE PUBLIC OCEANS
Beyond public forests and rangelands, beyond the reach of
piers and offshore oil platforms, lies one of the world's oldest
economies: commercial fisheries. Since 1976, the United States
has exercised an extended fisheries jurisdiction stretching 200
miles from the shoreline.47 2 This jurisdiction covers more than
100,000 miles of U.S. coastline, and more than 2.2 million
nautical square miles of ocean-an area roughly doubling the
size of the United States47 3 and encompassing nearly 20% of
the world's maritime fisheries.474 As a matter of simple geography, the management responsibility is awesome.
Only this decade have statistics revealed how poorly the
United States has exercised this responsibility. Much of the
New England fishing fleet, once the pride of the region, now
sits grounded in port;4 75 the federal government is now trying
to buy out the boats.47 6 Salmon fishing has been banned off the
coast of Washington, and severely restricted down the western
seaboard.4 7 Chesapeake Bay oysters are at 1% of historical
levels; swordfish are landing at 60 pounds instead of 1000
pounds and more; bluefin tuna are down 90% since 1975; had-

472. See 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994).
473. See Eldon V.C. Greenburg, Ocean Fisheries,in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 260 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993).
474. See id. at 260-61 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-416, at 11 (1975)).

475. See The Tragedy of the Fisheries,LAND LETTER, Apr. 20, 1994, at 255;
see also Deborah Cramer, Troubled Waters, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1995,
at 22; Ken Hinman, State of the Seas, SALT WATER SPORTSMAN, April 1995, at
62; Michael Parfit, DiminishingReturns, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, November 1995,
at2.
476. In March 1995, the Department of Commerce announced a $2 million
pilot program to buy out fishing boats on the Georges Bank and retire them;
the pilot was seen as a prelude to a $100 million buyout progam. See Roger
DiSilvestro, Are We Headed Toward a Fishless Ocean?, DEFENDERS, Spring
1995, at 29.
477. See The Tragedy of the Fisheries,supra note 475, at 255.
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dock are down 94% since 1960; and harvestable cod and yellowtail flounder are at their lowest levels on record.478 Between 1990 and 1992, the chief groundfish species of New
England dropped 30% from historic averages. 479 The biomass
of bottomfish in the Gulf of Mexico has dropped 85% since
1973, largely due to shrimp trawling.48 °
These declines have economic consequences. In 1990, near
the onset of the current crashes, U.S. fishermen landed a record 4.4 million metric tons, valued at $3.6 billion. In that year,
U.S. consumers spent $26.7 billion for fishery products; 481 an
estimated 17 million recreational fishermen caught 230.9 million fish on 39.8 million trips into just the Atlantic Ocean and
the Gulf of Mexico.48 2 U.S. fisheries generate an estimated
$111 billion a year, and employ 1.5 million working Americans.483 The collapse of the New England fishing industry
alone cost 14,000 jobs and $350 million in annual revenues.48 4
Something went very wrong.
Fisheries management will never be a simple business.
485
Managers often lack basic information on fish populations,
and even healthy stocks fluctuate widely in nature, often undermined by natural or human events over which managers
have no control.486 Managers also face the balkanization of law
enforcement jurisdictions, with state, federal, and international authorities often exercising control over the same stocks
and species. 487 Add to this palette the growing conflicts among
478. See id. at 1-2.
479. See id. at 1.
480. See id. at 2.
481. See Greenburg, supra note 473, at 267.
482. See id.
483. See The Tragedy of the Fisheries,supra note 475, at 2. The Commerce
Department estimates that, with proper national management, U.S. fisheries
could create 300,000 new jobs and $3 billion additional income. Saving the
Fish,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at A22.
484. See Saving the Fish,supra note 483, at A22.
485. See Michael Weber, Federal Marine Fisheries Management, in
AUDUBON WILDLIFE REPORT 267 (Amos S. Eno et. al. eds., 1986).
486. See Kelley, Making the Habitat Connection, NAT'L FISHERIEs, April
1991, at 20 (relating the loss of habitat to declines in fish populations).
487. See 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994) (extending state fisheries and maintenance jurisdiction to three miles from the shoreline). See generally WILLIAM
T. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 1-25 (1994) (discussing
the evolution of jurisdictional boundaries; national jurisdiction, extends 200
miles before the high seas become subject to international regulation); Greenburg, supra note 473, at 269 (noting that as early as the mid-1970s, the
United States had entered into 22 international agreements on ocean re-
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fisheries users and fishery-dependent communities: recreational fishers versus commercial, seiners versus longliners,
large boats versus small, wild culture versus mariculture, and
the ultimate enigma of whether the objective of management is
to increase production, or biomass, or dollar value, or to lower
consumer prices, or to preserve coastal traditions and ways of
life.488 In all of this tug of war, we have never attempted to
manage the ecosystem as a whole-assuming that such a thing
is even possible4 89-or to preserve ecosystem diversity.4 90 More
disappointing, we have been unable to maintain even the bestknown and most commercially-important fish stocks at sustainable levels, despite an elaborate statutory framework requiring just that. These failures reveal the imprint of both
consensus-based politics and a poorly articulated standard of
law.
The passage of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976 (FCMA), like the nearly concurrent
passage of NFMA and FLPMA, was the watershed event in
U.S. ocean fishery management. Although it reads as a conservation law, the FCMA was motivated by the specter of foreign fishing fleets, some the size of small cities, that were
stripping the Georges Banks and similar "inexhaustible" fishing grounds of their riches. 491 Under the Act, U.S. fishermen
sources covering many fish species and stocks, including tuna, herring, halibut, cod and salmon); Weber, supra note 485, at 325-26 (discussing the problems caused by fish that spawn and then migrate across jurisdictional
boundaries).
488. See DiSilvestro, supra note 476, at 29 (describing these and other
fisheries management conflicts); Parfit, supra note 475, at 2 (discussing a variety of management issues and problems).
489. See Greenburg, supra note 473, at 264 ("Ecosystem interactions may
be too inherently complex and marked by too much uncertainty to provide a
realistic basis for the management of fish stocks"). See generally ELLIOT
NORSE, GLOBAL MARINE BIOLOGICAL DrVERSiTY: A STRATEGY FOR BUILDING
CONSERVATION INTO DEcISIONMAKING, at xvii (1993) ("How to accommodate
our material needs and growing desires while not degrading the life support
systems of a world that was not designed to accommodate billions of us is the
greatest challenge facing the human species."); Brett Hagar & Raymond Just,
PredatorMIS, 9 T-ULANE ENvTL. L.J. 385 (1996) (offering a creative solution to
incorporating coherent ecosystem principles into management plans).
490. See Kokechik Fisherman's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d
795, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that the FCMA § 301 requires consideration
of the impacts of harvests on interrelated stocks, but this requirement has not
been regularly implemented).
491. See Weber, supra note 485, at 282 (showing that, in the Northeast,
foreign fleets had driven domestic stocks down by 50% between 1961 and
1973); John P. Wise, Federal Conservation and Management of Fisheries in
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would come first, a principle that virtually eliminated foreign
fishing in U.S. waters.4 92 What it also did, unfortunately, was
by other countries with unsusreplace unsustainable fishing 493
tainable fishing by Americans.
The FCMA establishes a planning process guided by management principles intended to lead to conservation and based
on concepts of sustained yield.4 94 It begins with a policy statement directing the government "to take immediate action to
conserve and manage" U.S. ocean fishery resources. 495 The
government will "promote domestic commercial and recreational fishing,"496 but "under sound management principles,"49
498
thus steering the program back toward its original goals.
Two features nearly unique to national fisheries law then follow. The first is the replacement of sustained yield by
"optimum yield."499 The second is decisionmaking by regional
councils composed of state fishery managers and by represen50 0
tatives of the commercial and recreational fishing industries.
Each presents a special problem.
The "optimum yield" (OY) standard for fisheries begins
with the concept of sustained yield. 0 1 The House Report underlying the FCMA describes maximum sustained yield (MSY)
as "the safe upper limit of harvest which can be taken consistently year after year without diminishing the stock."50 2 In
the United States 24 (1991) (on file with author) (noting that, as of 1974,
while American boats were taking $2.5 billion in fish from the U.S. zone, foreign boats were taking $9 billion from the same waters); see also JOSEPH J.
KALo, COASTAL AND OcEAN LAW 437-38 (1990).
492. Wise, supra note 491, at 26-27; see also Associated Vessels Servs. v.
Verity, 628 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1988) (illustrating the lengths to which the
United States went to exclude foreign fishing from domestic waters).
493. Wise, supra note 491, at 7 ("[Tlhe major effect of the Act has been replacement of foreign overfishing by domestic overfishing.").
494. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851 (1994) (describing the national standards for
fishery conservation and management); id. § 1853 (describing the contents
required of fishery management plans); id. § 1854 (describing agency review
of management plans); id. § 1855 (outlining the process for implementing
management plans).
495. Id. § 1801(b)(1).
496. Id. § 1801(b)(3).
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id. § 1851(a)(1).
500. See id. § 1852 (describing the establishment and operating characteristics of regional fishery management councils).
501. See 50 C.F.R. § 602.11(d) (1995) (discussing in detail the determination of OY and its relationship to a specified MSY).
502. H.R. REP. No. 94-445, at 46(1976).
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practice, managers may determine MSY from average past
catches, computer models, biomass estimates, or similar methods.50 3 OY is prescribed on the basis of MSY "as modified by
any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor."5°4 The
opaque quality of this standard should be readily apparent.
The legislative history of the FCMA explains the use of OY by
noting that conditions may necessitate driving a stock below
sustainability, if only temporarily, for the benefit of other
stocks or the ecosystem as a whole. 0 Fair enough-thus far,
the bottom line remains reasonably objective. The House Report continues, however, by explaining that OY also compels
fishery managers to consider "the economic well-being of the
commercial fishermen, the interests of recreational
fishermen,
5 0 6 QY "will
and the welfare of the nation and its consumers."
be a carefully defined deviation from MSY" in order to accommodate these interests. 7 Exactly how one might arrive at a
"carefully defined" departure from the consideration of such
broad and open-ended interests is not explained; nor can it be.
Pitted against the relentless pressure toward overuse that affects all public resources, from grass to timber to fisheries to
water, OY provides no effective brake. 8 To the fishing fleet of
503. See 50 C.F.R. § 602.11 (d)(2)-(3) ("MSY... must be based on the best
scientific information available.... MSY may need to be adjusted because of
environmental factors, stock peculiarities, or other biological variances .....
504. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18)(B) (1994).
505. See H.R. REP. No. 94-445, at 47.
506. Id. at 48. NMFS regulations proceed to make the concept of OY even
more murky by explaining that it "need not be expressed in terms of numbers
or weight of fish," 50 C.F.R. § 602.11 (f)(4)(i) (1995), and that management
measures should not exceed OY "by a substantial amount." § 602.11(g).
507. H.R. REP. No. 94-445, at 48.
508. It should be noted that the regulations also prohibit "overfishing."
See 50 C.F.R. § 602.11(a)-(b) (1995). This prohibition is soon weakened, however, by the statement that "[elxceeding OY does not necessarily constitute
overfishing." § 602.11(g)(2). Overfishing, nowhere defined in the statute, is
defined by regulations to mean a level of harvest jeopardizing the "capacity of
a stock or stock complex to produce MSY on a continuing basis." § 602.11(c).
Unfortunately, NMFS has interpreted this injunction to allow overfishing on a
less than long-term basis; the definition is also unclear as to whether a stock,
once depleted, may still be heavily fished so long as some recovery is possible.
See Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (1st Cir. 1977) (allowing the Secretary discretion to allow fishing as long as some recovery is possible). As
might be expected, NMFS takes the position that it may. To make matters
even less clear and therefore less enforceable, the guidelines the Secretary is
to develop are stated to be nonbinding and without the force of law. See 16
U.S.C. § 1851(b) (1994). The bottom line for overfishing ends up looking familiar to a student of population viability under the Forest Service diversity
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New Bedford, Massachusetts, OY means more fish today.
Every reasoned analysis of the FCMA has identified OY as an
Achilles' heel of the national fisheries program. 0 9 Particularly
so, as next seen, when the prisoners are making the decisions.
The second unique feature of the FCMA is that the commercial fishing fleet of New Bedford and the agency promoting
commercial fisheries in the State of Massachusetts are lead
players in determining the harvest.5 10 The conflicts here have
become obvious even to the popular press."' 1 A report of the
American Fisheries Society asked: "Can people who clearly
represent specific economic interests perform adequately as
trustees of the public resources they use? [Qin balance the answer is no ... ."512 Every reasoned critique of the FCMA has
identified this conflict as a source of the51 catastrophe
in the
3
Northeast, and the ones elsewhere to come.
mandate. Both agencies will allow harvest right down to the point ofjeopardy
and endangerment; nothing else is enforceable and anything goes. See supra
notes 90-121 and accompanying text (discussing survival of the northern spotted owl as the bottom line for Pacific old-growth forest management); supra
notes 162-170 and accompanying text (discussing survival of indicator species
as the basis for Tongass Forest planning).
509. See KALO, supra note 491, at 505-06; Greenburg, supra note 473, at
262 (discussing the difficulties in applying the OY standard); Marine Fish
Conservation Network, How Congress Can Conserve America's Fisheries,
NETWORK NEWS, March 1995, at 2 (proposing a stronger OY standard).
510. In order not to run afoul of constitutional limitations'on the delegation of federal authority to non-federal entities, the Act reserves final approval
of management plans to the Secretary of Commerce. See 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)-(b)
(1994). According to one experienced observer, in practice the Secretary exercises "just enough adult supervision over the activities of the self-interested
councils to permit the unblushing argument that the system is constitutional."
Robert J. McManus, America's Saltwater Fisheries: So Few Fish, So Many
Fishermen, NAT. RESOuRcEs & ENV'T, Spring 1995, at 4. Like Mr. Greenburg,
Mr. McManus was formerly General Counsel to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Id. at 1.
511. "[Flishermen have extracted short-term benefits at the expense of the
long-term stability of the resources and the industry." Wise, supra note 491,
at 8 (citing W.J. Campbell, Empty Nets--the Devastation of a New England
Resource, HARTFORD COURANT, July 9-11, 1989).
512. Id. (citing testimony of the Society on the reauthorization of the Magnuson Act, American Fisheries Society Newsletter 7(2), at 3-7).
513. See Marine Fish Conservation Network, supra note 509, at 2;
McManus, supra note 510, at 14; Wise, supra note 491, at 8-10; see also Barry
Meir, Fight in CongressLooms on Fishing;Concerns Raised on Ethics of Regulatory Councils, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1994, at B9 (discussing conflicts of interest in fishery councils). No participant in or observer of the Regional
Council process, with its scientific reports and detailed committee work, can
fail to be impressed by the ability and dedication of virtually everyone involved or by its phenomenon of consensus-decisionmaking. As the collapse of
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This experience in fisheries management offers some
poignant lessons for the protection of diversity and larger ecosystems. One would think that regulating direct take of a single species, implicating as it does what might be left for tomorrow, would be a more simple task both scientifically and
politically. Instead, it becomes clear that few public resource
users, no matter what might come tomorrow, are going to conserve out of instinct, intelligence, or the goodness of their
hearts. It is the classic prisoner's dilemma, and turning resource decisions over to the prisoners is not likely to achieve
high levels of either self-restraint or resource protection. 14
A second and corollary lesson is that, no matter who
makes decisions this difficult, they will not be made in favor of
conservation without a firm, fact-based standard: law to apply.
The only reason that restraints on fishing finally came to New
England-despite a level of resource devastation patent even
to the most casual observer and long clear to the NMFS and
the New England Regional Fisheries Management Council-is
that the Conservation Law Foundation of New England
brought a lawsuit to require them. 5
Even on the waffling
standards of the FCMA, the Foundation was so likely to prevail that the process blinked. 16
Stepping back from these lessons, one can see an unsettling parallel between fisheries management and the emerging
trend towards terrestrial ecosystem management. It rests in
the relationship between the people-are-part-of-ecosystems approach of the new ecosystem guidelines, and the people-arepart-of-acceptable-yield tenet of OY. Biological diversity and
ecosystem protection are, like fisheries, basically about yield.
Once people's wants and desires become the standard for the
harvest-whether the subject is timber, grass, watersheds or
the New England fishery amply demonstrates, however, when it comes to
hard calls on harvest levels, consensus and its compromises do not always
achieve conservation and sustainability.
514. The stakeholder-decisionmaking nature of the FCMA is not restricted
to its Regional Councils. Stakeholders also have ready access to Congress,
and few natural resource laws have more special exceptions for one segment
of an industry or another, one region or another, than the FCMA. Greenburg,
supra note 473, at 286-87. The great majority of these exceptions have one
thing in common: they undermine conservation in favor of a stakeholder.
515. Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v. Mosbacher, No.
91-11759-MA, 1991 WL 501640 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 1991).
516. The Conservation Law Foundation lawsuit led to a consent decree requiring more protective management on a fixed schedule. See Greenburg, supra note 473, at 258-95.
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tuna-there is no standard at all. There is only a process that
will continue to lead back to derelict timber towns in the
Northern Rockies and the moribund docks of New Bedford,
Massachusetts.:
IV. DIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM PLANNING ON
NON-FEDERAL LANDS
While every environmental program contributes in some
way to diversity and ecosystem protection, 518 no federal law attempted to safeguard species and their habitat from state and
private development until the Endangered Species Act.
Adopted in 1972 to protect both listed species and "the ecosystems on which [they] depend,"519 the Act has become the driving force for large scale conservation on non-federal lands.
Of interest to this study is the extent to which the ESA has
brought large-scale, ecosystemic planning to private land development, and the reason it has been able to do so. This extent is remarkable because, in its quest, the ESA has come up
against forces so dominant in the American landscape that
they had resisted all prior, and at times compelling, impulses
for change. Two-thirds of the United States is privately owned,
5 20
as are the majority of its endangered biological communities.

517. At the time of this writing, the FCMA was in the final stages of reauthorization, during which serious efforts were made to impose a biological,
MSY standard on fishery management plans and to restructure the regional
fishery councils. FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT AMENDMENTS OF
1995, H.R. REP. No. 104-171, at 22-23. Neither effort had succeeded. Id.
518. For example, federal water pollution environmental programs under
the Clean Water Act, imposing discharge limits on private industry, have
made significant improvements to ecosystems as large as the Great Lakes and
the Chesapeake Bay. See ENvIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL
WATER QUALITY INVENTORY 314 (1995) (citing improvements in the Great
Lakes); id. at 330 (citing improvements in Chesapeake Bay).
519. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (b) (1994). The statute reads:
The purposes of this Act are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such
endangered species and threatened species, and to take such steps as
may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
Id.
520. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:
INFORMATION ON SPECIES PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 4-5 (1994)
(stating that 90% of listed species are found on non-federal lands; 73% of
listed species have more than 60% of their habitat on non-federal lands, and
37% of them rely exclusively on non-federal habitat).
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The accelerating pace of development on these lands is apparent to anyone who looks out the window. 21 Enter the ESA and,
for the first time, a bottom line.
A. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT PLANNING
Despite the purpose of the ESA-to protect ecosystems as
well as species-and the authority it conferred to regulate the
"taking" of species by private parties,522 the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service was fully occupied in the early years of the Act
23
with its application to the localized effects of federal projects.1
Then, in the early 1980s, two federal courts ratified a Service
regulation5 24 defining "take" to include habitat modification by
state and private actors. 25 At about the same time, a proposed
private housing development on San Bruno Mountain, south of
San Francisco, threatened the habitat of three endangered butterflies, setting the stage for a classic megabucks-versus-insect
confrontation. 26 Instead, the confrontation took an unexpected
path. " The developer, the state, the county, environmentalists and the Service sat down, negotiated, and after two hard
years came up with a development and conservation plan.5 28
The inescapable issue of the discussions was how much of what
521. For readers who have not looked out this window recently, here is the
picture on the Front Range of Colorado: "Development is intensifying all
along the 70-mile corridor from Denver to Colorado Springs and threatens to
merge the two cities into a single metropolis. The State estimates that an average of 10 acres of open lands yield to development every hour, or 90,000
acres per year." GOCO, COMMON GRoUND, July-Aug. 1996, at 7.
522. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994) (stating, in pertinent part, "it is unlawful for any person... to take any such species within the United States").
523. For a discussion of these issues, see Houck, supra note 6, at 292-311;
and Kilbourne, supra note 6, at 564-72.
524. 50 C.F.R § 17.21(a), (c)(1995).
525. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495,
497 (9th Cir. 1981) (defining the state's maintenance of feral sheep and goats
in the Palila's critical habitat as a taking because the action endangered the
species); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (taking
under advisement claims that agency actions constituted a taking). The
Service's regulation has been subsequently upheld in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapterof Communities for a GreaterOregon, 115 S.Ct. 2407, 2413-16 (1995).
526. See William E. Lehman, Reconciling Conflicts Through Habitat ConservationPlanning,ENDANGERED SPEcIEs BuLL., Jan-Feb. 1995, at 16-17; see
also Robert D. Thornton, Searchingfor Consensus and Predictability:Habitat
ConservationPlanning Under the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL.
L. 605, 621-26 (1991) (discussing plans for development on San Bruno Mountain).
527. See Lehman, supra note 526, at 17-18.
528. See id.
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type of habitat the butterflies needed, and where. 2 9 Under the
final plan, 80% of the mountain and 90% of the butterfly habitat was protected. 530 The San Bruno plan would set the
model-and a very high standard of protection-for all that
was to follow.
Emboldened by this experience, in 1982 Congress incorporated the San Bruno process into the Endangered Species Act,
allowing private parties to "take" listed species with an approved habitat conservation plan.531 That done, nothing much
happened for a while; between 1983 and 1989, only two other
HCPs, involving small parcels of land, were adopted. 53 2 In
1990, however, the program began to move; by September
1994, the Service had issued 36 HCP permits and 13 more
permit amendments; 150 additional HCPs were in the works.5 33
Not only did HCP numbers expand, so did their scope. A plan
for the Simpson Timber Company, California, covered 380,000
acres; International Paper Company, Alabama, 30,000 acres;
Washington County, Utah, 135,000 acres; South Carolina Forestry Commission, 2 million acres; and Kern County, California, 2 million acres. 534 Of the original 36 permits, 22 were for
isolated projects, but the remaining 14 were moving to regional-scale planning.5 35 The ante was going up.
As the ante went up on private lands, so did fears and
frictions between developers and the government. 5 36 The development community moved aggressively with proposals to

529. See id. at 17.
530. See id. at 18.
531. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1994). A habitat conservation plan is one designed to permit activity that would otherwise harm a listed species through
specific measures to minimize and offset that harm. See Thornton, supra note
526, at 621 (outlining requirements that must be met to allow an incidental
taking). Congress has prescribed objective requirements for plan approvals,
including a determination that less harmful alternatives are not available,
adequate finding, mitigation and impacts that "will not appreciably reduce
the likelihood of survival and recovery" of species in the wild. Id.
532. See Lehman, supra note 526, at 18. The development of the early
HCPs is well described in MICHAEL J. BEAN ET AL., RECONCILING CONFLICTS
UNDER THE ESA: THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING EXPERIENCE 7-10

(1991).
533. See Lehman, supra note 526, at 18.
534. See id.
535. See id. at 19.
536. See generally Babbitt, supra note 371 (describing tensions between
developers and the ESA, and means to alleviate them).
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weaken the Act,537 while the Clinton administration moved as
rapidly as it could to make the Act more user-friendly-while
keeping it active in the non-federal game.5 38 The administration offered states, industry, and private landowners early access to endangered species planning,5 39 the opportunity to plan
for multiple species at a time, 540 and the certainty that, once an
agreement to take protective measures was struck, it would be
all but final no matter what bad turn the species, or newlydiscovered species, might take. 41 Most germane to this study,
the planning itself-which might take place prior to a species
listing,542 in conjunction with the listing of a threatened species,543 or as a habitat conservation plan for a listed species 5 "
537. See Timothy Egan, Industries Affected by Endangered Species Act
Help a Senator Rewrite Its Provisions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, at A20
(discussing the role of affected industries to assist in rewriting the ESA to
"scrap major provisions").
538. See The White House, ProtectingAmerica's Living Heritage:A Fair,
Cooperative and Scientifically Sound Approach to Improving the Endangered
Species Act, reprinted in 8 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 5 (1994) (announcing initiatives to make the ESA more flexible and to accommodate private landowners).
539. See Notice of Availability of Draft Guidance for Candidate Species
Under the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,780 (1994) (soliciting
public comments of all interested parties on draft guidance for candidate species).
540. See Notice of Intragency Cooperative Policy on Recovery Plan Participation and Implementation Under the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg.
34,272, 34,273 (1994) (stating a policy to "develop multiple species plan"
where possible).
541. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service & National Marine Fisheries
Service, No Surprises: Assuring Certainty for Private Landowners in Endangered Species Act Habitat Conservation Planning (Aug. 11, 1994) (on file with
author).
542. See supra note 538 and accompanying text (discussing Clinton administration offers of early access to endangered species planning); see also
The EndangeredSpecies Act: Testimony Before the EndangeredSpecies Task
Force of the House Resources Comm., 104th Cong. (1995), available in 1995
WL 331945 (testimony of George T. Frampton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Interior, describing pre-listing planning); Current Managementand Issues in the
Lower Basin of the Colorado River: Statement Before the Water and Power
Subcomm. of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Comm., 103d Cong.
(1994), available in 1994 WL 14188548 (statement of Elizabeth Ann Rieke,
Assistant Secretary of Interior, describing pre-listing planning on the Lower
Colorado River).
543. Section 4(d) of the ESA allows the Secretary some flexibility in determining conditions of "take" of threatened species, through the issuance of
special regulations. 16 U.S.C § 1333(d) (1994). While the limits of this flexibility are not altogether clear, see Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783 (D.
Minn. 1984), afrd in part, rev'd in part, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985), the Department has relied on Section 4(d) authority to negotiate protective regulations for increasingly large habitat areas. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 16,758 (1993)

1997]

LAW OFBIODIVERSITY

957

would look more comprehensively at large-scale, state-wide,
region-wide resource management.
ESA-based ecosystem
planning was off to the races.
No single study can capture the sweep of this planning.
By the summer of 1996, 320 HCPs had been adopted or were
under development, in addition to an unrecorded number of
Section 4(d) and pre-listing agreements. 4 5 Irrigation projects
on the Umatilla, the Truckee-Carson and the Yakima Rivers
were being revised. 4 6 The Upper Colorado River was deep into
a multi-year planning exercise that will inevitably lead to remanagement of water levels and instream flows. 5 47 The Lower
Colorado was embroiled in a similar exercise from Colorado to
Mexico,5 48 as were users and regulators of the Platte River Basm of Wyoming and Nebraska.5 49 Hydropower operations were
in question along the length of the Columbia River for the Pacific salmon, 550 and along rivers of the eastern seaboard for the
Atlantic salmon, the width of the continent away. 51 An entirely new water management regime had come to the Sacra-

(the California gnatcatcher); 57 Fed. Reg. 594 (1992) (the Louisiana black
bear); see also 60 Fed. Reg. 9484 (1995) (the northern spotted owl); discussion
supra notes.
544. See, e.g., Kern County HCP, discussed in text accompanying supra
note 534.
545. See Memorandum of John Kostyack and Tom France, Counsel, National Wildlife Federation, to Scott Jacobs, Office of Rep. Saxton et al., 3 (May
14, 1996) (on file with author).
546. A recent description of these and other irrigation project revisions is
contained in Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Managing Reclamation Facilities for
Ecosystem Benefits, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 197 (1996).
547. See James S. Lochhead, Upper Colorado River Fish: A Recovery Program That Is Working-Myth or Reality? 1 (Symposium, Biodiversity Protection: Implementation and Reform of the Endangered Species Act, University
of Colorado School of Law, June 10-12, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
548. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Memorandum of Agreement for
Development of a Lower Colorado River Species Conservation Program (1996)
(on file with author).
549. See Ruhl, supra note 4, at 598 n.123 (citing Memorandum of Agreement for Central Platte River Basin Endangered Species Recovery Implementation Program (June 10, 1994)).
550. See supra text accompanying note 394.
551. See National Ass'n of Fisheries Organizations, Annual Report of U.S.
Atlantic Salmon Assessment Committee 12-15 (Mar. 1996) (on file with
author). Atlantic Salmon restoration efforts have been driven in part by a
petition to list Atlantic Salmon stocks as endangered species. See RESTORE:
The North Woods, et al., Petition for a Rule to List the Anadromous Atlantic
Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act (Sept. 1993) (on file with author).
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mento delta552 and to South Florida as well. 3 Coastal Florida
counties were beginning to zone development along their
beaches and canals,554 coastal Alabama along its beaches. 55
Massive private forest holdings were being revamped in Georgia, North Carolina, and across the American South; 556 a plan
for 1.6 million acres of state forest lands was adopted in
Washington.5 5 Central Texas, unable to keep itself from extinguishing its own water supply, was finally being required to
think again, 58 as were, to their continuing grief, real estate developers in the hill country around Austin, Texas 55 9-- each to
meet the biological needs of endangered species.
The adequacy of these plans and planning processes is not
at issue here; 560 nor are the genuine frustrations of their many
participants.5 61 Planning on this scale, if it is to effect any
552. See Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward
Sustainability, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 347-49 (1996) (discussing the agreement between California and the EPA).
553. See Thomas T. Ankersen & Richard Haymann, Ecosystem Management and the Everglades:A Legal and InstitutionalAnalysis, 11 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 473 (1996).
554. See FLA. STAT. § 370.12 (1997) (requiring permits for any development activity affecting endangered marine turtles and the construction of
docks and piers in waterways frequented by the endangered manatee).
555. See Carl Hulse, Building Near EndangeredSpecies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
28, 1993, at C4 (describing Alabama plan).
556. See Hulse, supra note 555 (describing International Paper plans in
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi to protect the gopher tortoise and red
hills salamander); see also Bruce Babbitt, Save Our Countryside: On the Move
to Save the Red-Cockaded Woodpecker, COUNTRY LIVING, July 1996, at 14,
(describing a conservation agreement regarding Georgia-Pacific Corp. forest
holdings); Robert L. Peters, Hope for the Red-Cockaded?, DEFENDERS, Fall
1996, at 27 (describing a statewide forest conservation plan for Georgia).
557. See HabitatPlanningin Washington, LAND LETTER, Nov. 15, 1996, at
6 (noting approval of an HCP to manage 1.63 million acres of state-owned
timberlands).
558. See Carlos Guerra, This Isn't About Blind Critters, Bunny Huggers,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 24, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11496386
(quoting Senior U.S. District Court Judge Lucius D. Bunton Im: "The Edwards
Aquifer region has finally reached the point where the aquifer is unable to
provide for the needs of all those who depend upon it during dry years").
559. The controversy surrounding this development and the New Balconies HCP is described in J.B. Rubl, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning
Under the EndangeredSpecies Act: Pushing the Legal and PracticalLimits of
Species Protection,44 SW. L.J. 1393 (1991).
560. For questions concerning the adequacy of the plans, see Houck, supra
note 6, at 356-58.
561. See Ruhl, supra note 559, at 1421 (discussing problems with a Texas
RHCP); Thornton, supra note 526, at 608 (noting frustrations of the development community).
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change, is an agony. What is at issue here is the ambition and
magnitude of what is currently under way. Those who contend
that the ESA is deficient because it fails to address biological
diversity and ecosystem protection on a broad enough scaleand these complaints have become something of a mantra in
the literature-simply have not opened their eyes. Those who
complain that the ESA is forcing "federal solutions" on state
and private parties have not opened their eyes either. What
the ESA has done in each of these instances is to convene the
meeting and draw a bottom line.5 62 It has acted as the therapist for conduct we all knew was harmful and had limits, but
could not bring ourselves to admit was a problem, much less
begin to solve.
That the ESA has been able to do this much is a miracle. 6 3
Against some of the most entrenched powers on the American
landscape, it has managed to compel hard conversations and
hold us to them until we agreed on new patterns of behavior.
Why the ESA, when all other laws have fallen short? The answer is obvious to anyone who has participated even on the
periphery of the process, and is oft-stated by those most heavily and bitterly engaged.5 6 The ESA provides the muscle for
the discussions: a reason for them to take place, and a boundary below which they cannot fall. The reason is the presence of
a salmon, owl, or desert tortoise, an ultimate indicator species.
562. See John H. Cushman, Jr., U.S. and CaliforniaSign Water Accord,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1994, at A24 (describing ESA-driven Sacramento Delta
planning); Lindell L. Marsh, Conservation Planning Under the Endangered
Species Act: A New Paradigm for Conserving Biological Diversity, 8 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 97, (1994) (describing ESA-driven collaborative planning along
California's southern coast).
563. In part, the power and reach of the ESA is due to the early boost it
received from the Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978)
(stating that "[tlhis language admits of no exception"). It is also, however, due
to a strong public sentiment in favor of species preservation, a sentiment that
approaches a morality and faith. See Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect
EndangeredSpecies, and What Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on
PrivateProperty to Protect Them Constitute "Takings"?, 80 IOWA L. REv. 297,
299 n.10 (1995).
564. For an example, see the acknowledgment of California Secretary of
Natural Resources concerning the conservation planning for the southern
California coast, infra text accompanying note 585; see also the similar remarks of John Volkman, General Counsel for the Northwest Planning Council
on revised-planning for the Columbia River, in Columbia River Salmon: Are
Any of the ESA Tools Adequate for the Job?, Symposium, Biodiversity Protection: Implementation and Reform of the Endangered Species Act, University
of Colorado School of Law, June 10-12, 1996 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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The boundary is impairment of these species' ability to maintain viable populations. These determinations are objective,
science-based and enforceable. They are law to apply. Without
such law, very few of these conversations would have taken
66
place.5 65 Fewer still would have led to meaningful change.
The truth of these assertions, and their positive impact,
can be tested not just by the data summarized above but by examining two ESA case histories in more detail.

B. MULTIPLE-SPECIES MANAGEMENT IN ACTION
The following histories illustrate the potential of multiple
species-based planning for ecosystem management on private
lands. Each started with a formidable-indeed, historically irresistible-development pressure. Each arrived at a comprehensive plan for diversity and ecosystem protection. And each
got there through the use of indicator species.
1. The California Coastal Sage Shrub Plan
The State of California has proven to be the innovator and
the test site for much of modern environmental law, and no
less for the protection of biological diversity. As noted above,
the first habitat conservation plans were developed around
California species, precedent for what is now taking place in
every region of the country. In California, meanwhile, this
565. Virtually every one of the ESA's achievements and continuing efforts
towards ecosystem and large-scale diversity planning was initiated by a listing petition, a critical habitat designation petition, or a lawsuit over current
operations under the ESA. See discussions supra notes 90-147 and accompanying text (Pacific northwest old-growth forests), notes 148-224 and accompanying text (Alaska old-growth forests), notes 381-421 and accompanying text
(Columbia River management); infra note 571 and accompanying text (coastal
California development). A full listing would exceed 100 reported cases and
dozens more administrative actions, and is beyond the scope of this Article.
Suffice it to say that the fact that the ESA has driven ecosystem planning is
the very reason for the governments alternative, train-wreck-avoiding, consensus approach. See supra note 562 and accompanying text (explaining that
the ESA has drawn a bottom line for ecosystem planning). The question, and
the question of this Article, is whether this approach can succeed without a
baseline of indicator species.
566. Before the listing of the salmon as endangered under the ESA, for example, discussions over the rapidly diminishing salmon runs on the Columbia
River had been continuing-without appreciable effect-for more than 20
years. See supra note 550 and accompanying text (noting the long-running
efforts to win concessions). Discussions over the depletion of old-growth forests, western rivers and the nearly full range of ecosystem losses had been
ongoing as well. See Noss & PETERS, supra note 2.
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planning has been superseded by more proactive, multiplespecies planning that is impressive in its scale and all the more
impressive for its first location: smack in the middle of some of
the most expensive, desirable and booming real estate in
America. 67
Settlement of southern California began at San Diego in
the mid-1700s, but had little impact on the land until the subsequent diversion of water, opening a near-desert ecosystem to
large scale development.5 68 Today, of the 2.5 million acres between Los Angeles and San Diego, only around 400,000 acres
(16%) remain in a natural state. Fifteen million people reside
here and the boom continues; raw real estate sells for $200,000
an acre, and ocean view property may sell for $2 million an
acre.169 Orange County occupies the northern tier of this region, and has earned a legendary reputation for its conservatism and its solicitous concern for commercial and private
property rights. An annual "patriotic slogan" contest for Orange Country public and private school students offered the
following examples of prize winning entries: 'Free Enterprise
Built America-Let's Keep Building," and "Forget the
Whales-Let's Save America." 7' This is not environmentalist
country, and any proposal to limit growth faces instinctual and
widespread opposition. For biodiversity planning, Orange
County was an acid test.
Inevitably, with the transformation of an ecosystem so
massive, the test would come, and it came in the form of an endangered species, the coastal California gnatcatcher.5 7 1 The
coastal gnatcatcher inhabited the original shrub and scrub
coastal desert from Los Angeles south into Mexico. Some 80 to
90% of this habitat has been lost to real estate development.5 12
In late 1990, environmentalists petitioned to list the gnat-

567. See Pat Brennan, O.C. Tries New Way to Save Wilderness, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Apr. 17, 1996, at Bi; see also Peter Steinhart, California'sBiodiversity Experiment, DEFENDERS, Fall 1994, at 11, 13-18.

568. See Raymond F. Dasmann, Embattled Eden, DEFENDERS, Fall 1994,
at 40, 42.
569. See Ronald B. Taylor, Crusade for the Gnatcatcher,DEFENDERS, Fall
1994, at 26, 30.
570. Americanism Education League (undated brochure, on file with
author).
571. See Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer, Californiavs. Gnatcatcher,
AUDUBON, Jan. 1, 1995, at 38, 102-04 (describing listing of gnatcatcher and
subsequent developments).
572. See Taylor, supra note 569, at 30.
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catcher under the federal ESA. The gnatcatcher was only the
first candidate species from this collapsing ecosystem; up to
one hundred more species were in the wings. Anticipating the
inevitable, California moved in April 1991 to avert the listing
by launching a "Natural Communities Conservation Planning
program" (NCCP) targeted, first, at the southern California
coastal shrub ecosystem. 73 The program was voluntary; landowners would enroll some of their properties for conservation,
in return for permission to develop the rest.57 4 The business
community was supportive, if not enthusiastic. Several environmental groups were more guarded, criticizing the absence of
specific goals and the rapid pace of development-more than
1,000 acres a year-which would continue before the planning
took effect. 575
Hobbled by this lack of consensus, the program moved forward nonetheless to enroll volunteers and even to secure voluntary agreements not to develop listed properties for eighteen
months. Once properties were listed, local governments would
assess the impacts of development proposals on coastal sage
scrub habitat, and "strongly consider" the advice of federal and
state wildlife agencies. At the same time, the program commissioned a scientific review panel of conservation biologists
and other specialists to assess the ecosystem and, more importantly, to develop guidelines for the ultimate conservation

573. Douglas P. Wheeler, An Ecosystem Approach to Species Protection,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 7, 8. Under the Natural Community Conservation Planning Act of 1991, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 28002840 (West Supp. 1997), the California Department of Fish and Game may
"enter into agreements with any person for the purpose of preparing and implementing a natural community conservation plan to provide comprehensive
management and conservation of multiple wildlife species. .. ." Id. § 2810.
This "planning may be undertaken by local, state and federal agencies independently or in cooperation with other persons." Id. § 2820. As an inducement for creating these agreements, section 2835, allows the "department [to]
permit the taking, as provided in this code, of any identified species whose
conservation and management is provided for in a department approved natural communities conservation plan," and section 2830 allows the same for
candidate [non-listed] species. Finally, section 2840 assures that the department will be adequately funded for these measures. In effect, the NCCP Act
creates a formal structure for voluntary contracts for multispecies protection,
in return for permitted takings of species.
574. See Deborah Schoch, Big Piece of Common Ground, L.A_ TIMES, Apr.
14, 1996, at Al; Natural Community Conservation Planning Act of 1991, CAL.
FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2800-2840 (West Supp. 1997).
575. See Steinhart, supra note 567, at 19.
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plan.57 6 This committee of scientists adopted what it saw as
the most logical tool for ecosystem protection: management
indicator species.
The Committee focused on three target species distributed
throughout the planning area-the California gnatcatcher, the
coastal cactus wren, and the orange-throated whiptail lizard. 7
It found existing information inadequate to formulate a longrange document; instead, it produced interim rules to guide
longer-term planning, and to curb short-term development. Its
rules are a case study in population viability analysis, moving
from inventory to analysis of dispersal characteristics, corridor
use and time-series data on abundance and distribution, followed by population projections and then by surveys to verify
the projections made. In the interim, development would be
limited to 5% of the remaining sage scrub habitat. It would,
further, avoid hotspots of biological diversity, and corridors
linking these hotspots to other critical areas. In the ultimate
plan, these restrictions would be implemented by categorizing
the diversity potential of this habitat as high, medium or low,
depending upon those principles of conservation biology urged
unsuccessfully in the Wisconsin cases: large, intact, unfragmented habitat at the top.578 In each planning region, 50% of
the sage scrub habitat would be designated as high value, 25 to
40% as intermediate, and 10 to 25% as low. 579 The Committee
left as little as possible to chance, politics, and subsequent
agency discretion.
Meanwhile, as the voluntary NCCP process was limping
forward with major, but by no means full, landowner participation, and under sniper fire from an increasingly impatient
environmental community, the U.S. Department of Interior
could no longer ignore the pending petitions to recognize the
endangered status of the California gnatcatcher and listed the
species as "threatened. 80 In so doing, Interior was careful to
576. See COMMMITrEE ON SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 84-87 (1995).

577. Id. at 85; Taylor, supra note 569, at 30.
578. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
579.

COMMMErEE ON SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT,

supra note 576, at 86-89.
580. Endangered Species Comm. of the Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of S. Cal. v.
Babbitt, 852 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1994) (invalidating listing because of failure
to meet procedural requirements); 58 Fed. Reg. 16,741 (1993) (to be codified at
50 C.F.R. pt. 17). For litigation over this listing, see 56 Fed. Reg. 47,053
(1991) (proposing to list the California gnatcatcher as a threatened species);
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preserve the NCCP process and to give the state and local governments additional flexibility to protect the ecosystem on
their own. What the federal listing did, in effect, was to transform the state program from voluntary to mandatory, leveling
the playing field among those landowners who were willing to
agree to a development-gnatcatcher compromise and those who
were not. Unwilling landowners would now face the sanctions
of the ESA, which they could only avoid by making a deal
similar to their neighbors. The compromise would involve setting aside the high value lands, in return for limited development in the low value habitat and development rights outside
of the sage scrub habitat area.
The upshot of the federal-state conservation planning is
captured in the sub-regional plan developed for Orange County
itself. 8 ' The sub-region includes over 208,000 acres, half of
which are still underdeveloped but under heavy development
pressure. Within that habitat, 30,833 acres of sage scrub support at least 44 rare plant and animal species, including approximately 600 pairs of gnatcatchers. Of this acreage, 5,336
acres of "low value" habitat are subject to development, leading
to the loss of an estimated 110 pairs; another 2,000 acres of low
value habitat will be taken by non-participating landowners
under the same guidelines." 2 In all, about 80% of the habitat,
and 80% of the breeding population, will be preserved. When
the full plan for the Los Angeles-to-San Diego corridor is implemented, it will protect approximately 380,000 acres, some
81,000 of which is occupied by coastal gnatcatchers and the
remainder by other management indicator species.5 83 With
some lingering outriders, the business community is largely on
board; the State is on board; the environmental community -is
on board. A miracle in southern California.
That results this dramatic could be produced in Orange
County is due to a number of factors, not least of which are
foresight and leadership at the state level, and creative and
sensitive use of the Endangered Species Act at the federal
level. The agencies were moved, no doubt, by a strong environmental community and by property owners themselves, who
saw the quality of their own lives crumbling before the conges59 Fed. Reg. 28,508 (1994) (noting invalidation of listing); and 60 Fed. Reg.
15,693 (1995) (affirming decision to list species).
581. 61 Fed. Reg. 27,363-64 (1996).
582. See id.
583. See Taylor, supra note 569, at 30.
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84
tion and pressure of continuing, unchecked development.
But the California NCCP was triggered in the first instance by
the articulated needs of a legally-protected indicator species,
the gnatcatcher. As California's Secretary of Natural Resources explained, "[W]ithout the very real threat of the regulatory power and control that accompany [ESA] listing, natural
58
The necommunity conservation planning could not work."
cessity of protecting the gnatcatcher brought landowners to the
table and kept them there.5 86 Tough odds called for precise
law.
The California program was made effective, moreover, not
by abstract consideration of an ecosystem, but rather, by the
scientific quantification of the needs of three representative
species. It was these needs that determined how much habitat
was required, and of what kind, and thus what would be developed and what would not. The mechanisms used to redirect
that development are the subject of other articles, and offer excellent additional lessons. 87 The lesson here is that, for an
objective, scientifically and politically-defensible limit to development in a climate by no means receptive to development constraints, California turned to indicator species. And it worked.

2. The Plum Creek Old-Growth Plan
If Orange County, California was the acid test for restraints on private housing development, Plum Creek Timber
588 Company-the "Darth Vader" of the Northwest forests
posed the ultimate challenge for environmental law'on private
timberland. Plum Creek was big, and it had an attitude. The
584. See Peter Steinhart, What Will California Tell the World About Saving Biodiversity?, DEFENDERS, Fall 1994, at 8, 8-9; see also Deborah Schoch,
PactCreates37,000-Acre Wildlife Preserve, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1996, at A3.

585. Steinhart, supra note 567, at 20 (quoting California's secretary
Douglas Wheeler). Mr. Wheeler further explained, "[Ilt is the prospect of
listings that creates the incentive for landowners to participate." Id.
586. See Lynn E. Dwyer et al., Avoiding the Trainwreck: Observations
From the Frontlinesof Natural Community ConservationPlanningin Southern California, ENDANGERED SPEcIES UPDATE, Dec. 12, 1995, at 5, 6

("A

target species approach made multiple species conservation planning goals
achievable.").
587. See, e.g., Thornton, supra note 526.
588. Dennis Farney, Unkindest Cut? Timber Firm Stirs Ire FellingForests
FasterThan They Regenerate; Burlington Northern Spinoff ClearcutsAncient
Stands Granted by Abe Lincoln; Spooked by CorporateRaiders, WALL ST. J.,
June 18, 1990, at Al (quoting Republican Congressman Rod Chandler of

Washington).
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company's "only concern," said Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus
after viewing a Plum Creek clearcut in 1987, was "cashing out
their equity at everyone else's expense."5 89 The following year,
as if to prove Andrus's point, the company was bulldozing a
logging road into prime elk habitat in northern Idaho, an area
proposed by both the State and its senior Senator as a wildlife
refuge.590 The following year it "jolted" Bozeman, Montana
5 9
with plans to cut a canyon prized for hiking and hunting. 1
Nothing seemed to stop Plum Creek. Today, Plum Creek is on
the leading edge of the most ambitious habitat conservation
plan yet designed for a private company.592 The plan will redirect its management and harvest programs on nearly 200,000
acres of private forest in the Cascade Mountains of Washington, for up to 100 years.5 93 Driving the plan, and forming the
baseline for its protections, are the habitat requirements of
indicator species.
Plum Creek is an important story not only because of the
steps it is now proposing, but also because it typifies the history and the psyche of the western timber industry and the
challenge they present to diversity and ecosystem protection.
Plum Creek's story begins, as with all the timber giants of
the American West, with the western railroads, which received
vast grants of land as incentives to reach the Pacific and occupy the continent.5 94 Burlington Northern Railroad would end
up with timber holdings second only to Weyerhauser in the
American West.5 95 The lands were granted in alternating
tracts a mile square, creating a checkerboard pattern of owner-

589. Id. (quoting Governor Andrus).
590. See id. The special management area had been proposed by Governor
Andrus and Senator Janus McClure. Id.
591. See id.
592. See Availability of a Final Environmental Impact Statement on the
Proposed Issuance of a Permit to Authorize Incidental Take of Threatened
and Endangered Species on Plum Creek Timber Company, L.P., Lands in the
1-90 corridor, King and Kittitas Counties, Washington, 61 Fed. Reg. 16,257,
16,257-58 (1996) [hereinafter Availability of a Final Environmental Impact
Statement]; see also Leslie Brown, Environmentalists Still Uneasy with Logging Plan,NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma), Apr. 15, 1996, at B3 (discussing the plan and
some reactions to it).
593. See Availability of a Final Environmental Impact Statement, supra
note 592, at 16,258.
594. See Timothy Egan, Montana's Sky and Its Hopes Are Left Bare After
Logging, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1993, at Al (The 1864 railroad land grants still
haunt much of the West....").
595. See Farney, supra note 588, at Al.
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ship hard to distinguish on the ground but increasingly apparent from the air. By the end of World War II, the clearcutting
had begun; in the words of one journalist, "[T]he landscape often looks as if it has been sprayed with buckshot. Clearcuts,
have cut holes in the forest
clumps of farms and subdivisions
5 96
fabric like measles and mange."
Burlington Northern managed its holdings passively until
the 1980s, when the company, attracted by the burgeoning
Japanese demand for raw timber, and seeking to boost its stock
values, created the Plum Creek subsidiary and turned it
loose.5 97 The result was a "cutting spree" at rates "that had not
been seen since the cut-and-run logging days of the last century."598 What Plum Creek saw as profit maximization, its
critics saw as "liquidation" of its timber resources. 99 By 1989,
the company was cutting 597 million board feet, with another
500 million scheduled for 1990 and 400 million for the years
ahead. 6°° The annual growth rate of Plum Creek forest was
perhaps as high as 250 to 300 million board feet; its own prospectus put it at 210 million.60 1 As one company official explained: "We have never said we were on a sustained-yield program and we have never been on a sustained-yield program.
Let's get to the heart of 60it.2 Sure its extensively logged, but
what is wrong with that?"
Plum Creek's clearcutting liquidated more than timber
and wildlife; it also liquidated small timber-dependent communities across Washington and Montana. Communities that
had long survived on sustained yield forestry were now going
into cycles of boom and bust, which always ended. at bust. °3
The company characterized growing public criticism of its
596. Bill Dietrich, Blueprint for Wildlife, Trees in the Works-Biologists
Look to Protect Whole Ecosystems, SEATTLE TIMES, July 7, 1991, at Bl; see
also Egan, supra note 594, at Al ("That [checkerboard] pattern on the map
looks the same on the ground in some parts of the state after a decade in
which the two big private timber companies [Plum Creek and Champion]
clear-cut their square mile patches.").
597. See Egan, supra note 594, at Al.
598. Id.
599. Farney, supra note 588, at Al (discussing Plum Creek's overall
growth).
600. See id.
601. See id.
602. Id.
603. Egan, supra note 594, at Al (outlining the process of boom and bust);
see also M.K Gefin, How Two Logging Towns Were Lost, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (Carson City), Mar. 8, 1993, at 14-15.
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practices as basically a "public relations problem." It tried to
sell off its stripped lands for real estate development, but found
few takers.6 ° Criticism continued to mount. Enter-once
again-the spotted owl.
The first-and most celebrated-effects of the spotted owl's
ESA listing were on the national forests intermingled with
Plum Creek holdings in the Pacific Cascades; 6° but the private
forests were not far behind. °6 Plum Creek found itself sitting
on the highest density of spotted owls and owl habitat on private lands in the State of Washington. 60 7 It responded by modifying its cut plans with "leave areas" around owl roosts and
"migration corridors" between, 60 8 but the circular leave areas
around owl roosts began to spread like measles on the map of
its holdings.60 9 Worse yet, the marbled murrelet, another rare
resident of these same forests, was about to be listed, and the
wide-roaming grizzly bear, wolf and other listed and candidate
species were in the wings.6 10 Once those circles were added,
604. See Farney, supra note 588, at Al (describing Plum Creek's reaction
to public criticism).
605. See infra notes 610-621 and accompanying text.
606. A 1992 HCP for the Simpson Timber Company, for example, set aside
owl habitat on its holdings in Northern California. Lehman, supra note 526,
at 18.
607. See James A. Kraft, General Counsel, Plum Creek Timber Company,
Habitat Based Multi-Species HCPs: Lessons from the Naturalist 3 (Symposium,
Biodiversity Protection: Implementation and Reform of the Endangered Species Act, University of Colorado School of Law, June 10-12, 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). Plum Creek has been surveying spotted
owls since 1982. A systematic project was begun in 1990, following the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service guidelines from PROTOCOLS FOR SURVEYING
PROPOSED MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES THAT MAY IMPACT NORTHERN SPOTTED

OWL (1991). In a cooperative effort between Plum Creek and the Forest
Service, it surveyed about three-quarters of the HCP area. Plum Creek Timber Co., LP., Cascades Habitat Conservation Plan, 75 (undated) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Plum Creek HCPI For instance, between 1991 and 1994
it found 39 nests and 54 fledglings in the planning area, mostly east of the
Cascade crest. Id. at 77. In 1993-1994, there were 94 adult birds monitored
in the planning area. Id. at 79.
608. Richard Larsen, A Reformed Sinner, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990,
at A17.
609. James A. Kraft, Address at the University of Colorado School of Law
Biodiversity Protection Symposium (June 11, 1996).
610. See Availability of a Final Environmental Impact Statement, supra
note 592, at 16,258. There are about 5,500 marbled murrelets in Washington.
The population size of murrelets within the Plum Creek HCP boundary is unknown, but it is believed to be small. Plum Creek HCP, supra note 607, at 88.
There are approximately 28 grizzly bears in Washington, with nine sightings
in the planning area between 1974 and 1991. Id. at 92. There were also seven
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the harvestable remainder would begin to resemble a gerrymandered voting district. Plum Creek had to come up with a
better approach.
The complexity of this job rivaled that of the FEMAT plan
on federal lands, 611 many of which lay check-by-jowl alongside
Plum Creek holdings. The total planning area was more than
400,000 acres, nearly half of it Plum Creek land.6 12 The company spent over $1.2 million developing its Habitat Conservation Plan, and eighteen months negotiating it with the Department of Interior.6 13 The analytical method was to prepare
and link detailed inventories of forest and wildlife resources,
providing a matrix of habitats to support multiple indicator
species.6 14 The four primary wildlife indicators were the owl,
murrelet, grizzly, and wolf, although about two dozen other
species of "special emphasis" were also identified. 615 The main
protections, however, radiate from the owl. Each spotted owl
was allotted a 1.8 mile radius habitat circle; 61 6 107 such circles
were drawn in the total planning area, 67 of them on Plum
Creek land. 17 Additional protections were extended for foraggray wolf sightings in the planning area between 1992 and 1994, all on the
eastern side of the Cascade crest. Id. at 100.
611. See supra notes 121-130 and accompanying text (describing FEMAT's
undertakings).
612. See Plum Creek HCP, supra note 607, at 62. The total planning area
was over 400,000 acres-201,801 managed by the U.S. Forest Service, 169,177
by Plum Creek and approximately 41,000 other owners. Id.
613. See Kraft, supra note 607, at 3. The demand for Plum Creek's supporting documents has been so great that the company has proposed a list of
its 17 major outputs which are available for purchase for a total of $405. The
Company provided a copy of the Habitat Conservation Plan to the author at
no charge.
614. Plum Creek's forest inventory carried the symbolic acronym
FIBRPLAN. See Plum Creek HCP, supra note 607, at 62. FIBRPLAN is a
computer model used to define when stands of timber are available for harvest. See id. at 61. Plum Creek's inventory classified "each stand of forest
polygon by tree species, size class, and stocking level." Id. Inventories and
management units for other landowners in the planning area were also developed. See id. at 62-63. Field data, management unit information, and yield
models were fed into the FIBRPLAN Forest Landscape Simulator, creating a
"State of the Forest Data Profiling Future Forest Landscape" including stand
structure, owl habitat, other lifeform habitat, economic evaluations, harvest
scheduling, and timber inventory. See id. at 67. The data generated were
combined with maps from the Geographical Information System to create a
visual schematic showing how owl and other habitats will change over time,
given harvest and regrowth rates. See id. at 68.
615. Id. at 62-100.
616. See id. at 62.
617. See id. at 76.
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ing and dispersal habitat.6 18 To these were added leave areas
for wolves and bears, limits on road densities and the retention
of ground cover.6 19 Wildlife habitats were further protected by
enlarged buffers along streams and across wetlands. 2 0 The
major emphasis of the plan, however, and its primary protection, derived not so much from these reserves as from deferrals
in harvest schedules that would leave larger tracts of older
trees standing for longer periods of time.6 21 Over time, the owl
circles would move. The combined effect of these restrictions
and deferrals was to reduce harvests by up to 90% in some locations, and by lesser degrees in others, with no harvest reductions in some areas.62 2 This was timber management, not
wilderness, and the plan was clearly a compromise.
Whether the compromise will ultimately prove enough for
the species remains to be seen. As critics have pointed out, the
plan protects current populations, not areas inhabitable by
them, which could be necessary to their restoration.6 23 Worse,
it might fail to support even those numbers now known and
identified. Anticipating this contingency, the plan calls for
continuous monitoring and for its own renegotiation in
"extraordinary circumstances" that might jeopardize the species in question.6 24 Short of that event, however, the plan, its
protections and its harvest schedules will continue for the next

618. See id.
619. See id. at 92-100; see also Availability of a Final Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 592, at 16,258 (noting the addition of leave areas
for additional species).
620. See Availability of a Final Environmental Impact Statement, supra
note 592, at 16,258; see also Conservation Planning Under Section 10 of the
Endangered Species Act and Other Private Land Initiatives, 104th Cong.
(1996) (statement of William J. Snape III, Legal Director, Defenders of Wild-

life).
621. See Brown, supra note 592, at B3 (describing the importance of deferring harvest schedules).
622. Plum Creek divided the planning area into three types. In the most
restrictive, it assumed an annual harvest of 2 million board feet for 20 years,
a 10% removal of harvestable volume; in the next most restrictive, an annual
harvest of 5 million board feet for 50 years, a 50% removal of harvestable volume; in areas of the HCP with no owl restrictions, it assumed the use of traditional harvest methods and an annual harvest of 8 million board feet forever, a 90% removal rate.
623. See Availability of a Final Environmental Impact Statement, supra
note 592, at 16,258 (noting critiques of the plan).
624. Brown, supra note 592, at B3; Kraft, supra note 607, at 5.
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fifty years, and for up to fifty years beyond
that so long as habi6 25
tat is provided above the specified levels.
The proof of the Plum Creek plan will be years in the
knowing. The purpose of this analysis is neither to praise nor
to criticize it, but rather to show how far Plum Creek came in
getting to it, literally from the rear of the pack to somewhere
close to the front. Doubtless, the company was motivated by
the beating it was taking in public relations from such unusual
quarters as state governors, members of Congress and the Wall
626 But when
Street Journal.
push came to shove, it was the defined, empirical needs of protected species that drew the circles, brushed in the corridors and stretched out the harvest rotations to more nearly mimic a natural forest environment.
"More nearly mimic" will not satisfy everyone; perhaps it will
not even satisfy the basic needs of creatures in considerable
peril. But given the history of Plum Creek, it has been an incredible journey, and without legally-protected indicator species there is no reason to think that it would ever have occurred.
C. EXPANDING THE ESA: THE WORKING GROUP PROPOSALS
It should be clear from the foregoing examples of Endangered Species Act planning that the Act-despite a chorus of
criticism that it "fails to address ecosystems"--is addressing
some badly battered ecosystems on a very large scale, and
nudging forward the long-overdue process of their repair. In so
doing, the Act has offended a landscape of vested interests
that, up to now, have avoided any serious accommodation with
the natural world. In 1996, the Endangered Species Act was
slated for reauthorization; from this landscape of real and
imagined adversaries came a shopping list of "reform" proposals, each designed to weaken a central feature of the program.62 Partly because of their extremism and partly because

625. See Kraft, supra note 607, at 6.
626. For an example of Plum Creek's eventual sensitivity to the criticism it
was receiving, see Larsen, supra note 608, at A17.
627. The lead vehicle for the development community in 1996 was H.R.
1490, introduced by Representatives Tauzin (D-La) and Fields (R-Tex). H.R.
1490, 103d Cong. (1993). Among other features, the bill slowed the ESA listing process, required new benefit-cost analysis, emphasized captive breeding
in lieu of habitat protection, expanded compensation to landowners for ESA
protection, and limited citizen enforcement suits. See id. For the role of industry in drafting these same proposals on the Senate side, see Timothy
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of their eclipse by an oncoming presidential campaign, the
amendments died in the 104th Congress. One proposal with a
serious chance of passage, however, and with an equally serious chance of being the lead vehicle in future reauthorization,
was engineered by an unusual coalition of environmental and
industry lawyers working with members of the House of Representatives and called the "ESA Working Group." 628 The
Group's proposal met with strong criticism from both the development and the environmental community, 629 the merits of
which are beyond the scope of this study. Within the scope,
however, are its attempt to take the ESA into broader, ecosystem planning on private lands and the vehicle it chose for doing so.
At the heart of the Working Group bill were "Natural Systems Conservation Plans" designed to protect, restore or enhance "identified ecosystems, natural communities, or habitat
types" on which endangered species depend.6 3 ° The plans, once
approved, would act as multiple-species Habitat Conservation
Plans, guaranteeing future development within the planning
area consistent with their conditions. The strength of these
guarantees-they waived other federal laws, 631 had no time
limits, and were irrevocable, except for the breach of a condition, even if jeopardy or a new endangered species were discovered 6 3 2 -makes the obvious question all the more important:
what was the bottom line? The bottom line was indicator spe63
cies.

Egan, IndustriesAffected by the EndangeredSpecies Act Help a Senator Rewrite Its Provisions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, at A20.
628. See Margaret Kriz, On A Rocky Middle Path, 28 NAT'L J. 825, 826
(1996) (explaining the cooperation between industry lawyers, environmental
lawyers, and members of the House of Representatives). For a full description
of the ESA Working Group proposal, see Win. Robert Irvin, Endangered Species Act Reform Proposals:
An Environmentalist's Perspective 3-6
(Symposium, Biodiversity Protection: Implementation and Reform of the Endangered Species Act, University of Colorado School of Law, June 10-12,
1996)(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Mr. Irvin was a leading
participant in the Working Group.
629. See Margaret Kriz, The CenterFolds, 28 NAT'L J. 1469, 1469-70 (1996)
(describing the criticisms levied from both sides of the issue).
630. H.R., 105th Cong. § 6 (1997) (discussion draft of a bill introduced by
Representative Jim Saxton (R-N.J.)).
631. See id. § 6(5) (waiving section 7 of the National Environmental Policy
Act); id. § 6(8) (waiving section 9 of the National Environmental Policy Act).
632. See id. § 6(6).
633. See id. § 5(3)(E).
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The Natural Systems Conservation Plans depend on two
The first, called "indicator species,"
types of indicators.
"collectively served as general indicators of the well being of
the ecosystems," and served as surrogates "so as to minimize"
the need to designate additional species. 634 These choices appeared to be exclusively based on science, and included the
classic flagship and umbrella species of conservation biology;
they would not include, one would hope, the "desired species"
category that has opened the door for raccoons and white-tailed
deer. The second class of indicators was "specialized species,"
and included officially-recognized endangered, threatened, and
candidate species as well as "any other species of comparable
rarity or vulnerability" according to a state natural heritage or
wildlife agency. 635 So far so good. Then, the bill faltered.
In approving a Natural Systems Conservation Plan, the
Secretary of Interior was to find that, "based on the effects of
the plan on the indicator and specialized species identified,"
the plan provided "reasonable certainty" that the habitat
within the plan area would support the species. 636 The Secretary was, further, required to disapprove a plan if it was "likely
to jeopardize" an indicator or specialized species or cause an
unlisted species to become threatened or endangered.6 3 7 Setting aside questions of "reasonable certainty" and burdens of

634. Id. § 5(2)(C). It is less clear, however, whether these species include
all taxonomic groups, including plants, flmgi and other, some would say necessary, indicators of ecosystem health.
635. Id. § 6(1)(D).
636. Id. § 6(3)(E). The provision reads:
[Biased upon the effects of the plan on the indicator and specialized
species identified in such planning agreement, provides reasonable
certainty that such ecosystems, natural communities, or habitat
types will be maintained in the plan area throughout the life of the
plan. . . in sufficient quality, distribution, and extent to support
within the plan area those species typically associated with such ecosystems, natural communities, or habitat types ....
Id. § 3(E).
637. Id. § 6(4). The provision reads:
[Tihe Secretary shall disapprove a plan if the Secretary determines,
based upon the best available scientific and commercial data, that
implementation of the plan(A) is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any indicator or
specialized species identified in the planning agreement; or
(B) will cause any indicator or specialized species not endangered or
threatened at the time of plan submission to become threatened or
endangered ....
See id. § 6(4).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

974

[Vol. 81:869

proof-which, given the degree of uncertainty that surrounds
the exact needs of reclusive species, can be critical 6 3 8-there is
an obvious difference between supporting an indicator species
within the plan area and taking action so drastic as to jeopardize its existence. The former requirement is similar to that of
the current Forest Service diversity regulations: viable populations, well-distributed across the planning area.639 The latter
is very much the approach of the Service's proposed revisions,
which allow any disturbance short of one that causes endangerment or outright extirpation at the local level."
These and other provisions of the ESA Working Group
proposal are certain to receive more scrutiny in the 105th Congress, under whatever bill number and sponsorship they
emerge. Germane to this analysis is the fact that, in reaching
towards ecosystem protection from the Endangered Species
Act, they chose to broaden the class of target species from
which protective planning was to proceed. So choosing, they
seem to have cured some of the existing problems with indicator species selection. They also, however, fell into the trap of
leaving the degree of protection largely up to discretion and
good faith. A requirement that ecosystem plans avoid jeopardy
to listed species imposes no bottom line that does not already
exist in law. If ecosystems are actually going to be "protected,
enhanced and restored" by the use of indicator species, then we
are going to have to commit ourselves to "protecting, enhancing
and restoring" those species and their habitats more affirmatively, and not simply to preventing their extirpation.
V.

REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM PROTECTION
The law of diversity and ecosystem protection is at a crossroads. Looking back over our shoulders we can see that single
species management has been fairly effective-in some cases
wildly effective-in promoting the success of individual species
and the habitats on which they depend. This approach has be638. This problem has been the focus of strong criticism from the environmental community. See, e.g., Suellen Lowry, Concerns Regarding ESA Working
Group Proposal (undated) (on file with author). Mr. Lowry is an attorney
with the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund.
639. See supra Part H-A (discussing the Service's regulations).
640. See supra Part H.C (discussing the Service's proposed regulations).
For the havoc this approach has brought to commercial fisheries, see supra
Part IH.A (discussing the approach's effect on the New England fishery).
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gun to lose its steam, however, as more species and more habitats come into view. The temptation to shed our concerns for
individual species in favor of conservation on a more holistic,
landscape level is strong. All the more so where single species
protections require us to make specific and difficult accommodations, while landscape conservation can be assigned to the
realm of planning and discretion. At bottom, species-based
protection is law. Ecosystem management, as currently promoted, is politics with a strong flavor of law-avoidance.6 1
This conclusion in no way gainsays the need to think, plan
and act on a landscape level. Every commentary made in favor
of ecosystem management is correct on this point: without
landscape-level thinking, over time, the ship sinks. But the
great paradox of this, the ultimate issue in natural resources
law, is that while we cannot save species without saving the
whole, as a practical matter we cannot save the whole unless
we focus on species-and build up from there. 642 Our best
choice at the current crossroads, therefore, is not to take one or
the other fork, but to take them both. Landscape-level planning-to the extent it is based on principles such as island geography, gap analysis and other tenets of conservation biology-will allow us to identify, acquire where necessary, and
manage more proactively virtually all pieces of the mosaic.
What it will rarely be able to do, however-for whatever lands
are identified, acquired or reserved in any category short of
wilderness-is justify a reduction in animal unit months on an
allotment north of Reno, Nevada or the reservation of minimum stream flows in the San Pedro River. As these decisions
escalate to larger and more difficult scales, as they have in the
Pacific Northwest and coastal southern California, if we want
to impose a measure of restraint on our own behavior we will
641. See supra notes 330-365, 411-421 and accompanying text (describing
the political nature of ecosystem management). The true test of any conservation policy is not what it would allow a Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt
to do, but what it would allow a Secretary of Interior James Watt to do. See
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, MARCHING BACKwARDS: THE DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR UNDER JAMES G. WATT (1982). On this measuring stick, the

prospect of ecosystem management replacing viable population requirements
has to be sobering.
642. One prominent scientist in the field of conservation biology has concluded: "Although ecosystem management is the buzzword of the day; management of individual species on a population or metapopulation level remains a necessary part of any conservation strategy." Reed F. Noss, Some
Principles of ConservationBiology as They Apply to Environmental Law, 69
Cm.-KENT L. REV. 893, 900 (1994).
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find ourselves looking to the objective, quantifiable needs of the
owl, the gnatcatcher and the silvery minnow. 3 Not because
they are the desired result, but because they are an effective
mechanism for conservation and change.
One message of this study is that it can be done. The experience of FEMAT and the Pacific Northwest plan, the Tongass interagency report, southern California's NCCP, and
Plum Creek's FIBRPLAN is that biologists can look to multiple
indicator species, overlay their needs, and arrive at a bottom
line that is defensible in law, enforceable, and sufficiently
flexible to allow management options. Indeed, indicator species, umbrella species, keystone species are the only way that it
is being done. They are as far as science can go in delineating
exactly how much of an identified ecosystem must remain.
Another lesson emerging from more routine forest planning examined in this study is that, for a species-based process
to work, it must be honest in selecting its baseline and its indicators. To identify the natural system as whatever humans
have made of it or may want it to be, and to select species on
the basis of their popularity or tolerance of human disturbance
is abusive and shameless; fortunately, it is also correctable
through a process that places biological decisions in. the hands
of biologists, where they belong. The determination of what an
ecosystem requires to retain its contribution to diversity islike a decision on whether a species is sufficiently rare to be
listed as endangered, or sufficiently threatened by a proposed
action as to be in jeopardy-a factual, scientific call. Whether
humans want to abide by that determination is another question. But there is no reason to distort it. Other than, of course,
that it is unwelcome news.
Why is it that indicator species work? Granted, they are
by no means perfect surrogates for ecosystems and, granted
again, the proof of their requirements can be complex and demanding for scientists operating at the far edge of data and
predictability and trained to conclude nothing until all possible
alternative hypotheses, however remote, have been disproved.
643. The converse is equally true. For examples of planning failures for
want of a standard, see Stephen C. Trambulak, The Northern Forest: Conservation Biology, Public Policy and a Failure of Regional Planning, 11 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Dec. 1994, at 7 (describing an extended, fruitless planning effort for New England forests and concluding: "We must be
aware of the danger.., of legitimizing 'business as usual' under a veneer of
'consensus building' and participatory democracy"), and supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the "Colorado Model" rangelands).
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Nonetheless, indicators work because, in the end, they produce
specifics. 6 " Viewed from a different but related perspective,
they work because they remove the impossible factor from the
equation: the ecosystem of human beings. Determining the essential minima of the sage shrub community of coastal California based on the gnatcatcher and other indicators is indeed
difficult, and at times will be open to legitimate scientific challenge; but it is at least possible. Determining, on' the other
hand, what a "desired" ecosystem of coastal California should
look like given what we have already done to it and are going
to continue to do as fast as we can is not, in any legal sense,
remotely possible. Once you put humans into the baseline, the
standards disappear into a smudge of "multiple use," "optimal
yield," and "people-are-part-of-ecosystems" rhetoric of the
emerging and highly political federal process. Which is why,
for federal managers, they are so tempting. They slip the
shackles of law.
The great and current danger is that federal agencies will
succumb to this temptation. There is every reason to encourage their enlarged visions of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem and the Northern Rockies, but there is every reason to fear
their abandonment of indicator species to establish the necessary protections-until species are reduced to the point of endangerment. It is scary to see this trend emerge in proposed
Forest management regulations, and be mimicked by the land
managers of BLM and fishery managers of NMFS. There is
more at work here than enthusiasm for an attractive new concept. There is at least an equal enthusiasm to avoid being
driven by the needs of species into making very hard decisions.
The emerging ecosystem approach is friendly and nonthreatening; it perpetuates business-as-usual and defers the
hard decisions to a later day. If I were a Regional Forester or
BLM manager, I might find that option quite attractive-right
up until the time I saw the need to make some changes. At
which point I would be begging for some indicator species to

644. The dependence of pollution control law on specificity is longstanding
and linear. Progress in air, water, and waste management is measured and
achieved through ambient and technology-based standards that-although
influenced by the political process-are objectively derived, numerical, and
enforceable. By contrast, natural resources law has been characterized by
nearly unlimited discretion, and correspondingly uneven performance. Management indicators provide a first step towards objectivity for managing the
land base of the country. None too soon.
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back me up. At which point I might well be told: "Hell, they're
not endangered yet are they?"
The ultimate question is whether we will restrain ourselves to accommodate the natural world. It is the question in
all of environmental law, but it is raised with particular poignancy in those laws that deal with resource management and
development because they contain few hard restraints at all.
Except, of course, for the Endangered Species Act. What the
ESA does, in effect, is draw a small (but growing) number of
circles of enforceable restraint around the nests, breeding
grounds, and habitats of a few creatures on the brink of extinction. The plight of these creatures may, but does not always, reflect the plight of the ecosystems they inhabit. It is
now up to us to say whether we are willing to draw larger concentric rings around keystone, flagship, indicator species for
the natural systems of this earth-and adhere to them. Not to
wall ourselves out of them, but to limit our conduct within
them by the predicted needs of the species and their support
systems. The conclusion of this study is that it can be done.
In the final analysis, it is important to have a process to
work collaboratively towards landscape conservation on the
largest possible scale. We can call this process "ecosystem
management" if we wish, and Godspeed. But it is also important to motivate people to collaborate, and to give all parties a
line below which the result may not fall. We may call this line
"species diversity," and we should never lose it from view.
VI. EPILOGUE
Perhaps the most endearing story of the Bible is Noah's
Ark, in which we see that Noah-albeit with less than enthusiasm and good grace-saves the wildlife of the world. From
which we conclude that the God-Noah combination is not only
impressively powerful but also, basically, compassionate.
Much of the literature surrounding the Endangered Species
Act and, more recently, biodiversity law, repeats the same allegory: compassionate stewards that we are, like Noah, we are
saving the creatures.
In so concluding, we may have the point backwards. What
we miss is that Noah and his crew were saved too. And the
reason they were saved is that they were the ones who were
carrying the animals. The animals brought Noah home.
The conclusion of this study is that, whatever else we may
do in the name of maintaining the natural world, we need the
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animals as much as Noah did. If we ignore them, we sink. If
we focus on saving them, they will bring us home.

